RUSSIA  &  DEMOCRACY : 

THE  GERMAN  CANKER  IN  RUSSIA. 


RUSSIA  &  DEMOCRACY: 

THE  GERMAN  CANKER  IN  RUSSIA. 


BY 


G.  DE  WESSELITSKY, 


WITH  A  PREFACE 
BY 

HENRY  CUST. 


PUBLISHED  FOR 

THE  CENTRAL  COMMITTEE 

FOR  NATIONAL  PATRIOTIC  ORGANIZATIONS, 

62,  CHARING  CROSS,  LONDON, 

BY- 

DUFFIELD  &  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK. 

1916. 


Printed  in  Great  Britain, 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

PREFACE           v 

CHAPTER 

I.     FROM  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  STATE  TO 
THE  ACCESSION  OF  PETER  THE  GREAT  (A.D.  862- 

1682)            3 

II.  PETER  THE  GREAT  (1682-1725)   7 

III.  FROM  PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  CATHERINE  THE 

GREAT  (1725-1762)     10 

IV.  CATHERINE  THE  GREAT  (1762-1796)    16 

V.  PAUL  I.  (1796-1801) ;  ALEXANDER  I.  (1801-1825)  20 

VI.  NICHOLAS  I.  (1825-1855)   27 

VII.     ALEXANDER  II.  (1855-1881)            37 

VIII.     ALEXANDER  III.  (1881-1894)          49 

IX.     THE  PRESENT  REIGN  :   PERIOD  OF  CONSERVATISM 

(1894-1905)  ...                   54 

X.     PERIOD  OF  PROGRESS  (1905-1915) 69 

XI.     RECAPITULATION  AND  CONCLUSIONS          82 

POSTSCRIPT      87 

INDEX             93 


PREFACE. 


THE  enlightenment  of  war  may  be  counted  among  the  very 
few  advantages  war  brings  to  man.  War  strips  bare  and 
illuminates  what  peace  disguises  and  huddles  away.  And  this 
is  true  not  only  of  men  and  nations,  but  of  attitudes  of  mind 
and  trends  of  thought  and  policy,  of  which,  after  dim  movings 
and  returnings,  appearances  and  vanishings,  the  long  results 
stand  suddenly  apart  and  clear ;  unexpected,  but,  it  seems, 
inevitable.  Things  futile  and  fortuitous  are  seen  as  ordered 
processes ;  and  the  unmeaning  takes  on  significance.  This  war 
has  already  left  many  men  and  nations  mother-naked,  and 
later  has  exposed,  for  good  or  for  bad,  the  very  nerves  of  their 
spines  and  the  convolutions  of  their  brains.  The  world  went 
travelling  a  year  ago,  and  discovered  Germany,  France  and 
England,  nations  hitherto  unknown  ;  discovered  them  equipped 
with  a  psychology,  histology,  pathology,  &c.,  undreamed-of 
by  the  newest  science.  But,  in  judging  Russia,  who  was  also 
girding  her  loins,  men  were  the  more  perplexed,  because  their 
means  of  diagnosis,  especially  of  political  diagnosis,  were  scant 
and  faulty.  Here  was  a  state  of  mind  which  seemed  of  sudden 
birth  ;  an  impulse,  a  conviction,  a  unity,  a  faith ;  a  creed,  un- 
preached,  unformulated,  and  yet  of  perfervid  and  overmastering 
vehemence.  Whence  grew  the  flame  and  whither  was  its  blasting 
heat  directed  ? 

We  have  heard  much  of  Russia  in  the  last  thirty  years,  but 
in  the  main  of  modern  Russia  only.  Of  old  Russia,  the  Russia 
of  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries,  where  the  roots  of  Russia 
lie  deep,  there  is  little  reading  to-day.  Alexander  Gwagninus 
and  Paulus  Oderbornius  we  may  reasonably  leave  unopened. 


VI  PREFACE. 

Even  Samuel  Purchas  found  in  them  nothing  but  "  huskes, 
shels  and  rumours."  But  the  close-packed  stories  of  Giles 
Fletcher  and  Sir  Jerome  Horsey,  ambassadors  of  Elizabeth  to 
Ivan  IV.,  and  go-betweens  in  that  astounding  passage  of  love 
and  commerce ;  of  Richard  Chanceler,  shipmate  and  co- 
adventurer  of  Sir  Hugh  Willoughby ;  of  George  Turbervile, 
writer  of  verse ;  of  Anthony  Jenkinson  and  of  Robert  Best ; 
of  the  Italians,  Paolo  Giovio,  Contarini  and  Barbaro  ;  of  the 
Germans,  Sigismund  von  Herberstein  and  Olearius  ;  ending  \vith 
the  stately  pages  and  glorious  engravings  of  Corneille  Le  Brun  ; 
all  these  paint  us  the  Russian  picture  and  the  men  who  thought 
and  wrought  and  fought  within  its  frame,  in  a  style  of  mingled 
breadth  and  detail  which  has  lost  nothing  of  freshness  or 
value. 

Here  are  the  blood  and  bones  and  body  of  the  Russian 
stock  from  which  derived,  sequentially  and  logically,  Orloff 
and  Potemkin,  Suvaroff  and  Koutousoff,  Pushkin,  Turgenieff, 
Tolstoy,  and  Dostoievsky  ;  but  with  which  half  the  famous 
names  in  later  Russian  history  have  nothing  whatever  to  do. 
And  it  may  well  be  that  the  stress  that  has  been  lately  laid  on 
Russian  phenomena,  some  partly  alien,  some  wholly  exotic, 
both  in  literature  and  art,  has  led  to  a  forgetfulness  of  the 
broad  human  foundation  of  the  Russian  people. 

The  mighty  revolution  of  Peter  the  Great  made  rather  for 
division  than  for  union  among  the  Russians.  That  swashing 
blow  at  custom  and  tradition  was  too  swift  to  be  profound  or 
abiding,  and  the  Master's  need  for  intelligent  foreigners  to 
execute  his  plans  sowed  germs  of  a  disease  which  came  near  to 
suffocate  the  healthy  national  life  he  thought  to  establish. 
Russia  was  divided  and  in  some  sense  has  remained  divided  until 
to-day.  There  has  been  a  Russia  looking  out  of  the  window  and  a 
Russia  inhabiting  the  house,  but  the  face  has  not  interpreted 
the  body.  It  has  given  a  false  presentment  of  the  truth  behind 
it,  and  in  it  alien  blood  has  circulated.  To  shift  the  image,  the 


PREFACE.  VU 

stream  of  the  people's  life  has  flowed  on  and  in  time  brought 
flower  and  fruit  to  birth,  a  generous  harvest  for  the  world  to 
wonder  at  and  seek  to  understand.  The  true  character  of  the 
Russians  silently  enlarged  and  fixed  its  type.  Late  learners  they 
were,  but  their  character  was  founded  deep  in  sheer  simplicity 
and  brought  simplicity's  attending  dangers.  For  simplicity  may 
most  easily  be  led  astray  into  the  perverse  paths  of  cunning  and 
weakness,  before  it  shall  find  at  last  its  natural  and  inevitable 
heritage  of  sincerity  and  strength.  Russia,  half  in  blindness, 
half  in  compulsion,  wandered  under  perfidious  guidance  from  the 
way,  and  has  to-day  regained  it. 

And  so  it  is  that  you  find  the  Russia  of  to-day  as  has  been 
sketched  above.  For  to-day  Russia  is  getting  rid  of  Germany. 
Two  hundred  years  of  tyranny,  of  suppression,  of  paralysis 
are  being  realised  almost  for  the  first  time,  and  in  that 
realisation  are  being  swept  away.  Two  long  centuries  of 
reaction,  of  intrigue,  of  exploitation,  of  perfidy,  and  of  false 
sacrifice,  are  going  up  in  gunpowder  along  the  banks  of  the  San. 
And  millions  of  men  feel  a  new  hope  in  a  new  heart,  and  lift 
undazzled  eyes  to  a  dawn  which  they  had  grown  at  last  to  believe 
would  never  break.  The  mighty  work  of  Peter  is  purged  of  the 
long  slow  poison  it  trailed  in  its  traces,  and  Russia  comes  to  her 
o\vn  at  last.  And  how  this  fell,  this  book  is  written  to  relate. 

For  this  is  not  a  book  on  Russia.  It  is  a  closely  knit  political 
study  of  two  hundred  years  of  Russian  history,  in  which  a  great 
people  went  near  to  ruin  and  has  won  through  to  power  and  great- 
ness, and,  it  may  be  hoped,  to  happiness  such  as  it  has  never 
known.  And  the  author  is  perhaps  the  most  competent  living  man 
to  write  it.  Of  his  perfect  devotion  to  the  cause  of  Anglo-Russian 
friendship  I  have  had  the  fullest  means  of  judging  for  near  a 
quarter  of  a  century.  Of  his  utter  loyalty  and  integrity  I  have 
had  the  same  experience.  His  personal  acquaintance  with 
Napoleon  III.  and  Bismarck,  to  mention  but  two  names,  adds  a 
quality  of  immediacy  to  his  work.  "  No  man  perhaps  has  shown 


Viii  PREFACE. 

me  more  kindness/'  he  wrote  to  me  once,  "  than  Prince  Bismarck  ; 
though  no  personal  gratitude  could  prevail  against  national 
feeling.  And  his  greatest  act  of  kindness  was  the  knowledge  of 
the  realities  in  politics,  which  I  derived  from  discussing  with  him 
every  possible  eventuality.  Of  all  my  teachers  I  owe  him  most/1 
And  he  added  curiously,  "  My  next  greatest  teacher  was  Leo 
XIII."  In  such  a  school  of  high  policy,  where  action  alternated 
with  state-craft,  M.  de  Wesselitsky  won  his  fine  international 
position.  By  his  steadfast  loyalty  to  the  central  idea  of  an  Anglo- 
French-Russian  Alliance,  the  old  historic  aim  of  Peter  the 
Great,  he  earned  and  has  retained  the  distinction  of  the  cordial 
dislike  and  dread  of  Germany  and  Austria,  in  whose  journals  he 
is  constantly  abused.  For  this  he  has  his  reward  to-day. 

As  President  for  some  fifteen  years  of  the  Foreign  Press 
Association  in  London  he  has  gathered  fresh  store  of  influence, 
respect  and  affection.  England  and  Russia  owe  him  much,  and 
by  this  new  and  most  original  volume  he  adds  to  the  debt.  It 
is  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  yet  larger  recognition  for  such  generous 
service  that  I  have  ventured  at  the  wish  of  my  friend  to  write 
this  introduction. 

HENRY  GUST. 


RUSSIA   AND   DEMOCRACY: 

THE  GERMAN  CANKER  IN  RUSSIA. 


RUSSIANS  who  reside  in  England  are  agreeably  impressed 
by  the  fact  that  the  English  political  world  and  English  Society 
of  to-day  show  cordial  appreciation  of  the  actual  progress 
of  Russia  and  of  her  culture  in  general.  They  are,  moreover, 
deeply  touched  by  the  warm  recognition  of  the  efforts  of 
Russia  to  do  her  duty  by  her  Allies  in  the  present  war.  The 
writer  hears,  however,  that  there  are  earnest  and  sincere  men 
in  this  country  and  in  the  United  States  who  think  she  is 
still  the  same  Russia  she  was  at  the  time  of  the  Crimean 
War,  and  who  consider  an  alliance  with  her  as  incompatible 
with  the  struggle  of  Democracy  against  Military  Despotism. 

We  Russians  can  confidently  leave  to  our  English  friends 
the  task  of  clearing  up  those  misunderstandings  and  of  bringing 
home  to  the  larger  public  an  up-to-date  knowledge  of  Russia 
as  she  really  is.  This  is  already  being  done  very  ably  and 
consistently  in  articles  and  books  on  Russia,  as  well  as  in  the 
daily  communications  of  British  correspondents  in  Russia. 
The  above-mentioned  objections,  however,  touch  on  a  very 
important  question  on  which  it  is  well  worth  while  to  throw 
a  clear  and  true  light,  particularly  at  the  present  moment, 

B 


2  RUSSIA   AND   DEMOCRACY. 

SSbtrty°apndosed    VIZ">  whether  there  really  exists  an  opposition  between  liberty 

democracy  ? 

and  democracy  on  one  side  and  Russia  on  the  other.  An 
adequate  answer  to  this  question  cannot  be  found  in  one  stage 
or  in  one  feature  of  Russian  development.  It  must  be  sought 
in  the  whole  course  of  her  history,  in  her  fundamental 
institutions,  in  her  national  life  and  character. 

G.  DE  W. 


CHAPTER   I. 

FROM  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  STATE  TO  THE 
ACCESSION  OF  PETER  THE  GREAT  (A.D.  862-1682). 

For  many  centuries  preceding  the  foundation  of  the  Russian 
State  the  Slavs  of  Russia  lived  in  small,  self-governing,  mostly 
agricultural  communities,  all  members  of  which  were  free  and 
equal ;  they  did  not  owe  allegiance  to  feudal  chiefs  and  waged 
no  wars  of  plunder  or  of  conquest.  All  their  local  affairs  were 
decided,  in  towns,  by  the  Vetche,  and  in  villages,  by  the 
Mir,  an  assembly  of  heads  of  families.  Only  in  vital  matters 
the  decision  rested  with  the  elders  of  the  tribe.  In  the  vast 

peasantry  of 

Empire  of  Russia  of  to-day  the  great  bulk  of  the  population  ^-^ 
is  still  living  in  villages  with  the  same  primeval  Mirs.  The 
life  and  character  of  the  immense  majority  of  the  Russians 
can  hardly  be  said  to  have  essentially  changed  through  all 
the  evolutions  of  the  Russian  history.  Left  to  themselves, 
the  Russians  always  reverted  to  the  same  kind  of  existence. 
The  necessity  of  defending  themselves  against  foreign 
aggression  alone  produced  various  superstructures  over  their 
primitive  society. 

The  appeal  made  to  the  Varanger  princes  was  the  first  step  Democratic  Re 
in  the  way  of  permanently  securing  the  safety  and  indepen- 
dence of  the  country.     The  state  of  the  Russian  Slavs  was 
not,  however,  substantially  altered  thereby.    National  unity 
came  to  be  represented  by  the  Grand  Duke,  who,  in  reality, 


4  RUSSIA  AND  DEMOCRACY. 

was  only  the  first  among  other  Princes,  and  these  mostly  were 
commanders  of  troops  and  chief  magistrates  in  the  local 
democracies.  It  was  under  the  nominal  rule  of  Princes  that 
Novgorod  and  Pskov  grew  up  as  prosperous  and  powerful 
republics.* 
The  Kon«oi  yoke  The  Mongol  yoke  first  introduced  the  conception,  till  then 

and  absolute 

utterly  unknown  to  the  Russians,  of  an  absolute  power  as  an 
omnipotent,  all-overwhelming  force  to  which  obedience  was 
irresistibly  due.  The  Grand  Dukes  of  Moscow,  as  vassals  and 
representatives  of  the  Great  Khans,  claimed  to  exercise  the 
fulness  of  the  authority  belonging  to  their  suzerains.  At  the 
same  time  they  assumed  the  part  of  intercessors  for,  and 
defenders  of,  the  people.  The  marriage  of  the  first  independent 
Sovereign  of  Russia,  Ivan  III.,  with  a  Palaeologus,  connecting 
the  Russian  monarchy  with  the  Byzantine  tradition,  bestowed 
on  it  a  historic  legitimacy,  while  the  sanction  of  the  Church 
endowed  it  with  a  sacred  character.  The  title  of  Tsar  assumed 
by  Ivan  IV.  gave  a  full  expression  to  that  evolution, 
limitations  of  For  a  long  time,  however,  the  autocracy  of  the  Tsars  existed 

absolutism  by  the 

in  principle  rather  than  in  reality.  Representatives  of  the 
people  used  to  be  called  together  in  different  principalities 
before  the  Mongol  invasion  ;  this  habit  was  preserved  and 
extended  during  the  Moscow  period,  and  the  Zemsky  Sabors 
became  a  national  institution.  They  were  mostly  convened  in 
great  emergencies  and  a  more  direct  influence  was  exercised 
by  a  permanent  council,  the  Boyarskaya  Douma,  a  stronghold 


*  The  progress  of  civilization  brought  about  in  large  cities  marked 
differences  in  fortune  and  position  which  led  to  the  rise  of  ancient  and 
wealthy  families  who  strove  for  influence ;  yet  on  the  whole,  the  political 
and  social  organization  of  Russia  before  the  Moscow  period  remained 
decidedly  democratic. 


TO  ACCESSION   OF  PETER  THE  GREAT.  5 

of  the  Muscovite  aristocracy  which  grew  up  simultaneously 
with  the  growth  of  the  monarchy.* 
Thus  Russia,  after  having,  in  striking  contrast  with  Western 

Emigration  and 

Europe,  been  from  time  immemorial  a  pure  democracy,  began 
in  the  fifteenth  century  to  resemble  in  political  institutions 
and  social  organizations  West-European  countries.  But, 
however  necessary  this  new  regime  may  have  been  for  her 
national  development  in  that  period,  it  was  too  uncongenial 
to  her  profoundly  democratic  people.  Many  Russians,  rather 
than  submit  to  it,  preferred  leaving  the  Russia  of  those  days ; 
and  these  emigrants  founded,  in  lands  inhabited  by  or  exposed 
to  the  invasion  of  Tartar  peoples,  the  military  democratic 
republics  of  the  Cossacks  of  the  Dnieper,  the  Don,  the  Volga, 
the  Yayik  (Oural),  and  the  Terek. 

In  their  struggles  with  the  boyars  the  Tsars  leant  on  the 
other  classes,  and  the  stronger-willed  among  them  showed 
great  solicitude  for  the  welfare  of  the  people  at  large.  Ivan  the 
Terrible,  who  was  trying  to  crush  the  boyars  completely,  not 
only  convened  the  Zemsky  Sabors,  but  allowed  elected  repre- 
sentatives of  the  middle  and  lower  classes  a  share  in  juridical 
functions  and  administrative  duties.  He  granted  also  charters 
of  self-government  to  many  peasant  communities.  Notwith- 
standing the  outbursts  of  his  wrath  directed  against  the  boyars, 


*  When  Moscow  became  the  centre  of  national  life,  wealthy  and 
influential  personages  from  all  parts  of  Russia,  accompanied  by  numerous 
followers,  began  to  gather  there,  entering  the  service  of  the  rulers  of 
Moscow  and  actively  working  for  the  unification  of  Russia.  The  position 
of  the  boyars  (lords)  of  Moscow  was  raised  thereby  to  a  high  eminence, 
still  more  increased  by  their  being  also  joined  by  princes,  descendants 
of  Rurik,  who  had  lost  their  principalities  and  were  content  to  become 
Moscow  boyars,  retaining  only  their  princely  title.  This  aristocracy 
differed,  however,  from  West  European  in  being  dependent  on 
service  to  the  State,  and  not  on  feudal  or  territorial  position. 


under  the  banner 


6  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

but  reaching  occasionally  whole  towns  or  provinces,  he  greatly 

contributed  to  the  growth  in  the  imagination  of  the  masses 

popui*r  w.ai  of  a    of  the  ideal  of  a  People's  Tsar.    On  the  contrary,  rulers  weak 

People'*  Tsar. 

in  character  or  in  their  position  invariably  fell  under  the 
influence  of  the  aristocracy.  Boris  Godounoff,  who,  owing  to 
the  circumstances  of  his  accession,  needed  particularly  the 
support  of  the  upper  classes,  forbade  free  labourers  to  leave 
on  or  about  St.  George's  day  the  estates  they  were  cultivating, 
as  was  customary  in  Russia,  thus  converting  them  virtually 
introduction  or  into  serfs.  This  act,  depriving  the  mass  of  the  people  of 

serfdom.    War  of 

personal  freedom  which,  unlike  the  people  of  Western  Europe, 
it  had  always  enjoyed,  led  naturally  to  a  tremendous  political 
and  social  upheaval  ;  one  false  Dimitri  after  another, 
personifying  in  the  eyes  of  the  masses  a  legitimate  as  well 
as  a  popular  Tsar,  found  strenuous  partisans,  particularly 
amongst  the  peasants  and  the  Cossacks. 

While  the  boyars  were  intriguing  for  personal  advantage 
even  with  foreign  enemies  the  gentry  and  the  upper  middle 
class,  animated  with  ardent  patriotism,  saved  the  independence 
of  Russia  and  put  an  end  to  anarchy  by  electing  as  Tsar  a 
scion  of  the  universally  popular  house  of  the  Romanoffs.  The 
rulers  of  that  dynasty  had  decided  popular  sympathies  and 
recognized  the  need  of  reforms  ;  their  intentions,  however, 
were  paralyzed  by  more  or  less  disguised  opposition  on  the 
part  of  the  boyars. 


CHAPTER  II. 

PETER  THE  GREAT  (1682-1725). 

Peter  the  Great,*  whose  gigantic  personality  seems  to  have 
equalled  in  strength  and  energy  the  whole  French  Convention, 
broke  down  the  boyardom,  utterly  destroying  Russian 
aristocracy,  completely  subjected  the  Church  of  Russia  to  the 
State,  and,  for  the  first  time  in  Russia,  rendered  monarchy 
really  absolute.  Moreover,  under  the  name  of  "  Reform  " 
he  undertook  to  revolutionize  the  entire  political  and  social 
organization  as  well  as  the  whole  national  life  of  Russia. 
It  appears  probable,  however,  that  he  looked  on  absolute 


*  Peter  the  Great  was  the  last  Russian  Sovereign  whose  official 
title  was  "  Tsar  of  Russia."  At  the  request  of  the  "  Governing  Senate," 
he  adopted,  November  2,  1721,  the  title  of  "Emperor  of  Russia" 
which  has  gradually,  in  special  clauses  of  international  treaties,  been 
recognized  by  all  Powers.  In  this  way  only  can  a  Russian  Sovereign 
be  officially  addressed. 

Ever  since,  all  educated  Russians  have  always  spoken  of  their 
Sovereign,  in  a  foreign  language,  as  "  the  Emperor"  and  in  Russian  as 
"  Gosoudar  Imperator"  or  simply  "  Gosoudar"  (Sire).  The  title 
"  Tsar"  is  still  greatly  used  by  the  peasants,  who  likewise  use  the  word 
"iGosoudar."  It  is  also  often  used  in  historical  works,  in  oratory  and  in 
poetry. 

In  Western  Europe  diplomatists,  particularly  those  who  have  been  in 
Petrograd,  generally  use  the  official  appellation  of  "  Emperor  of 
Russia,"  while  with  the  public  the  former  title,  "the  Tsar,"  still  mostly 
prevails,  meaning  exclusively  "  Emperor  of  Russia  "  ;  strictly  speaking 
it  is  no  longer  correct,  for  the  Bulgarian  Sovereign  bears  the  title  of 
"  Tsar  of  the  Bulgarians." 

Since  Alexander  I.  all  Imperial  Manifestoes  are  issued  in  the  name 
of  "  Emperor  of  Russia,  Tsar  of  Poland,  Grand-Duke  of  Finland." 


8 


RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 


forms  of  life. 


power  as  a  temporary  dictatorship  necessary  for  the 
establishment  of  the  new  order  of  things,  destined  to 
assure  to  Russia  her  natural  place  among  the  Nations. 
He  gave  a  strong  organization  and  extensive  rights  to  the 
Senate,  which  he  called  "governing"  to  emphasize  its  sharing 
with  the  Sovereign  in  the  government  of  Russia.  A  law 
passed  at  the  end  of  his  reign,  but  never  applied  by  his 
successors,  provided  for  the  election  of  two  members  for  each 
province  who  were  also  to  sit  in  the  Senate.  And  he  took  up 
again  Ivan  IV.'s  democratic  reforms,  giving  the  people  a  share 
in  provincial  and  municipal  administration.  He  also  opened  up 
all  careers  to  men  of  all  classes.  A  man's  advancement  was  in 
future  not  to  depend  on  the  mere  accident  of  his  birth,  but  on 
the  value  of  his  services  to  the  State. 

This  last  measure  certainly  was  in  the  interest  of  democracy, 
but  its  benefit,  like  that  of  all  of  Peter  the  Great's  measures, 
was  vitiated  by  the  obligation  for  the  servants  of  the  State 
*°  adopt  West  European  dress  and  manners.  As  the  great 
majority  of  the  Russians,  viz.,  all  peasants  and  most  towns- 
folk, rigidly  kept  to  the  traditional  customs  and  national 
way  of  living,  only  a  small,  passively  obedient  minority,  the 
new  Noblesse,  took  interest  in  the  State  as  its  governing 
class  ;  the  rest  of  the  population  were  mere  taxpayers  and 
Rift  in  the  Russian  subjects.  Many  of  them,  distrusting  a  Church  in  subjection 
to  civil  power,  joined  the  Raskol  (Dissent),  which  then  became 
a  form  of  the  national  protest  against  the  forced  introduction 
of  foreign  ways.  A  rift  was  thus  created  in  the  Russian  nation 
which  is  only  now  being  filled  up. 

The  greatest  ruler  of  Russia  remained  unbeloved  by  his 
people  during  his  life,  and  the  utility  of  his  "Reform"  never 
ceased  to  be  a  matter  of  discussion.  To  its  artificial  character 


PETER  THE  GREAT.  9 

are  attributed  most  of  the  unwelcome  sides  of  the  development 
of  Russia  during  the  last  two  centuries.  The  worst  consequence 
of  the  "  Reform "  was  that  fatal  separation  of  the  new 
bureaucratic  Noblesse  from  the  mass  of  the  people  which  per- 
mitted the  domination  of  the  Russian  State  by  a  foreign 
nationality. 

Peter  the  Great's  foreign  policy  was,  on  the  contrary,  quite 
in  the  national  interest,  both  in  what  he  achieved — the  opening 
up  of  a  window  into  Europe — as  well  as  in  what  he  attempted, 
the  liberation  of  Eastern  Christians  and  the  alliance  of  Russia 
with  France  and  England.  In  1698  he  clearly  saw  the  necessity 
of  what  has  been  achieved  only  in  1914  !  And  he  was  not  less 
wise  in  his  policy  towards  Germany,  that  of  protecting  her 
minor  States  against  the  ambitions  of  Austria  and  of  Prussia. 


10 


Russia  ruled  by 
cosmopolitan 
coterie  regardlei 
of  tlie  wisiies  of 
the  nation. 


CHAPTER  III. 

FROM  PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  CATHERINE  THE  GREAT 
(1725-1762). 

Peter's  immediate  successors  unfortunately  exaggerated  the 
wrong  sides  of  his  home  programme,  and  totally  upset  his 
foreign  one.  The  direction  of  the  whole  military  and 
administrative  machine  became  concentrated  in  St.  Peters- 
burg, the  new  capital  situated  at  the  extremity  and  almost  out 
of  the  Empire — imagine  the  capital  of  Great  Britain  at  Land's 
End! 

To  this  place  soon  streamed  a  mass  of  adventurous  foreigners 
who  settled  there  as  in  a  colony  of  their  own,  spreading  a 
foreign  atmosphere  round  an  already  almost  denationalized 
government.  So,  as  a  natural  result,  the  Government  ruled 
Russia  from  the  new  capital  without  any  consideration  for 
the  needs  and  wishes  of  the  people,  guided  merely  by  the  private 
interest  of  the  momentary  holders  of  power,  and  sometimes 
even  by  their  enthusiastic  devotion  to  the  interests  of  a  foreign 
country. 

They  were  enabled  so  to  act  owing  to  the  indifference  of 
the  masses  who  regarded  the  "reformed"  State  as  unholy, 
and  limited  their  relations  with  it  to  a  sullen  obedience  to  all 
its  commands  which  could  not  be  eluded.  The  new  Noblesse, 
unsupported  by  the  people,  was  of  necessity  subservient  to  the 
Court  and  particularly  to  the  dominant  faction  of  the  moment. 


FROM  PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  CATHERINE  THE  GREAT.   II 

Only  in  one  instance  did  the  democratic  spirit  of  the  nation 
show  itself  even  in  "reformed"  Russians.  When  the  St. 
Petersburg  government,  in  imitation  of  Prussia,  tried  to  create 
a  class  of  large  landowners  on  the  basis  of  the  right  of 
primogeniture,  and  enacted  a  law  according  to  which  a  man's 
whole  estate  passed  to  his  eldest  son,  the  Russian  Noblesse 
never  applied  it  and  persistently  demanded  its  abolition  until 
the  government  saw  itself  compelled  to  give  way  on  that  point 
to  a  feeling  which  was  quite  unanimous. 

The  great  Peter,  in  revolutionizing  the  whole  structure  of 
Russian  life,  needed  above  all  clever  and  precise  men  to  carry 
out  his  will  unhampered  by  any  connection  with  the  order  of 
things  he  was  resolved  to  destroy.  He  found  them  at  first 
chiefly  in  foreigners  and,  after  the  conquest  of  Esthonia  and 
Livonia,  availed  himself  particularly  of  the  services  of  the 
German  barons  of  those  provinces  who  were  accustomed  from  German  barons  of 

the  Baltic 

their  birth  to  rule  over  a  subject  race.  He  never  meant  to  bestow 
on  them  any  privileges  over  Russians,  and  was  making  hasty 
efforts  so  that  Russians  might  acquire  in  great  Western  centres 
all  the  knowledge  he  wished  to  see  applied  to  Russia.  Nothing 
could  have  been  further  from  Peter's  thoughts  than  granting 
to  foreigners,  and  least  of  all  to  Germans,  a  predominant 
position  in  the  Empire.  Notwithstanding  this,  various  factors 
inevitably  led  exactly  to  such  a  result. 

Intermarriages  with  members  of  German  dynasties  brought  SJ^JriniSEr 
to  St.  Petersburg  German  princes  and  princesses  with  their 
suites,  and  gave  to  a  great  extent  a  German  character  to  the 
Russian  Court.  Many  of  the  Baltic  barons  settled  likewise 
in  the  capital  of  the  Empire  which  they  considered  themselves 
to  be  called  upon  to  rule.  Thither  flocked  from  all  parts  of 
Germany  men  whose  title  to  nobility  was  small  or  doubtful ; 


12  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

many  of  them,  even,  were  but  simple  adventurers.  They  were 
attracted  by  the  great  resources  of  Russia  which  an  almost 
German  Court  held  at  its  disposal,  and  they  often  obtained 
most  unexpected  prizes. 
JSSJoftSS1"  Members   of   German   learned   and   teaching    professions, 

upper  and  middle 

following  in  the  wake  of  princes  and  nobles,  came  to  Russia 
and  acquired  highly  privileged  positions.  The  Russian  Academy 
of  Sciences  became  a  German  institution,  so  much  so  that, 
up  to  quite  lately,  it  published  its  works  in  German.  It  never 
concealed  its  hostility  towards  Russian  scientists,  and  boy- 
cotted the  most  eminent  among  them.  It  refused  admittance 
in  its  midst  even  to  Mendeleyeff.  When  the  latter  came  to 
Oxford  in  1894  to  receive  the  highest  honours  from  the 
University  of  Oxford,  he  was  there  often  referred  to  as  a 
Member  of  the  Russian  Academy  of  Sciences.  On  one  occasion 
he  told  the  writer  (who  accompanied  him  there)  that,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  it  was  the  only  academy  in  Europe  of  which  he  was 
not  a  member.  The  favour  shown  to  German  schools  in  Russia, 
and  their  growing  prosperity,  for  a  long  time  contrasted 
strongly  with  the  many  restrictions  placed  on  Russian  schools, 
and  the  very  scanty  funds  which  the  Russian  Exchequer, 
up  to  the  present  reign,  found  possible  to  devote  to  them. 
G?ma£"nf  ^  wou^  ^G  to°  ^onS  *°  enumerate  all  the  privileges  enjoyed 

by  Germans  in  every  profession  and  trade  in  Russia,  many  of 
which  were  still  preserved  till  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war. 
Some  are  continued  even  at  this  day.  As  a  remarkable  example 
of  them  the  following  may  be  quoted.  The  writer,  when 
residing  in  Germany  in  the  eighties,  witnessed  the  universal 
outburst  of  indignation  there  on  account  of  Russian  Jews 
having  petitioned  the  Russian  Government  for  permission  to 
own  chemists'  stores  in  St.  Petersburg,  then  an  exclusive 


FROM   PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  CATHERINE  THE  GREAT.      13 

privilege  of  Germans.  German  writers  and  speakers  appealed 
to  the  Jews  of  Germany  to  require  from  their  co-religionists  in 
Russia  that  they  should  abstain  from  such  a  "  revolting  " 
attack  on  the  "  rightful "  possessions  of  Germans  in  Russia. 

The  influx  of  Germans  was  so  great  that,  in  consequence  of 
intermarriages  with  them,  a  considerable  part  of  the  Russian 
Noblesse  had  German  blood  in  their  veins.  And  the  same  was 
the  case  with  the  Russian  intelligentzia  and  the  upper  middle 
class  in  St.  Petersburg.  If  the  language  of  the  cosmopolitan 
society  in  the  new  capital  did  not  become  German,  it  was 
chiefly  due  to  the  fact  that  the  German  princes  and  nobles 
of  the  eighteenth  century  spoke  French  among  themselves. 
With  them,  however,  even  a  foreign  language  served  as  a 
vehicle  for  national  thoughts,  while  the  adoption  of  it  by  the 
Russian  ruling  class  consummated  their  denationalization. 
Acquaintance  with  French  literature  inspired,  in  truth,  in 
many  Russians  interest  in  and  sympathy  with  France,  but 
did  not  exercise  any  influence  on  the  policy  of  Russia,  the 
Court  and  Government  remaining  more  or  less  greatly 
Germanized.  The  use  of  a  foreign  language  in  society  and  at 
home  by  all  families  of  distinction,  or  pretending  to  be  such, 
had  the  effect  of  widening  more  than  anything  the  gulf  between 
the  rulers  and  the  ruled.  Foreign  observers,  even  so  late  as  the 
end  of  the  last  century,  noted  with  amazement  that,  in 
administrative  departments  and  other  public  institutions, 
courteous  attention  was  paid  to  all  foreigners,  as  well  as  to 
Russians  who  spoke  a  foreign  language,  while  those  who  spoke 
the  language  of  the  country  were  treated  with  contempt. 

While  society  was  becoming  cosmopolitan,  the  Court  and 

, .    ,  .,  i    *   •    i  i       •     •    j        ,  •  a  Germanic  power 

diplomacy,  the  army  and  higher  administration  grew  more 
and  more  to  be  a  private  domain  of  the  Germans.  They  were 


14  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

filling  up  all  the  most  important  and  advantageous  posts, 
and  always  pushed  forward  other  Germans  who  received  every 
preference  over  Russians.  Ruled  thus  by  the  Germans,  the 
Russian  Empire  was  practically  a  Germanic  Power  whose 
forces  were  principally  employed  to  serve  Germany  and 
Germanism.  And  the  German  yoke  proved  to  be  harder  and 
more  deeply  harmful  than  the  Mongol. 

German  t.rror.  it  reached  its  climax  when  the  Empress  Anna  (1730-1740) 
entrusted  with  absolute  power  her  German  favourite,  Biron, 
who  introduced  a  regime  of  terror  against  all  Russians 
suspected  of  disliking  German  rule.  He  created  a  special 
inquisition,  invented  tortures,  and  was  the  first  to  make 
extensive  use  of  banishment  to  Siberia. 

It  was  enough  to  bear  the  reputation  of  being  independent 
in  character  or  of  having  national  Russian  feelings  to  ensure 
becoming  a  prey  to  the  spies  and  agents  of  the  Teuton  tyrant. 
The  meekness  with  which  the  Russians  submitted  to  an  anti- 
national  persecution  in  their  own  country  can  be  understood 
only  by  remembering  that  it  was  exercised  chiefly  on  a 
denationalized  class  who  had  lost  the  confidence  of  the  people, 
who  did  not  see  much  difference  between  being  oppressed  by 
foreigners  or  by  their  own  estranged  countrymen. 

There  was  a  kind  of  reaction  against  the  exclusive 
domination  of  the  Germans  under  the  Empress  Elizabeth 
(1741-1762),*  but  it  was  only  a  superficial  one.  The  persecution 
of  Russians  as  such  ceased  ;  and  they  were  again  admitted 
to  higher  posts  in  the  administration.  But  no  serious  measures 
were  taken  to  dislodge  the  Germans  from  the  many  privileged 


*  Elizabeth  died  on  December  25, 1761(0.3.), which  in  the  i8th  century 
corresponded  to  January  5,  1762  (N.S.). 


FROM   PETER  THE   GREAT  TO  CATHERINE  THE   GREAT.      15 

positions  they  had  possessed  themselves  of,  or  to  counter- 
balance their  influence  at  Court  and  in  the  government. 
Russia's  foreign  policy  continued  to  be  determined  by  one  of 
the  two  rival  German  factions  at  Court,  one  Austrian,  the  other 
Prussian.  Elizabeth  favoured  the  former  and  made  war  on 
Frederick  II.  The  St.  Petersburg  Germans,  who  already  saw 
in  that  King  the  restorer  of  the  ancient  power  of  Germany, 
were  entirely  for  Prussia.  They  were  gathered  round 
Elizabeth's  heir,  the  Duke  of  Hoist ein,  a  German  in  his 
feelings  and  an  enthusiastic  admirer  of  Frederick,  who  openly 
declared  he  valued  his  commission  in  the  Prussian  Army 
higher  than  the  Imperial  Crown  of  Russia.  On  ascending  the 
throne  as  Peter  III.  (1762)  he  immediately  gave  back  to  en< 
Frederick  II.  East  Prussia,  Brandenburg  and  Pomerania, 
which  had  been  conquered  by  the  Russian  Army,  then 
occupying  Berlin.  He  did  not  ask  for  any  compensation  or 
guarantee  for  the  future,  and  even  placed  his  army  in  Prussia 
under  the  command  of  Frederick.  The  latter  recognized  that 
he  had  been  saved  by  Russia  from  utter  destruction,  but 
showed  his  gratitude  in  his  own  way.  Before  even  the  end 
of  the  Seven  Years'  War  he  sent  emissaries  to  instigate  the 
Khan  of  the  Crimea  to  invade  Russia. 


16 


CHAPTER  IV. 


Bussitn  national 
revival  under 
Catherine. 


Her  liberal 

reforms. 


CATHERINE  THE  GREAT  (1762-1796). 

Catherine  II. 's  reign  constituted  a  more  serious  anti- 
German  reaction.  Russia's  foreign  policy  became  as  a  rule 
independent  of  the  Germanic  Cabinets  and  pursued  purely 
Russian  aims.  The  recovery  of  the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea 
was  an  historical  achievement  as  essential  to  the  existence 
of  the  Russian  Empire  as  was  that  of  the  shores  of  the  Baltic. 
In  the  Army  and  the  administration  Germans  were  no  longer 
favoured  at  the  expense  of  Russians  ;  the  foremost  generals 
and  statesmen  of  Catherine  bore  Russian  names.  She  won 
the  enthusiastic  loyalty  of  the  Noblesse,  which  in  her  reign 
ceased  to  be  mere  bureaucracy.  She  extended  the  privileges 
granted  by  Peter  III.  in  the  Charter  of  the  Noblesse.  The 
nobles  were  given  a  certain  share  in  the  management  of  local 
affairs  in  the  provinces.  Provincial  and  district  assemblies  of 
the  Noblesse  were  the  first  deliberative  bodies  of  the  reformed 
Russia ;  their  presidents,  the  Marshals  of  the  Noblesse, 
were  the  first  elective,  non-bureaucratic,  high  functionaries 
of  the  Empire.  Catherine  gave  also  municipal  self-government 
to  larger  cities.  She  went  even  much  farther.  Under  the  name 
of  the  "  Commission  for  the  framing  of  laws,"  she  convened 
an  assembly  elected  in  the  whole  Empire  in  which  all  classes 
were  represented.  That  assembly  met  in  1767,  twenty-two 
years  earlier  than  the  French  States-General  convened  by 


CATHERINE  THE   GREAT.  17 

Louis  XVI.  It  was  not,  however,  given  to  the  "  Commission  " 
to  become  a  starting-point  of  the  constitutional  development 
of  Russia.  The  spirit  of  independence  evinced  by  its  members 
impressed  courtiers  and  bureaucrats  as  being  dangerous  to 
their  privileges.  Under  their  influence,  Catherine,  though 
she  largely  availed  herself  of  the  legislative  work  of  the  Com- 
mission, never  summoned  it  again. 

Russian  writers,  comparing  Catherine's  reign  with  those  JS 

German  idsiM. 

of  her  predecessors  as  well  as  of  her  successors,  regard  it  as 
an  era  of  national  revival.  This  is,  on  the  whole,  true. 
Catherine  consistently  strove  to  feel  and  to  act  as  a  Russian, 
though  she  was  not  altogether  free  from  the  influence  of  her 
German  blood  and  education.  In  spite  of  her  relations  with 
French  philosophers,  she  was,  in  her  inner  policy,  mostly 
carrying  out  German  ideas.  Her  constitution  of  the  Noblesse 
as  a  class  of  privileged  landowners  was  an  imitation  of  the 
Prussian  "  Adelstand  " ;  and  the  Assemblies  of  the  Noblesse 
were  copied  from  the  "  Landtage."  The  organization  of  the 
trades'  corporations  and  of  the  municipal  administration 
was  also  on  German  lines. 

She  had  a  clear  perception  of  the  necessity  of  emancipating 
the  serfs,  yet  she  did  not  attempt  to  carry  it  through.  As 
she  owed  her  throne  to  her  popularity  with  the  Noblesse,  and 
particularly  the  officers  of  the  Guards,  on  whose  further 
support  she  relied,  Catherine  could  hardly  undertake  against 
the  wishes  of  the  nobles  a  reform  so  deeply  affecting  their 
interests. 

Not  only  did  she  not  abolish  serfdom,  but  she  even  extended  oa^rine  in*n 

rates  «Jeim*n 

it  to  parts  of  Russia  where  it  was  not  known.  The  result  was 
similar  to  that  of  the  introduction  of  serfdom  by  Boris 
Godounoff — a  terrible  insurrection  in  which  peasants  and 

c 


1 8  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

Cossacks  thronged  to  the  banner  of  a  false  Peter  III.,  in  whom 
they  once  more  imagined  they  saw  the  incarnation  of  their 
old  dream  of  a  People's  Tsar. 

While  the  position  of  the  Russian  agriculturists  was 
rendered  still  harder,  favours  were  lavished  on  German 
colonists  called  in  by  Catherine  to  settle  in  Russia.  Every 
one  of  them  received  60  dessiatines  (about  160  acres)  of  the 
best  land,  and  every  colony  large  pasture  grounds  and  woods. 
They  were,  moreover,  exempted  from  all  taxes  and  duties, 
even  from  military  service,  and  were  granted  complete 
self-government.  Absolutely  useless  to  Russia,  those  colonies 
formed  advance  guards  of  the  German  Drang  nach  Osten. 

The   most   fatal   instance   of   the    German    influence    on 

tcnaeqnenre  of 

Catherine's  policy  was  her  listening  to  Frederick's  proposals 
concerning  Poland  and  her  consenting  to  its  partition.  It  is 
true  she  annexed  provinces  originally  Russian  and  mostly 
inhabited  by  Russians.  Nevertheless,  the  participation  of 
Russia  in  an  act  of  unjustifiable  violence  against  a  Slavic 
Kingdom  bound  more  strongly  than  anything  the  policy  of 
Russia  to  that  of  Prussia  and  Austria.  Every  time  that  Russia 
appeared  inclined  to  form  friendships  with  Western  Powers, 
the  Germanic  Cabinets  appealed  to  the  solidarity  among  the 
three  partitioning  States.  They  even  arrogated  to  themselves 
the  right  to  object  to  any  treatment  of  the  Russian  Poles  which 
might  encourage  their  national  aspirations.  No  other  act 
of  the  St.  Petersburg  government  proved  more  helpful  to 
Germany  and  more  detrimental  to  Russia. 

Catherine's  wars  with  the  Turks  produced  quite  a  different 

and  the  people  in 

tbertmggietorKn  effect.  They  not  only  secured  for  Russia  her  natural  frontiers 
in  the  South,  but  also  gave  her  the  right  to  protect  the 
Eastern  Christians  which  equally  gratified  the  sentiments  of 


CATHERINE  THE   GREAT.  IQ 

both  the  westernized  Noblesse  and  of  the  masses  faithful  to 
the  ancient  Muscovite  regime.  These  saw  in  the  struggle 
against  Infidels  a  defence  of  their  own  faith  and  a  liberation 
of  their  co-religionists.  These  campaigns  were  the  first  action 
of  the  reformed  State  which  the  people  could  understand  and 
sympathize  with.  They  opened  the  series  of  Russian  Crusades, 
and  began  to  unite  the  severed  parts  of  the  nation  in  fighting 
for  the  same  ideal. 

Catherine  systematically  encouraged  Russian  language  and 
literature,  stimulated  Russian  national  feeling  and  mani- 
fested her  pride  in  being  a  Russian  Sovereign.  Of  all  the 
reigns  of  the  St.  Petersburg  period  hers  was  the  most  liberal 
up  to  that  of  Alexander  II.  and  the  most  national  up  to  that 
of  Alexander  III.  Above  all  she  knew  how  to  inspire  daring 
enterprise,  persistent  efforts  and  boundless  devotion  to  the 
throne  and  the  country,  which  led  to  feats  of  heroism  and  self- 
sacrifice  filling  the  Russians  with  confidence  in  their  own 
Empire  and  nationality. 


20 


CHAPTER  V. 

PAUL  I.  (1796-1801) ;   ALEXANDER  I  (1801-1825). 

Catherine  the  Great  seemed  to  have  clearly  traced  for  her 
successors  the  main  lines  of  their  right  policy.  The  fact  is 
the  more  astonishing  that  they  adopted  just  the  reverse. 
Her  death  was  immediately  followed  by  the  restoration  of 
the  German  domination  over  Russia,  not  in  sooth  in  the  crude 
form  of  Biron's  tyranny,  but  in  a  more  subtle  one,  penetrating 
the  Russian  State  deeper  than  ever  before,  and  determining 
the  whole  foreign  policy  of  Russia  for  ninety-five  years,  from 
the  accession  of  Paul  I.  to  the  conclusion  of  the  Franco- 
Russian  Alliance  by  Alexander  III. 

PsiU\  I.'s  reign  was  particularly  remarkable  for  its  tendency 

by  his  predilection 

frfeSdsSpnwithd     to  reverse  whatever  had  been  done  under  Catherine.  The  hopes 

the  Sovereign!  of 

Prussia.  Of  Russian  Liberals  were  set  on  his  heir,  who  appeared  to  be 

destined,  not  only  to  continue  Catherine's  reforms,  but  also 
to  satisfy  the  aspirations  of  all  lovers  of  progress.  Cautious- 
men  even  apprehended  the  radicalism  of  a  revolutionary's 
pupil.*  In  the  opinion  of  the  talented  historian  who  threw 
more  light  than  any  other  on  Alexander  I.'s  personality 
(the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  Mikhailovitch),  he  was  a  great  ruler, 
but  not  for  Russia.  Most  unfortunately  he  neither  under- 
stood Russia,  nor  liked  anything  Russian.  And  he  had  a  strong 

*  Alexander  I.'s  tutor  was  Laharpe,  who  afterwards,  as  a  Jacobin 
Member  of  the  French  Convention,  voted  for  the  execution  of  Louis  XVI. 


PAUL  I.  ;     ALEXANDER  I.  21 

preference  for  everything  German.  Loving  humanity  above 
all,  he  saw  its  highest  expression  in  Germany,  by  promoting 
whose  interests  he  believed  himself  to  be  working  for  the 
greatest  good  of  mankind.  He  was,  besides,  bound  by  ties  of 
intimate  friendship  to  King  Frederick  William  III.  and  Queen 
Louisa  of  Prussia,  the  object  of  the  one  platonic  affection  of 
his  life.  The  vows  he  exchanged  with  them  were  in  his  eyes 
more  binding  than  his  duty  to  his  own  country.  The 
consequence  of  that  state  of  mind  were  fatal  to  himself  as  well 
as  to  Russia. 

Grand  Duke  Nicholas  Mikhailovitch,  in  publishing  Alexander 
I.'s  private  correspondence  with  his  sister  and  political 
confidant,  the  Grand  Duchess  Catherine,  showed  that  at 
Tilsit  Napoleon  decided  to  wipe  Prussia  out  of  the  number  of 

of  Enma  in  order 

independent  States  and  offered  Russia  for  her  frontier  the  to  »ave 
line  of  the  Vistula  and  that  of  the  Danube.  Alexander  refused 
both  ;  the  former  because  he  wanted  above  all  to  preserve 
Prussia,  and  the  latter  on  account  of  his  promise  to  Prussia 
not  to  annex  the  Danubian  countries.  Napoleon  consented, 
"  out  of  regard  for  the  wishes  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia  " 
to  preserve  the  existence  of  Prussia,  but  was  unable  to  under- 
stand a  Sovereign  caring  more  for  the  interests  of  a  foreign 
country  than  his  own.  He,  therefore,  suspected  Alexander 
of  fundamental  hostility  against  himself,  and  of  deep  designs 
against  the  French  Empire.  Their  friendship  was  thus  under- 
mined and  a  conflict  became  inevitable.  Yet  while  Alexander 
was,  for  the  love  of  Prussia,  staking  Russia's  existence  in  the 
war  with  France,  Frederick  William,  in  letters  full  of  most 
abject  flattery  and  humility,  was  imploring  Napoleon  to  give 
Prussia  the  Russian  Baltic  Provinces  ! 
But  even  his  friend's  shameful  betrayal  had  no  power  to 


22  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

change  Alexander's  heart.  After  expelling  the  French  and 
their  German  Allies  from  Russia,  he  at  once  undertook  a  war 
for  the  liberation  of  Germany ;  and  at  the  Vienna  Congress 
insisted  above  all  on  the  aggrandisement  of  Prussia.  Later 
on,  he  founded  the  Holy  Alliance,  which  practically  amounted 
to  Russia's  assisting  Prussia  and  Austria  in  the  satisfaction 
of  their  ambitions. 

His  predilection  for  Germany  and  the  Germans  influenced 

noances  t'as  idea 

also  the  whole  of  Alexander's  home  policy.  In  the  earliest 
years  of  his  reign  he  was  determined  to  grant  a  most  liberal 
constitution  to  Russia.  A  Committee  of  young  men  of  his 
age  enjoying  his  particular  confidence  sat  under  his  presidency 
in  the  Winter  Palace  elaborating  such  a  Constitution.  As  is 
seen  from  the  journals  of  that  Committee,  the  Emperor's  great 
apprehension  was  the  weakness  of  the  future  opposition. 
Early  wars  for  the  sake  of  his  German  friends,  his  absorbing 
interest  in  Prussia  and  the  influence  of  his  German  advisers 
deterred  him  from  giving  a  practical  shape  to  the  constitution. 
German-Russians  shared  most  of  the  important  posts  in  Russia 
with  Prussians  specially  invited  by  Alexander  I.  The  great 
to  Prussian  statesman,  Stein,  banished  from  Prussia  on 

highest  favour  in 

Napoleon's  demand,  exercised,  as  long  as  he  stayed  in  Russia, 
a  strong  influence  on  Alexander's  mind  ;  he  was  particularly 
instrumental  in  bringing  about  the  war  of  1812.  To  be  a 
German,  under  Alexander  I.'s  reign,  became  more  than  ever 
the  surest  way  to  every  honour  and  distinction.  The  famous 
general,  Yermoloff,  asked  by  the  Emperor  what  reward  he 
would  like  to  receive  for  his  great  services,  replied : — "  To 
be  promoted  German ;  rewards  would  then  follow  of  them- 
selves." 

Yet  in  one  year  of  his  reign  Alexander  I.  showed  himself 


PAUL   I.  ;     ALEXANDER   I.  23 

at  one  with  his  people  and  worthy  of  his  great  talents.  That 
was  during  Napoleon's  invasion  in  1812.  Although  almost 
all  the  States  of  Europe,  England  and  Sweden  excepted, 
sent  their  armies  to  join  the  French,  and  in  spite  of  Napoleon's 
occupying  Moscow,  Alexander  firmly  refused  all  proposals 
of  peace,  and  abode  by  his  decision  to  fight  on  till  the  last 
enemy  had  left  Russia.  The  desecration  of  Russian  Churches 
and  the  destruction  of  Moscow  moved  the  Russian  people 
to  the  innermost  depths  of  their  hearts,  and  roused  them  to 
wonderful  efforts  which  immensely  contributed  to  the  complete 
victory  of  Russia.*  It  was  generally  expected  that  after  that 
war  Alexander  I.'s  chief  care  would  be  to  reward  the  Russian 
people  for  their  sacrifices  by  granting  them  at  last  the  free 
institutions  he  had  been  preparing  for  them,  as  well  as  by 
devoting  all  his  thoughts  to  the  welfare  of  Russia. 

Unfortunately  he  was  again  diverted  from  it  by  his  solicitude 
for  the  cause  of  Germany  and  especially  of  Prussia ;  and  his 
German  friends  and  advisers  made  every  effort  to  dissuade 
him  from  applying  his  liberal  principles  to  Russia  proper. 
Yielding  to  their  representations,  he  contented  himself  with 

and  Autonomy 

giving  free  institutions  to  the  frontier  provinces  of  the  Empire 
inhabited  by  non-Russian  populations.  Out  of  the  provinces 
conquered  from  Sweden,  which  under  Swedish  rule  never  had 
any  autonomy,  he  created  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Finland, 
gave  it  a  liberal  constitution^  and  even  annexed  to  it  the 


*  It  is  interesting  to  remember  just  now  that  the  population  of  the 
invaded  parts  of  Russia  soon  discovered  the  difference  between  "  real 
French"  soldiers  and  their  German  auxiliaries  whose  rapacity  and 
cruelty  knew  no  limits. 

f  As  a  matter  of  fact,  that  constitution  benefited  chiefly  the  Swedish 
Noblesse  which  dominated  Finland,  and  Swedish  remained  the  only 
official  language  there  till  Alexander  II.'s  reign. 


24  RUSSIA  AND  DEMOCRACY. 

province  of  Vyborg,  till  then  united  to  Russia,  inhabited  partly 
by  Russians  and  situated  almost  at  the  gates  of  the  Russian 
capital.*     Out  of  the  Polish  provinces  which  the  partition 
had  given  to  Austria  and  Prussia,  and  of  which  Napoleon  had 
formed  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  Alexander  created  the  kingdom 
of  Poland  and  endowed  it  also  with  a  liberal  constitution, 
which,  however,  as  the  great  majority  of  the  people  were  serfs, 
gave  citizen-rights  to  the  Noblesse  alone.   He  intended,  more- 
over, to  go  much  farther  in  alienating   Russian  territory, 
viz.,  annexing  to  Poland  not  only  Lithuania,  but  also  White 
Russia  and  Little  Russia  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Dnieper, 
which  had  belonged  to  Poland,  although  the  Poles  were  in 
a  small  minority  there.    He  renounced  it  only  in  consequence 
of  a  pressing  appeal  of  the  great  Russian  historian  Karamzin, 
who  persuaded  him  not  to  sacrifice  to  non-Russian  minorities 
in  those  provinces  the  great  bulk  of  their  population,  which 
was  Russian  in  race,  creed  and  traditions.    The  privileges  of 
Esthonia,  Livonia  and  Courland  were  also  extended  so  as  to 
assure  them  full  autonomy.   So  the  non-German  natives  were 
delivered  up  to  the  tender  mercies  of  their  German  oppressors. 
Alexander,  it  is  true,  emancipated  the  serfs  there,  but  he  allowed 
the  barons  such  an  influence  on  the  framing  of  that  measure 
that  the  liberated  serfs  were  deprived  of  the  land  they  had 
been  cultivating   and  continued  to   be  subjected  to   their 
masters,  getting  nothing  of  freedom  except  the  naked  name. 
European  Liberals  always  warmly  approved  those  acts  of 
Alexander  I.  and  regretted  that  not  all  his  intentions  were 
carried  out.    They  evidently  were  not  aware  that  those  rights 


*  That  act  of  Alexander  I.  inspired  a  writer  in  the  Literary  Supple- 
ment to  the  "Times"  with  the  reflection  that  there  would  be  few  Irish 
home  rulers  in  Great  Britain  if  Ireland  began  in  Surrey. 


PAUL  I.  ;     ALEXANDER  I.  25 

and  liberties  benefited  only  small  privileged  minorities  at  the 
expense  of  the  people  at  large.  Alexander  I.'s  German  advisers 
inspired  him  with  the  anti-democratic  theory  that  the  nation-  «£ 
ality  of  a  country  was  to  be  determined  by  that  of  its  Noblesse. 
They  intimated,  moreover,  that  provinces  with  strong 
aristocratic  non-Russian  elements  ought  to  receive  new 
privileges  as  a  reward  for  furnishing  the  St.  Petersburg  govern- 
ment with  able  and  devoted  agents  to  assist  them  in  main- 
taining their  absolute  rule  over  Russia  proper.  That  alliance 
between  the  denationalized  and  greatly  Germanized  St. 
Petersburg  bureaucracy  and  the  non-Russian  Noblesse 
against  the  Russian  People  has  certainly  escaped  the  attention 
of  Western  radicals  and  democrats  who,  under  the  influence 
of  opinions  "  made  in  Germany,"  stood  up  for  a  policy  directly 
opposed  to  their  own  fundamental  principles. 

As  to  the  Russians  themselves,  Alexander  I.  limited  his  The  inlets  of 

the  Russian 

rificed 


reforms  to  the  creation  of  military  colonies  which,  given  into 

non -Russian 

the  charge  of  his  all-powerful  favourite,  Araktcheyeff,  became 
centres  of  intolerable  oppression.  Moreover,  in  the  last  years 
of  his  reign,  Alexander  entrusted  the  latter  with  the  exercise 
of  an  absolute  power  over  all  Russia  which  Araktcheyeff 
made  use  of  so  harshly  and  arbitrarily  as  almost  to  recall  the 
tyranny  of  Biron. 

The  Russian  Liberals,  at  the  head  of  whom,  before  his  The  rebellion  <* 

December,  1825 

accession  and  in  the  first  years  of  his  reign,  stood  no  other 
than  Alexander  I.  himself,  could  not  help  feeling  deeply 
discouraged  and  embittered  by  the  disappointment  of  their 
most  cherished  hopes.  They  formed  secret  societies  and 
prepared  a  revolution,  judging  the  propitious  moment  to  be 
just  after  Alexander  I.'s  demise.  Nicholas  I.  was  hesitating 
to  accept  the  crown  bequeathed  to  him  by  Alexander  I., 


26  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

passing  over  Nicholas'  elder  brother  Constantine.  The 
conspiracy,  which  spread  into  the  Army,  and  the  attempt 
at  an  open  rebellion,  undoubtedly  deserve  all  blame.  The 
programme  of  the  Decembrists  (so-called  from  the  attempt 
being  made  in  December,  1825,  old  style)  was,  however, 
incomparably  more  moderate  than  that  of  later  revolution- 
aries. Its  two  chief  points,  emancipation  of  the  serfs  and 
national  representation,  now  form  an  integral  part  of  the  legal 
state  of  Russia. 


27 


CHAPTER  VI. 
NICHOLAS  I.  (1825-1855). 

Nicholas  I.  shared  neither  his  predecessor's  liberal  leanings 
nor  his  exclusive  devotion  to  Prussia.  He  put  uppermost  his 
own  duty  to  Russia  and  the  interests  of  the  Russian  Empire. 
To  his  country's  and  his  own  misfortune,  however,  he  too  was 
influenced  by  German  ways  of  thinking  and  by  his  admiration 
for  the  Prussian  State.  He  considered  his  chief  task  was  to 
give  Russia  the  solid  Prussian  organization,  with  Prussian 
rigid  discipline  and  systematic  order.  Apparently  not  knowing 
or  understanding  enough  of  his  own  people,  he  overlooked 
the  discrepancy  between  the  free  and  easy-going  Russian 
national  disposition  and  the  Prusso-German  methods  which, 
excellent  in  their  own  place,  were  on  the  Russian  soil  quickly 
degenerating  into  soulless  formalism.  To  govern  Russia,  for 
her  own  good,  as  if  she  were  peopled  by  Germans,  or  as  if 
Russians  could  be  turned  into  Germans,  was  an  undertaking 
necessarily  doomed  to  failure.  Its  only  effect  was  to  regularize 
and  morally  Germanize  the  St.  Petersburg  bureaucracy, 
rendering  it  much  more  oppressive. 

Baltic  and  other  Germans,  who  had  been  invading  all 
services  under  Alexander  I.,  increased  still  more  in  numbers  ; 
they  were  considered  as  the  firmest  supporters  of  the  throne, 
deserving  greater  confidence  than  the  Russians  on  account 
of  their  presumed  absolute  loyalty  and  devotion  to  the 


28  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

dynasty.  Pahlen's  and  Bennigsen's  dastardly  murder  of 
PauljI.  was  wilfully  ignored  and  its  very  mention  strictly 
prohibited.  Nicholas  I.'s  belief  in  the  superior  moral  worth 
of  Germans  was  so  strong  that  he  quashed  sentences  of  the 
Courts  against  those  convicted  for  fraud  because  "  they  being 
Germans  could  not  have  committed  such  a  thing." 

Of  all  the  services,  the  diplomatic  was  the  most  thoroughly 
denationalized  and  Germanized.  That  was  at  first  the  work 
of  Alexander  I.  himself,  carried  on  more  consistently  by  Count 
Nesselrode,  foreign  minister  during  the  latter  part  of  Alexander 
I.'s  reign,  the  whole  of  Nicholas  I.'s  and  the  first  years  of 
Alexander  II. 's.  Nesselrode,  a  German  by  birth  who  remained 
a  German  at  heart,  never  even  learned  to  speak  Russian  and 
knew  nothing  about  Russia.  The  Russian  language  was 
consistently  avoided  in  written  as  well  as  in  verbal 
communications  at  the  Russian  Foreign  Office.  Even  a  Russian 
name  and  origin  became  a  drawback  in  the  diplomatic  career 
and  a  cause  for  suspicion.  This  "  Russian  "  diplomacy  made  a 
parade  of  its  devotion  to  the  interests  of  Europe  and  of  the 
monarchical  principle,  while  practically  serving  the  aims  of 
Austria  or  of  Prussia.  It  was  animated  by  intense  hatred  of 
Catherine's  national  Russian  policy  ;  and  one  of  its  oracles, 
Baron  Brunnow,  in  a  Memorial  destined  to  serve  as  a  guide 
in  the  study  of  foreign  politics  of  Nicholas  I.'s  heir  (Alexander 
II.)  subjected  all  the  great  achievements  of  Catherine  to  severe 
criticism  ;  her  acting  independently  of  Austria  and  Prussia 
appeared  to  him  as  a  betrayal  of  "  Europe."  That  Memorial 
exercised  an  unwholesome  influence  on  Alexander  II. 's  mind. 
In  accordance  with  the  opinion  of  Nicholas  I.  and  that  of  the 
ruling  class,  no  criticism  of  the  German  nation  or  of  the  Austrian 
or  Prussian  policy  was  tolerated  ;  not  only  in  the  Press, 


NICHOLAS  I.  29 

but  even  in  works  of  history.  Germany  and  Germanic 
States  could  only  be  referred  to  with  unqualified  praise  as 
bulwarks  of  order  and  strongholds  of  the  monarchical  form 
of  government. 

There  existed,  however,  one  question  of  foreign  policy  which 
irresistibly  appealed  to  the  feelings  of  all  Russians  and  about 
which  the  "  reformed  "  classes  as  well  as  the  popular  masses 
were  equally  in  earnest.  This  was  the  fate  of  the  Eastern 

Eastern  question. 

Christians,  whom  every  Russian  thought  it  was  Russia's 
duty  to  protect  and  to  liberate.  And  even  the  most 
Germanophil  rulers  of  Russia  shared  it  themselves,  and  were 
on  that  point,  at  least,  more  or  less  at  one  with  their  people. 
German-Russians  and  the  cosmopolitan  "  Russian  "  diplomacy 
had,  therefore,  to  bow  down  to  the  inevitable ;  reserving  to 
themselves  to  limit,  in  practice,  the  working  out  of  the  policy 
imposed  upon  them.  At  the  St.  Petersburg  Foreign  Office, 
the  Asiatic  Department,  which  included  the  European  Near 
East,  differed  from  the  rest  in  so  far  that  the  Russian  language 
and  Russian  thought  were  admitted  there.  And  Russian 
Consuls  in  Turkey  performed  their  duty  of  protecting  Ottoman 
Christians  with  a  devotion  even  to  the  sacrifice  of  their  own 
lives.  All  the  higher  diplomatic  posts,  however,  continued 
to  be  filled  up  by  Germans  or  Germanized  Russians. 

The  above  explains  the  independence  from  German  influences  one  days  triple 
shown  by  Nicholas  I.  in  the  course  he  adopted  in  favour  of 
revolted  Greece.  To  the  great  anger  of  Vienna  and  Berlin  he 
brought  about  a  rapprochement  with  England  and  France ; 
a  tentative  Triple  Entente,  for  a  single  day  transformed  into 
an  alliance,  equally  glorious  for  the  three  Navies,  the  day  of 
Navarino  (October  20,  1827).  The  Entente,  however,  broke 
down  immediately  afterwards  ;  England  and  France  did  not 


30  RUSSIA   AND   DEMOCRACY. 

see  their  way  to  joining  Russia  in  the  measures  of  coercion 
which  she  proposed  to  adopt  against  Turkey  at  the  beginning 
of  1828.*  Seeing  Russia  alone,  the  Porte  refused  all  con- 
cessions and  declared  war  on  Russia,  which  nevertheless 
persisted  and,  by  dint  of  enormous  sacrifices  in  men  and 
money  during  a  two  years'  war,  succeeded  in  compelling 
the  Porte,  in  the  treaty  of  Adrianople  (1829),  to  recognize  the 
independence  of  Greece.  The  frontiers  of  the  new  State  were 
determined  by  Russia,  England  and  France  in  the  London 
Protocol  of  March  22,  1829.  By  the  same  treaty  of  Adrianople 
Russia  secured  autonomy  for  Moldavia,  Wallachia  and 
Serbia,  as  well  as  a  confirmation  of  Russia's  right  to  protect 
the  Christians  of  Turkey. 

The  French  Revolution  of  1830  and  its  echo,  the  Polish 

(•if  man  it  powers. 

Rebellion,  led  to  a  new  triumph  of  Germanism  in  Russia. 
Believing  peace  and  order  threatened  by  a  new  revolutionary 
wave,  Nicholas  I.  renewed  his  alliance  with  the  Vienna  and 
Berlin  Cabinets  ;  and  Nesselrode  had  a  free  hand  for  modelling 
his  action  on  that  of  Metternich.  By  an  irony  of  Fate  it  is 
exactly  in  the  thirties  and  forties  of  last  century  that  Russian 
diplomatists  earned  the  fame  of  great  sagacity  and  astuteness. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  there  were  hardly  any  among  them  who 
thought  or  felt  as  Russians,  and  their  "  successes  "  did  not 
benefit  Russia,  but  rather  Austria  or  Prussia.  Their  most 
brilliant  achievement,  the  Quadruple  Entente  in  the  Egyptian 
question  in  1840,  which  separated  England  from  France  and 


*  The  popular  emotion  produced  in  France  by  the  devastating  warfare 
of  Ibrahim  Pasha  (Mehemet  Ali's  eldest  son)  in  the  Morea  induced  the 
French  Government  to  send  a  corps  of  troops,  which  expelled  the 
Egyptians  from  that  peninsula  and  remained  there  without  taking 
part  in  the  hostilities  against  the  Turkish  army,  till  the  end  of  the 
Russo-Turkish  war. 


NICHOLAS   I.  31 

isolated  the  latter,  furthered  no  interests  of  Russia,  but  only 
those  of  the  Germanic  States ;  and  it  was  paid  for  by  the 
abandonment  by  Russia  of  the  treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi 
(1833),*  which  had  been  the  nearest  approach  to  a  solution 
peaceful  and  also  satisfactory  to  Russia,  of  the  question  of 
the  Dardanelles. 

It  must  be  remembered  to  the  eternal  honour  of  Nicholas  I. 
that,  during  the  revolutionary  period  of  1848-1850,  he  supported  DA!ance  of  power- 
Prussia  provided  only  she  respected  treaties,  and  efficiently 
opposed  her  attempts  to  despoil  Denmark  of  the  Elbe  Duchies 
and  usurp  a  supremacy  over  minor  German  States.  The 
Russian  Baltic  Fleet,  acting  together  not  only  with  the 
Swedish  but  also  with  that  of  the  French  Republic,  compelled 
Prussia  to  evacuate  Schleswig-Holstein  and  to  give  up  her 
designs  of  conquest.  He  was  not  less  firm  in  exacting  from  the 
King  of  Prussia  the  renunciation  of  the  Imperial  Crown  of 
Germany,  offered  him  by  the  Frankfort  Parliament,  and  a 
return  to  the  constitution  of  the  Germanic  Confederation. 
In  both  instances  the  autocratic  Emperor  acted  as  a  guardian 
of  the  independence  of  small  States,  as  well  as  of  the  balance 
of  power  in  Europe. 

Nicholas  I.'s  most  criticized  act,  and  one  of  which  he  him- 
self bitterly  repented  afterwards,  was  his  saving  Austria  from 
disruption  by  crushing  the  victorious  insurrection  in  Hungary. 
Russia  received  no  compensation  whatever  for  her  exertions 
and  sacrifices,  not  even  a  war  indemnity.  An  excellent 
opportunity  was  lost  for  putting  an  end  to  that  ramshackle 


*  That  treaty  was  signed  July  8,  1833,  when  at  the  request  of 
Mahmoud  II.,  Russian  troops  were  landed  on  the  Asiatic  side  of  the 
Bosphorus  to  protect  Constantinople  against  the  advance  of  the  Egj^ptian 
Army  after  Ibrahim-Pasha's  victory  over  the  Turks  at  Konieh. 


32  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

Empire,  a  private  domain  of  the  Hapsburgs  who  exploited 
and  oppressed  different  nationalities,  exciting  them  to  strife 
against  one  another,  and  who  were  already  planning  to  extend 
their  sway  over  the  Balkan  Peoples  liberated  by  Russia.  To 
be  quite  fair  to  Nicholas  I.  we  must  add,  however,  that  the 
Russian  intervention  saved  the  Croats  and  Serbs  of  Hungary 
from  the  war  of  extermination  waged  against  them  by  the 
Magyars. 

A  combination  of  various  causes,  chief  among  which  the 
over-rating  in  Western  Europe  of  Russia's  power  of  conquest 
and  assimilation,  as  well  as  a  total  disregard  of  the  national 
spirit  of  the  Balkan  Peoples,  both  secretly  promoted  by  the 
diplomacy  of  Germanic  Powers,  brought  about,  at  the  end 
of  Nicholas  I.'s  reign,  a  coalition  against  Russia.  The  war 
resulted,  however,  in  the  attainment  of  none  of  its  objects. 

England's  trade  with  Russia  passed  into  Germany's  hands, 

and  Western 

£!SS'ti2^£*    and  a  deeP  estrangement  was  created  between  Russia,  on  one 

elusive  friendship 

side,  and  England,  France  and  Austria  on  the  other,  while 
Russo-Prussian  friendship  became  closer  than  it  had  ever 
been.  Prussia's  conduct  towards  Russia  differed  from  that  of 
Austria  in  form  and  degree  rather  than  in  substance.  Prussia 
made,  in  1855,  an  alliance  with  Austria  guaranteeing  her 
territory  against  an  attack  of  Russia.  Thus  Austria  could 
invade  Russia  without  any  opposition  from  Prussia,  but 
should  Russia  repulse  that  invasion  and  attempt  to  attack 
Austrian  territory,  Prussia  would  make  a  war  on  her.  Con- 
sidering that  Russia  had  saved  Prussia,  not  once,  but  several 
times,  from  utter  annihilation,  her  ingratitude  was  in  no  way 
less  than  that  of  Austria.  Yet  while  Austrian  leading  states- 
men themselves  declared  they  would  astonish  the  World 
by  their  ingratitude,  the  Prussian  Court  and  diplomacy 


NICHOLAS  I.  33 

knew  how  to  represent  their  conduct  as  a  new  proof  of  their 
fidelity  to  their  traditional  friendship  with  Russia.  They 
were  promptly  aided  in  deluding  the  Russian  Court  and 
Government  by  the  German-Russian  circles  in  St.  Petersburg, 
supported  by  the  whole  St.  Petersburg  bureaucracy.  The 
elimination  of  the  Austrian  diplomatic  influence  which,  directed 
by  Metternich,  had  successfully  rivalled  that  of  Prussia, 
left  the  Prussian  influence  in  Russia  without  any  counter- 
poise. The  proverbial  luck  of  the  King  of  Prussia  never  was 
better  proved,  for  the  Crimean  War  practically  placed  the 
power  of  Russia  at  the  services  of  him  who  appeared  as  her 
only  friend. 

The  high-souled,  chivalrous  and  patriotic  Nicholas  I.  died 
broken-hearted  with  grief  at  the  failure  of  his  strenuous 
efforts  to  assure  peace  and  prosperity  to  Russia.  Not  the 
least  painful  for  him  was  his  inability  even  to  attempt 
to  introduce  the  one  progressive  reform  he  had  at  heart  all 
his  life,  the  emancipation  of  the  serfs. 

Russia  was  never  governed  more  strictly  according  to  German 
ideas  than  under  Nicholas  I.  ;  and  yet  that  very  military, 
police  and  bureaucratic  regime  modelled  on  Prussia,  with 
Germans  in  highest  favour  at  Court  and  occupying  most 
responsible  posts  in  the  government,  saw  a  brilliant  era  of 
Russian  poetry  and  literature,  of  Russian  music  and  Russian 
art,  of  Russian  national  culture.  A  daily  Press  hardly  existed 
then,  books  of  any  importance  were  few  and  far  between  ; 
a  censorship,  rigorous  and  suspicious,  arbitrary  and  almost 
prohibitive,  seemed  to  be  there  in  order  to  crush  all  life  of  the 
spirit.  That  notwithstanding,  high  literary  and  political 

Russia. 

talents  in  considerable  number  thronged  round  two  or  three 


in  Russia. 

monthly  reviews  ;  and  their  productiveness  was  so  abundant 


34  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

and  so  valuable  that  it  could  not  be  entirely  kept  down. 
Between  writers  and  readers  was  established  so  close  and 
intimate  a  connection  that  it  permitted  the  writers,  in  terms 
understood  by  the  readers  alone,  as  in  a  code  language,  to 
convey  a  clear  and  full  statement  of  their  thoughts.  We 
cannot  dwell  here  on  the  literary  merit  of  that  movement, 
but  we  must  point  to  its  ultimate  victory  over  the  whole 
system  of  repression  on  the  part  of  the  Germanized  St.  Peters- 
burg bureaucracy.  A  public  opinion  was  created  in  Russia 
and  its  moral  power  has  continuously  and  rapidly  increased. 

Most  °*  ttie  writers  belonged  to  the  school  of  the  Zapadniki 
(Westerners),  centred  in  St.  Petersburg,  eager  to  further  Peter 
the  Great's  "reform,"  a  more  complete  imitation  of  Western 
Europe,  its  liberties  and  self-government.  But  there  was 
another  school,  the  Slavophils,  principally  in  Moscow,  who 
were  conservatives  and  partisans  of  Autocracy,  which  they 
only  wanted  to  be  rendered  thoroughly  Russian.  They 
advocated  a  return  to  the  dress  and  manners,  customs  and 
institutions  of  the  Moscow  period,  the  Zemsky  Sabors  included. 
They  dared  sharply  to  criticise  Peter  the  Great's  "  Reform" 
and  the  whole  St.  Petersburg  regime.  The  Zapadniki  excelled  in 
numbers,  as  well  as  in  variety  of  talents.  The  Slavophils  were 
characterized  by  depth  of  thought,  purity  of  life,  high  moral 
standard  and  ardent  patriotism.  Nevertheless,  these  loyal 
and  devoted  monarchists  were  more  suspected  and  disliked 
by  the  Germanized  bureaucracy  than  even  partisans  of 
republican  and  socialistic  ideas.  Placing  their  class  interests 
before  those  of  the  monarchy  whose  defenders  they  claimed 
to  be,  the  St.  Petersburg  bureaucrats  seized  every  opportunity 
for  persecuting  the  Slavophils  and  hardly  tolerated  their 
existence.  The  time  was  evidently  not  yet  arrived  when 


NICHOLAS  I.  35 

Russians  could  freely  assert  their  nationality  in  their  own 
country. 

Both  schools,  however,  had  one  trait  in  common,  springing  JJ 
from  the  primordial  democratic  character  of  the  Slavic  ««» <*  th 
race — love  of  the  people,  heightened  by  the  consciousness  of 
the  great  historic  wrong  suffered  by  the  free  labourers  of 
Russia  at  the  hands  of  Boris  Godounoff  currying  favour 
with  ambitious  nobles.  Economists,  historians,  philosophers, 
novelists  set  to  work  to  persuade  society  and  the  government 
to  remove  it.*  The  mind  of  the  Nation  was  made  up  on  that 
subject  before  the  first  step  was  taken  by  the  government. 

Nicholas  I.'s  reign  witnessed  the  beginning  of  another  unified  Germ 
remarkable  evolution,  the  appearance  in  public  life  of  Russified 
Germans  who  brought  to  the  service  of  the  Russian  nation- 
ality the  energy  and  efficiency  of  their  own  race.  They  were 
chiefly  offsprings  of  marriages  in  which  either  parent  was 
orthodox,  in  which  case  the  Russian  law  prescribed  that  children 
should  belong  to  the  Orthodox  Church.  Theoretically  that  law 
appears  to  infringe  absolute  religious  freedom,  but  practically 
it  proved  to  be  of  great  benefit  to  Russia.  The  same  result 
was  often  attained,  however,  by  Russian  education  and 
surroundings.  Under  a  Germanized  government  men  of 
German  descent  enjoyed  greater  freedom  of  action  and  could 
more  easily  stand  up  for  Russian  national  rights.  The  first 
Slavophil  Committee  was  founded  by  Hilferding.  The  most 
ardent  Slavophil  of  the  seventies  was  Orest  Miller.  Many 
bearers  of  German  names  in  our  days  not  only  do  not  yield 

*  The  name  of  one  man  deserves  to  be  mentioned  here,  who  helped 
more  than  any  other  to  attain  that  end — I.  S.  Tourgheneff,  whose 
"Memoirs  of  a  Sportsman  "  played,  in  the  emancipation  of  the  Serfs 
in  Russia,  a  part  similar  to  that  of  Mrs.  Beecher  Stowe's  "  Uncle  Tom's 
Cabin  ' '  in  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves  in  America. 


36  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

to  full-blooded  Russians  in  their  devotion  to  Russia,  but  are 
conspicuous  by  their  Russian  national  spirit.  The  late  M. 
Hartwig  earned  the  boundless  hatred  of  all  the  Germans  by 
his  strenuously  carrying  out  Russian  national  and  Slavophil 
policy  in  the  Balkans,  and  was  called  in  Berlin  and  Vienna  the 
most  dangerous  and  fanatical  Panslavist.  The  writer  could 
quote,  from  personal  knowledge,  many  other  German-Russians 
who  are  fighting  in  the  forefront  for  Russia  and  Slavdom. 


37 


CHAPTER  VII. 
ALEXANDER  II.  (1855-1881). 
Alexander  II.  was  a  Liberal  in  the  purest  and  highest  sense  Alexander  n.  M 

~  a  Sreat  Liberal 

of  the  word,  a  believer  in  the  goodness  of  human  nature, 
a  humanitarian,  full  of  generous  impulses.  His  liberalism, 
if  less  radical  than  was  Alexander  I.'s  in  the  beginning  of  his 
reign,  was  much  deeper  and  firmer.  He  certainly  loved  Russia 
and  the  Russian  People  above  everything,  and  was  a  true 
Russian  himself,  combining  the  firm  as  well  as  the  soft 
sides  of  the  Russian  national  character.  He  was  animated 
by  an  ardent  longing,  not  only  to  carry  out  the  reform  most 
desired  by  his  father,  but  to  regenerate  Russia  altogether. 
He  would  have  made  an  ideal  Russian  ruler  had  he  not  also 
had  the  unfortunate  trait  of  both  his  predecessors,  the  belief 
in  the  superior  civilizing  mission  of  Germany  and  the  trust 
in  the  friendship  of  the  Hohenzollerns. 

The  emancipation  of  the  serfs  was  effected  by  Alexander  II. 
in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  the  new  aristocracy,  the  descen- 
dants of  the  favourites  and  great  bureaucrats  of  the  preceding 
reigns.  The  Emperor's  strenuous  insistence  and  unshakeable 
determination  finally  prevailed  over  all  obstacles.  The  great 
measure  was  open  to  many  criticisms  from  the  juridical, 
economical  and  financial  standpoint.  To  conservatives  it 
appeared  too  radical  and  too  democratic,  almost  revolutionary, 
as  giving  no  compensation  to  serf-owners  for  the  loss  of  the 


38  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

gratuitous  work  of  their  serfs,  and  as  expropriating  them  in 
order  to  give  a  part  of  their  land  to  the  emancipated.  Liberals, 
on  the  contrary,  complained  of  the  insufficiency  of  the  land 
allotted  to  former  serfs  and  would  have  liked  to  see  it  given 
them  without  indemnifying  the  landowners.*  However, 
by  the  passing  of  that  law  the  wrong  done  to  the  peasantry 
by  Boris  Godounoff  was  made  good,  and  the  descendants  of 
the  wronged  were  compensated  with  land,  the  acquisition  of 
which  was  facilitated  to  them  by  the  government.  That  one 
reform  practically  amounted  to  a  peaceful  revolution,  and  laid 
a  basis  for  a  reconstruction  of  the  whole  fabric  of  the  Russian 
State.  After  the  emancipation  was  passed  in  1861,  Russia 
was  already  quite  different  from  what  she  had  been  during 
the  Crimean  war.  Those  who  take  her  as  being  the  same  now 
are  more  than  half  a  century  late  in  their  European  history. 

The  second  great  reform  was  that  of  Justice,  the  creation 
of  Courts  of  Justice  independent  of  the  executive  power. 
Recognizing  that  the  high  cost  of  justice  placed  it  at  the 
disposal  of  the  rich  alone,  the  Russian  legislator  strove  to  render 
justice  accessible  to  the  people  at  large,  thus  giving  that  reform 
a  decided  democratic  character.  The  third  not  less  great 
reform  was  the  introduction  of  a  new  way  of  local  self- 
government,  the  creation  of  the  Zemstvos,  provincial  and 
district  representative  assemblies,  elected  by  all  classes 


*  Contemporaneously  with  the  emancipation  of  the  serfs  in  Russia 
took  place  that  of  the  slaves  in  the  United  States  of  North  America. 
Although  it  would  not  be  fair  to  overlook  the  greater  difficulties  of  the 
latter  owing  to  the  race  question,  one  cannot  but  be  greatly  impressed 
by  the  Russian  measure,  much  more  radical  than  the  American,  being 
achieved  without  any  serious  perturbation,  not  to  speak  of  a  civil  war. 
The  emancipated  slaves  numbered  about  3^  millions  ;  the  Russian 
serfs  were  22  millions  belonging  to  the  Noblesse  and  21  millions  owned 
by  the  State,  about  43  millions  in  all. 


ALEXANDER  II.  39 

of  the  population.  They  were  a  continuation  and  an  expansion 
of  Catherine's  Assemblies  of  the  Noblesse.    And  just  as  the 
latter  prepared  men  for  the  work  of  the  Zemstvos,  these  formed 
other  men  for  the  work  of  the  State  Douma. 
Among  other  reforms  should  be  mentioned  an  extension  p«ater  reu^oua 

tolerance. 

of  municipal  self-government ;  an  abolition  of  all  censorship 
for  books  and  of  a  preventive  one  for  newspapers,  a  beginning 
of  the  freedom  of  the  Press ;  also  a  greater  religious  tolerance, 
a  milder  treatment  of  the  Russian  dissenters  (raskolniki). 
The  writer  cannot  here  omit  pointing  to  one  of  the  grossest 
errors  concerning  Russia  consistently  imposed  by  the  Germans 
on  public  opinion  in  England,  the  pretended  intolerance 
towards  West  European  Churches  in  Russia.  Since  the  begin- 
ning of  the  St.  Petersburg  period  all  West  Europeans  were 
treated  in  Russia  as  superior  beings,  and  enjoyed  all  freedom 
which  was  denied  to  Russians ;  their  churches  were  much 
more  independent  of  the  State  than  the  so-called  "  dominant " 
Church  of  Russia.  The  Lutheran  Church,  to  which  belonged 
the  German  Noblesse  of  the  Baltic  provinces  as  well  as  a  large 
part  of  the  St.  Petersburg  Court  and  bureaucracy,  was 
practically  the  most  privileged  church  in  Russia.  Restrictions 
were  imposed  upon  that  part  of  the  Roman  Catholic  clergy 
which  had  a  leading  r61e  in  Polish  political  agitation  ;  but  real 
intolerance  was  practised  only  regarding  Dissenters  from 
Russian  Orthodoxy. 

The  Dissenting  movement  originated  in  a  protest  against 
the  "  correction  "  of  the  copies  of  the  Bible  and  of  the  rites 
of  the  Church  of  Russia  to  bring  them  into  agreement  with 
the  Orthodox  Churches  of  the  East,  and  had  grown  enormously 
since  the  Westernizing  "  Reform "  of  Peter  the  Great.  It 
constituted,  as  we  remarked  before,  a  form  of  national  protest 


40  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

against  the  compulsory  imposition  of  foreign  ways  of  life. 
The  German  rulers  of  Russia  saw  in  it  a  direct  opposition 
to  their  power  over  that  country,  and  Biron  instituted  against 
those  sectarians  a  systematic  persecution.  Catherine,  very 
tolerant  herself,  introduced  as  much  tolerance  towards  the 
Dissenters  as  was  compatible  with  the  spirit  of  the  Russian 
upper  classes  at  the  time.  Their  treatment  became  harder 
again  under  Nicholas  I.,  but  Alexander  II.  rightly  saw  in  the 
Dissenters  Russians  misled  by  false  doctrines,  but  who  had 
faithfully  preserved  their  nationality  and  loyalty  towards  the 
throne  and  the  country.  When  he  had,  partially  at  least, 
eased  their  condition,  a  deputation  of  the  Old  Believers  told 
him  : — "  In  the  innovations  of  Thy  reign  we  see  the  good  old 
times  so  dear  to  us  coming  back  again."  That  was  the  best 
testimony  for  the  character  at  once  liberal  and  national  of 
Alexander  II. 's  home  policy.  Nothing  proves  better  the  mis- 
leading influence  in  Western  Europe  of  the  opinions  "  made 
in  Germany"  than,  on  one  side,  the  acceptance  as  truth  of 
the  perfectly  false  accusations  of  intolerance  towards  West 
European  faiths  and,  on  the  other,  a  total  absence  of 
sympathy  with  the  victims  of  real  intolerance.* 

Largely  democratic  reforms  were  introduced  by  Alexander 
II.  in  Finland,  making  the  Finnish  language,  spoken  by  the 
people,  to  be  the  official  language  of  the  country,  beside  the 
Swedish  spoken  by  the  upper  classes,  and  giving  the  Finnish 
people  in  general  equal  rights  with  the  Swedish  minority. 
Reforms  very  favourable  to  the  Poles  were  planned  and  were 
being  applied,  when  most  unfortunately  an  insurrection  stirred 


*  The  only  well-known  writer  who  showed  a  sympathetic  interest 
in  Russian  Dissenters  was  Hepworth  Dixon  in  his  books  on  Russia. 


ALEXANDER  II.  4! 

up  from  abroad  by  the  enemies  of  both  Slavic  peoples  defeated 
the  work  of  Alexander  II. 

The  reforming  Emperor  intended  to  crown  the  edifice  by 
the  grant  of  a  constitution.  Just  at  the  moment  when  he  was 
going  to  carry  out  his  plan  he  fell  a  victim  of  a  most  undeserved 
catastrophe.  Never  was  there  perpetrated  a  crime  more 
abominable  and  more  stupid !  It  put  the  clock  back  in  Russia 
for  a  quarter  of  a  century. 

It  is  painful  to  pass  from  a  survey  of  Alexander  II.'s  home  0li 

guided  by  Ms 

policy  to  that  of  his  foreign  one.    Only  one  common  trait  SSSE?J2dui 

trait  in  William  I. 

unites  both,  purity  and  generosity  of  motives.  His  foreign 
policy  was  guided  by  his  general  German  sympathies,  by  his 
deep  regard  for  and  complete  trust  in  his  maternal  uncle, 
William  I.  of  Prussia,  and  also  the  influence  of  Bismarck 
with  him  and  his  Chancellor,  Gortchakoff.  The  Prussian 
sympathies  of  the  Court,  of  the  diplomatic  service  and  the  higher 
bureaucracy  had  a  similar  effect.  The  almost  universal  dis- 
approval of  that  policy  by  Russian  public  opinion,  as  well  as 
the  misgivings  of  clearsighted  statesmen  and  writers,  were 
utterly  disregarded.  Yet  each  of  the  three  great  successive 
stages  of  the  rise  of  Prussia  was  not  less  directly  harmful 
to  the  vital  interests  of  Russia,  than  to  those  of  Europe  in 
general. 

The  conquest  of  Schleswig-Holstein  changed  the  balance 
of  power  on  the  Baltic,  depriving  Russia  of  her  predominance 
there  and  preparing  that  of  Germany.  The  exclusion  of  Austria 
from  the  Germanic  Confederation  destroyed  the  balance  of 
power  within  the  latter,  which  both  the  greatest  rulers  of 
Russia,  Peter  and  Catherine,  were  so  anxious  to  preserve, 
and  it  necessarily  made  the  minor  German  States  dependent 
on  Prussia.  At  the  same  time,  Austria's  exclusion  from 


William 

ackno 

decisi 


42  RUSSIA  AND  DEMOCRACY. 

Germany,  together  with  the  loss  of  her  possessions  in  Italy, 
made  her  extension  into  the  Balkans  the  one  aim  of  the  Austrian 
policy,  placing  Austria  in  an  irreconcilable  antagonism  to 
Russia  and  obliging  her  to  seek  an  alliance  with  Germany. 
Finally,  the  German  victory  over  France  led  to  a  definitive 
unification  of  Germany  under  Prussia,  and  to  the  restoration 
of  the  German  Empire  with  its  traditional  claims  of  universal 
supremacy,  as  the  heir  of  the  Roman  Empire. 

The  clearest  interest  and  duty  of  the  Russian  Government 
was  to  have  prevented  those  achievements,  or  at  least 
provided  each  time  some  compensations  or  guarantees 
with  the  view  of  maintaining  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe. 

It  seems  incredible,  but  is  nevertheless  true,  that 
Alexander  II.  zealously  supported  'and  enthusiastically 
rejoiced  over  them.  In  1870,  particularly,  it  was  Russia's 
threat  to  attack  Austria,  if  she  joined  France,  which  made 
Austria,  and  through  her  Italy  also,  renounce  their  alliance 
with  Napoleon  III.  The  conditions  imposed  on  France 
appeared,  in  truth,  too  hard  in  St.  Petersburg,  but  Bismarck 
won  Alexander  II.'s  consent  by  assuring  him  that  otherwise 
William  I.  would  lose  his  throne  and  monarchy  would  be 
Lwiedge«tte  imperilled  in  Europe.  William  I.  spoke  the  truth  when,  on  the 

ve  value  of 

conclusion  of  peace,  he  telegraphed  his  thanks  to  Alexander 
II.,  declaring  that  "  after  the  Almighty,  it  was  to  him  that 
Germany  owed  most  of  her  success." 

The  Russian  government  demanded  no  equivalent  for  the 
immeasurably  valuable  assistance  they  had  lent  to  Prussia. 
Alexander  II.,  Gortchakoff  and  all  the  friends  of  Germany  in 
St.  Petersburg  firmly  believed,  however,  that  William  I. 
and  Bismarck  would  seize  the  first  opportunity  for  testifying, 


ALEXANDER  II.  43 

by  deeds,  the  boundless  gratitude  they  expressed  so  often 
and  in  such  glowing  terms.  The  Balkan  crisis  of  1875-78 
seemed  to  afford  the  best  opportunity  for  doing  so,  and  it 
looked  as  if  Bismarck  had  indeed  resolved  to  avail  himself  e 

of  it  in  order  to  pay  off  Germany's  debt  to  Russia  and  thus 
to  secure  her  friendship  for  ever.  The  confidence  of  the  Russian 
governing  circles  in  Bismarck's  devotion  to  them  had  grown 
to  such  an  extent  that  they  applied  to  him  for  advice  in  all 
important  matters  and  he  became  the  actual  leader  of  the 
foreign  policy  of  Russia. 

Bismarck's  real  aims  and  the  origin  of  the  Balkan  crisis 
were  well  known  to  a  few  observers  (among  them  the  present 
writer),  who  repeatedly  warned  Russian  diplomatists  against 
their  delusions,  but  could  not  make  them  realize  the  unpalatable 
truth.  In  May,  1875,  Bismarck,  greatly  impressed  by  the  rapid 
recovery  of  France  after  her  terrible  disaster,  decided  to  strike 
a  new  and  more  crushing  blow.  The  usual  Press  campaign 
was  particularly  violent,  and  was  accompanied  by  military 
preparations  of  an  undoubtedly  threatening  character.  All 
Europe  was  alarmed,  and  Alexander  II.,  as  a  proved  friend  of 
Germany,  advised  William  I.  to  abstain  from  an  aggression 
which  could  not  be  approved  by  Russia.  His  advice  was 
supported  by  similar  representations  of  the  British  government. 
Both  Russia  and  England  had,  to  a  different  degree,  been 

Germany  frotni 

favourable  to  the  unification  of  Germany,  but  neither  of  them 
wished  to  see  a  further  diminution  of  France.  Bismarck 
stoutly  denied  having  ever  thought  of  attacking  France. 
Struck  by  the  wholly  unexpected  concurrence  of  England  and 
Russia,  he  resolved  to  prevent  a  repetition  of  it  in  future  by 
pushing  Russia  into  a  war  which  would  at  once  weaken  her 
and  place  her  in  opposition  with  England. 


44 


RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 


Bismarck  decides 
to  weaken  Rnuia 
by  ww  and  to 
place  her  in 
antagonism  to 
England. 


Germany  inooiet 
toBtirup 
taurarrtctioo  in 
Berzegovla*. 


The  story  of  the  German  policy  in  1875-78  is  most  instruc- 
tive, and  ought  to  be  told  in  detail.  The  writer  hopes  to  be 
able  to  do  it  in  another  work  ;  here  he  is  only  going  to  point 
to  the  most  striking  facts  which  have  never  yet  seen  the  light 
of  day.  Bismarck  went  on  preparing  the  war  he  held  to  be 
necessary  for  rendering  Germany  supreme  in  the  same 
unscrupulous  manner  as  William  II.  in  our  days.  The  interests 
of  all  other  Nations  and  of  Humanity  itself,  as  well  as  all  moral 
principles,  were  entirely  subordinated  to  that  one  goal.  The 
only  difference  lay  in  the  sense  of  realities,  and  in  the 
adaptation  of  means  to  ends,  which  characterized  Bismarck's 
action  and  ensured  its  success. 

As  the  Turkish  misrule  gave  a  permanent  ground  of  dis- 
content to  the  Christians  of  Turkey,  it  was  easy  to  stir  up 
among  them  an  insurrection  which  would  involve  the  Balkan 
States  and,  later  on,  Russia.  Bismarck  chose  for  that  purpose 
Herzegovina,  peopled  by  war-like  tribes  and  contiguous  to 
Austrian  territory.  He  imparted  his  ideas  to  high  personages 
of  the  Vienna  Court.  Francis  Joseph's  approval  was  easily 
obtained,  and  the  execution  was  entrusted  to  an  ambitious 
Slav  general,  Roditch,  governor  general  of  Dalmatia.  The 
plan  was  kept  secret  from  the  Austro-Hungarian  Foreign 
Minister,  Count  Andrassy,  who,  at  that  epoch,  like  most 
Magyars,  was  opposed  to  any  increase  of  the  Slav  population 
of  the  Hapsburg  monarchy.  The  first  rising  occurred  among 
the  protege's  of  Austria,  the  Catholics  of  Herzegovina,  while 
the  Orthodox  majority  of  the  country  was  rather  un- 
favourable to  the  movement.  They  were  finally  drawn  into 
it ;  Bosnia  followed  their  example  ;  and  a  year  later,  Serbia 
and  Montenegro  joined  the  brethren  of  their  race. 

The  Turks,  as  usual,  committed  many  atrocities,  not  only 


ALEXANDER  II.  45 

in  Herzegovina  and  Bosnia,  but  also  in  Bulgaria.  Public 
opinion  was  stirred  up  in  all  Europe,  and  nowhere  did  the 
indignation  rise  higher  or  find  a  more  eloquent  expression  than 
in  England.  The  Russian  people,  who  were  always  deploring 
the  oppression  of  Eastern  Christians  and  longing  to  free  them 
from  it,  were  most  impressed  by  Gladstone's  thundering 
indictment  against  Turkey,  and  felt  they  could  no  longer 
remain  passive.  Numerous  volunteers  of  all  classes  went  out 
to  help  Serbia,  and  those  of  the  peasantry,  when  asked  why 
they  were  doing  it,  mostly  answered : — "  To  suffer  for 
Christ!"* 
The  Russian  government,  taken  unawares  by  these  events 

.  .  Government  to 

in  the  midst  of  vast  reforms  necessitating  financial  operations  m»ke  ™- 
whose  success  depended  on  the  maintenance  of  peace,  were 
most  unwilling  to  go  to  war.  They  asked  the  advice  of — 
Bismarck.  This  candid  friend  expressed  his  astonishment  at 
the  hesitations  of  the  Russian  diplomacy,  criticized  its 
indecision,  and  ridiculed  its  fear  of  England  and  Austria. 
He  positively  promised  that  Germany  would  prevent  any  inter- 

and  ascribes 

vention  of  other  Powers,  and  would  see  to  it  that  Russia  fio 

concerning  bu 

should  not  be  despoiled  of  the  fruit  of  her  efforts. f  Later  on 
he  saw  in  the  continued  moderation  of  Russia  a  doubt  of 
Germany's  and  his  own  loyalty.  He  told  d'Oubril : — "  A 
repetition  by  Germany  of  the  Austrian  betrayal  in  1855  is 
unthinkable,  particularly  when  I  am  at  the  helm/'f  .  .  .  "  It 

*  The  writer,  who  was  in  Moscow  in  the  autumn  of  1876,  heard  that 
answer  repeatedly  from  those  peasants  who  had  made  a  vow  to  go  on 
pilgrimage  to  Jerusalem,  and  thought  it  was  still  better  to  go  to  fight 
the  enemies  of  Christ.  The  same  religious  spirit  animates  the  Russian 
people  in  the  present  war. 

t  Reports  by  d'Oubril,  Russian  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  of  December 
17  and  23,  1876. 

{  Report  by  the  same  of  April  6,  1877. 


46 


RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 


Simultaneously 
bt  waixs  Austria. 
again  it  Ruraia 
and  pro  miie  s 
Ckrmar  y  s  support 
to  Austria. 


Success  of 
Bismarck's  plans. 
He  promises 
Russia  to  get  the 
Berlin  Congress 
to  ratify  the 
treaty  of 
St.  Stefano. 


is  in  the  traditions  of  Austria  to  keep  a  dagger  in  her  bosom 
in  or4er  to  strike  a  friend ;  it  is  not  Germany  who  would  be 
capable  of  such  a  dastardly  policy."* 

It  is  now  known  from  Austrian,  as  well  as  from  German 
authentic  sources  that,  simultaneously  with  those  assurances, 
Bismarck  was  warning  the  Vienna  Cabinet  of  the  hostile 
designs  of  Russia  against  it.  He  even  informed  Andrassy 
that,  asked  by  Russia  about  Germany's  attitude  in  case 
Russia  attacked  Austria,  he  firmly  declared  Germany  would 
defend  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy  with  all  her  forces. 

Bismarck's  plans  succeeded  perfectly.  The  Russian  Govern- 
ment were  drawn  into  the  war  they  neither  planned  nor 
wished.  England  stifled  her  generous  impulses  under  the  pre- 
sumed necessity  of  defending  her  Empire  from  an  imminent 
danger.  Austria,  tempted  by  an  eventual  gain  of  territory, 
fell  under  Germany's  influence.  However,  Russia,  after 
lavishly  shedding  the  blood  of  her  sons  and  squandering  her 
material  resources,  just  then  most  needed  for  her  internal 
regeneration,  overcame  all  obstacles  set  to  her  Crusade.  She 
compelled  Turkey  to  accept  the  resurrection  of  Bulgaria, 
the  independence  of  Roumania  and  of  Serbia,  and  the 
liberation  of  Macedonia/)*  The  Powers  who  "  put  their 


*  Report  of  April  20,  1877. 

f  Article  2  of  the  treaty  of  St.  Stefano  says  : — "  La  Sublime  Porte 
recommit  definitivement  1'independance  de  la  Principante  du 
Montenegro,"  The  Turkish  occasional  pretensions  to  a  suzerainty  of 
Montenegro  never  having  had  any  real  foundation  whatever  the 
definitive  renunciation  to  them  by  the  Porte  was  not  counted  as  a 
gain  by  either  Montenegro  or  Russia,  and  had  only  a  retrospective 
value.  The  crushing  by  Russia  of  the  Turkish  power  of  resistance 
paved  the  way  to  a  subsequent  interpolation  in  the  treaty  of  Berlin 
of  a  clause  in  favour  of  a  rectification  of  the  Turco-Greek  frontier  which 
was  subsequently  developed  into  a  cession  of  Thessaly  to  Greece  by  the 
treaty  of  Constantinople,  May,  1881. 


ALEXANDER  II.  47 

money  on  a  wrong  horse  "  threatened  to  make  war  on  Russia 
unless  the  treaty  of  San  Stefano  was  revised.  Bismarck  won 
Russia's  consent  to  it  by  promising  so  to  direct  the  discussions 
of  the  Congress  as  to  secure  the  recognition  of  the  stipulations 
of  that  treaty.  The  belief  in  Bismarck's  devotion  to  Russia 
was  so  absolute  at  the  St.  Petersburg  Court  that  one  of  the 
highest  personages  of  Russia  wrote  to  the  Emperor : — 
"  Bismarck  is  sure  to  arrange  everything  in  the  best  way  for 
us,  if  only  Gortchakoff  does  not  spoil  it." 

Bismarck  arranged,  indeed,  everything  in  the  best  way 
for — Germany.  Liberated  Macedonia  was  given  back  to 
Turkey,  the  lot  of  her  Christian  inhabitants  was  much 
worsened,  and  for  35  years  more  the  unfortunate  province 
constituted  the  chief  centre  of  unrest  in  the  Near  East  and  a 
source  of  everlasting  conflicts  among  the  Balkan  States  as  well 
as  among  the  Great  Powers.  Germany  alone  profited  by  it, 
directly  or  indirectly  frustrating  every  scheme  of  reforms, 
and  appearing  in  the  eyes  of  the  Turks  as  their  only  friend. 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  who  had  struggled  and  suffered 
most  of  all,  were  placed  under  the  Austrian  yoke,  more 
dangerous  for  their  religion  and  nationality  than  was  the 
Turkish.  Austria  became  a  Balkan  Power  and  strove  to 
dominate  the  whole  Peninsula  ;  acting  henceforward  in  an 
irreconcilable  antagonism  to  Russia,  she  was  thus  made  entirely 
dependent  on  the  support  of  Germany  and  had  to  submit 
to  her  leadership.  England  and  Russia,  who  had  seemed  at 
one  moment  to  be  quite  united  in  their  sympathy  with  the 
Eastern  Christians  and  in  their  condemnation  of  Turkish 
tyranny,  became  more  than  ever  estranged  the  one  from  the 
other,  and  their  co-operation  in  any  question  was  for  a  long 
time  rendered  impossible.  Russia,  considerably  weakened 


48  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

and  exhausted,  could  no  more  dispute  German  pre-eminence 
in  Europe. 
Alexander  II.  naturally  experienced  a  most  cruel  disappoint- 

Alexander  IT. 

ment.  When,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Oriental  crisis,  a  Russian 
statesman  cautiously  uttered  some  doubts  concerning  the 
German  policy,  the  Emperor,  looking  painfully  surprised, 
asked  him  : — "  Do  you  doubt  my  uncle's  honour  ?  "  The 
alliance  of  Germany  with  Austria  unmistakeably  proved  those 
doubts  were  quite  justified.  William  I.  himself  was  perfectly 
aware  of  the  moral  value  of  his  policy.  He  wrote  to  Bismarck 
that  to  conclude  an  alliance  against  Alexander  II.,  after  all 
he  had  done  for  Germany,  was  "  manifestly  dishonourable." 
Nevertheless,  he  finally  concluded  it. 

A  high  dignitary  of  the  Court  of  Berlin,  very  attached  to 
William  I.  and  hostile  to  Bismarck,  confided  to  the  writer 
the  "true  reason"  of  that  Emperor's  consent  to  the  alliance 
against  Russia.  That  consent  was  won  by  Bismarck's  quoting 
the  words  of  Frederick  II. : — "  We  Kings  of  Prussia  sacrifice 
to  the  State,  not  only  our  life,  but  also  our  honour."  The 
old  courtier  added  : — "that  was  of  course  an  argument  which 
the  Emperor  could  never  withstand." 


49 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

ALEXANDER  III  (1881-1894). 


Alexander  III.  ascended  the  throne  under  the  immediate 
impression  of  his  father's  terrible  fate.  It  was  but  natural 
that  he  should,  first  of  all,  seek  to  consolidate  the  lawful  order 
and  to  strengthen  the  power  and  efficiency  of  his  Government. 
Bismarck  knew  how  to  profit  by  that  state  of  things,  and 
offered  a  renewal  of  the  Russo-German  friendship  on  the 
basis,  not  of  sentiment,  but  of  practical  usefulness  ;  explicit 
agreements  were  to  secure  precise  mutual  advantages.  He 
succeeded,  moreover,  in  throwing  the  responsibility  at  the 
Berlin  Congress  on  Gortchakoff,  who  had  "  misunderstood 
him  and  thwarted  Bismarck's  disinterested  efforts  to  serve 
the  Russian  cause."  Nothing  could  be  cleverer  and  more 
advantageous  to  Germany.  Her  treachery  to  Russia  was  thus 
condoned,  and  she  was  credited  with  having  repaid  the 
services  of  Russia  and  so  owing  her  no  gratitude  in  future. 

The  apparent  frankness  and  outspokenness  of  Bismarck's 

Three  Emp«row 

proposals  appealed  to  the  straightforward  and  practical  r< 
mind  of  Alexander  III.,  and  the  Germanophil  elements  in 
St.  Petersburg  enthusiastically  supported  the  return  to  the 
old  policy.  The  year  1885  saw  the  restoration  of  the  Alliance 
of  the  Three  Emperors,  the  greatest  and  last  success  of 
Bismarck.  The  true  character  of  it  was  best  described  by 
German  comic  papers  which  represented  Austria  as  a 

E 


50  RUSSIA  AND  DEMOCRACY. 

tame  elephant  decoying  a  wild  one,  Russia,  into  the  custody 
of  a  keeper,  Germany.  Bismarck's  plan,  as  the  writer,  residing 
in  Berlin,  1885-92,  was  able  to  ascertain  from  authoritative 
German  sources,  was  to  push  on  Austria  to  the  ^Egean  Sea 
and  Russia  towards  India,  then  to  compel  France  to  enter  a 
customs  Union  with  Germany  and  to  become  her  political 
vassal  like  Austria.  After  years  of  the  struggle  between  the 
Elephant  and  the  Whale,  the  Central  European  Federation, 
led  by  Germany,  would  have  imposed  peace  on  them, 
receiving  compensations  from  both  sides.* 

But  Alexander  III.,  while  faithfully  fulfilling  his  part  of 
the  agreement,  clearly  saw  through  Bismarck's  fallacies  and 

»llt»ncVwkh 

became  fully  aware  of  the  deceit  practised  by  him  on  Russia. 
He  took  courageously  the  only  counter-measure  possible, 
he  concluded  an  alliance  with  France.  Those  only  who 
realized  the  strength  and  subtlety  of  the  German  influences 
at  the  Russian  Court  and  in  the  Russian  Government  could 
duly  appreciate  the  greatness  of  Alexander  III.'s  achievement. 
He  was  enabled  to  perform  it  by  his  remarkably  clear  though 
limited  vision  of  Russia' a  position  and  interests,  and  by  his 
indomitable  fortitude  in  carrying  out  every  decision  once 
adopted.  He  never  hesitated  to  sacrifice  his  preferences 
and  prejudices  to  the  good  of  his  country.  A  firm  believer  in 
autocracy  he  nevertheless  became  the  sincere  ally  of  a  republic. 
The  Germans  and  Germany-serving  elements  in  Russia  bowed 


*  To  the  writer's  private  knowledge,  during  the  short  existence  of 
the  renewed  Alliance  of  the  Three  Emperors,  Bismarck  made  a  series 
of  attempts  to  embroil  Russia  with  England.  On  the  occasion  of  the 
Penjdeh  incident  in  1885,  he  urged  Russian  diplomatists  to  an  energetic 
action.  In  1886  he  strongly  advised  the  Russian  occupation  of  Bulgaria, 
etc.,  etc.  Once,  in  order  to  overcome  the  objections  against  a  strong 
action,  he  offered  the  support  of  a  German  army  corps. 


ALEXANDER  III.  51 

down  to  the  inevitable,  hoping  to  paralyse  the  new  policy  in 
execution  and  gradually  to  restrict  its  scope  and  singificance. 
Soon  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance, 
one  of  the  highest  and  most  influential  Russian  diplomatists 
tried  to  impress  on  the  writer  that  in  his  work  as  a  publicist, 
he  "ought  to  be  guided  by  that  truth,  that  the  interests  of 
Russia  and  Germany  were  identical." 

The  state  of  mind  of  the  St.  Petersburg  governing  circles, 
as  described  above,  accounts  for  the  astonishing  fact  that 
during  the  reign  of  the  monarch  whose  general  policy  was 
opposed  to  Germany,  the  latter  made  great  progress  in  two 
most  important  directions.  In  the  middle  of  the  eighties, 
just  when  Bismarck  was  once  more  drawing  the  Russian 
diplomacy  into  Germany's  orbit,  the  first  German  military 
and  financial  missions  went  to  Turkey;  and  early  in  the  o 

J  lion  into  Turkey. 

nineties,  the  foundation  of  the  German  domination  was  laid 

on  the  Bosphorus.  In  the  same  period,  the  German  colonization  «•!•*•»  coloniza- 
tion ia  EC— '- 

of  Russia  was  conducted  on  a  large  scale.  German  syndicates, 
directed  by  the  German  Government,  were  buying  land  in 
Russian  Poland  as  well  as  in  Western  and  Southern  Russia, 
which  they  were  afterwards  reselling  to  German  fanners. 
The  influence  of  the  St.  Petersburg  Germans,  adroitly  assisted 
by  the  German  diplomacy,  contrived  to  keep  the  Russian 
Government  in  ignorance  of  so  methodical  an  activity,  which 
was  only  disclosed  by  a  private  investigation  organized  by  a 
Russian  monthly  review  (Roussky  Vestnik).  The  figures 
published  by  it,  showing  the  extent  of  that  pacific  invasion, 
produced  a  great  sensation  at  the  moment,  but  were  soon 
forgotten  by  the  public,  while  the  Germanophil  forces  in  Russia 
succeeded,  first  in  delaying  and  then  in  shelving  all  the  measures 
intended  to  defend  Russia  against  a  disguised  German  conquest. 


52  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

Against  those  colossal  achievements  of  the  German  policy 
we  may  record  one  modest,  but  important  victory  of  the 
Russian  cause  over  Germanism  in  Russia.  The  extraordinary 
privileges  granted  by  Peter  the  Great  to  Esthonia  and 
Livonia,  and  conceded  also  to  Courland  on  its  annexation  by 
Catherine,  made  of  those  provinces  with  their  own  laws  and 
administration,  and  German  as  the  official  language,  an 
imperium  in  imperio ;  they  secured  to  the  German  Noblesse 
an  absolute  control  over  the  non-German  native  population. 
Those  privileges  needed  confirmation  by  every  succeeding 
sovereign,  generally  given  on  his  accession.  Alexander  III. 
declined  to  confirm  them.  This  national  and  democratic 
policy  was  the  first  act  to  lighten  the  terrible  tyranny  of  the 
German  barons  orer  the  people  of  those  provinces. 

I*1  Russia  proper,  the  chief  aim  of  Alexander  III.'s  ministers 

reform* 

was  to  fight  the  revolution,  with  which  object  they  tried  to 
curtail  some  of  Alexander  II. 's  reforms  and  placed  the  eman- 
cipated serfs  under  the  guidance  of  special  functionaries,  thus 
separating  them  from  other  classes  and  keeping  them  in  a 
state  of  half  freedom.  There  are  reasons,  however,  to  think 
that  Alexander  III.  was  personally  not  at  all  opposed  to  free 
institutions  when  once  public  order  and  the  reign  of  law  were 
permanently  secured.  From  statesmen  who  had  approached 
him,  the  writer  learned  that  the  Emperor  felt  a  warm  interest 
in  old  Russian  institutions,  the  Zemsky  Sabors  included. 
It  was  very  unfortunate  he  did  not  find  among  his  advisers 
anyone  who  could  give  him  that  full  information  about  them 
he  desired  to  possess. 

Still,  the  Russian  people  judged  Alexander  III.  aright, 
considering  him  a  thorough  Russian.  It  was  generally  known 
that  he  consistently  refused  to  give  preference  to  Germans  over 


ALEXANDER  III.  53 

Russians  in  the  military  and  civil  services.  He  even  began  to 
Russify  the  Russian  diplomatic  body  ;  he  rendered  the  Russian 
language  obligatory  in  its  domestic  correspondence.  He  made 
himself  greatly  popular  with  the  masses  by  abolishing  Peter 
the  Great's  ordinance  forbidding  servants  of  the  State  to 
wear  the  beard  which  he  himself  allowed  to  grow.  Also  he 
modified  the  uniforms  of  the  army,  making  them  resemble 
national  costumes  still  in  use  with  the  masses.  Such  changes 
may  seem  superficial  to  those  unacquainted  with  Russia,  but 
they  had  a  deep  meaning,  constituting  concessions  to  the  senti- 
ments of  the  great  majority  of  the  people,  or  rather  a  return 
of  the  Monarch  to  the  unaltered  popular  way  of  thinking. 
We  saw  how  Peter  the  Great  caused  a  rift  in  the  Russian 
nation  by  his  compulsory  introduction  of  foreign  manners. 
Alexander  II.  did  a  great  deal  towards  healing  it  by  his 
great  democratic  reforms.  Alexander  III.  added  to  them  the 
adoption  by  the  Sovereign  and  Dynasty  of  some  of  the 
people's  ways.  And  his  pure  and  happy  family  life  set  a  fine 
example  to  Russian  Society,  and  endeared  him  to  the  Russian 
people.  He  was  the  first  quite  national  Emperor  of  Russia,  Alexander  m.  a* 

'     the  founder  «f  a 

and  could  almost  be  regarded  as  the  founder  of  a  new  and  11* 

purely  national  Russian  Dynasty. 


54 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  PRESENT  REIGN  :    PERIOD  OF  CONSERVATISM 
(1894-1905). 

JSS2taSSgBfi«b*  The  Present  reign  in  Russia,  so  full  of  startling  and  decisive 
events,  must  be  regarded  as  an  era  of  fulfilments  and  con- 
summations. The  two  last  reigns  brought  Russia  to  a  turning 
point.  Problems  dating  from  the  dawn  of  Russian  history 
and  vital  for  the  Russian  Empire  came  to  the  front  and  had 
to  be  solved  without  any  further  postponement.  Aspirations 
of  the  Russian  people,  invariably  manifested  through  the 
thousand  years  of  its  existence,  had  to  be  at  last  satisfied, 
if  Russia  was  to  fulfil  her  destiny.  Alexander  II.'s  reforms, 
leading  to  a  reconstruction  of  the  State  and  society  in  con- 
formity with  the  democratic  character  of  the  Slavic  race, 
had  been  abruptly  broken  off,  and  a  reactionary  current  had 
set  in  favourable  to  the  arbitrariness  of  the  bureaucracy 
and  the  privileges  of  the  ruling  circles.  Alexander  III.'s  policy, 
to  free  Russia  inside  and  out  from  a  more  or  less  disguised 
German  yoke,  was  as  yet  uncompleted.  Hostile  forces  were 
working  to  replace  that  yoke.  A  failure  to  take  up  again  and 
completely  to  achieve  both  tasks  would  have  exposed  Russia 
to  either  revolution  or  reaction,  and  helped  the  hereditary 
enemy  of  Slavdom  in  his  designs  to  bring  the  only  great 
Slav  Power  under  his  sway. 


THE   PRESENT  REIGN  I    PERIOD  OF  CONSERVATISM.         55 

Such  were  the  difficulties  and  perils  which  awaited  at  his 
accession  the  twenty-six  years  old  Autocrat  of  Russia.  The 
first  period  of  Nicholas  II. 's  reign,  1894-1905,  appeared  chiefly 
as  a  continuation  of  his  father's  rule.  Alexander  III.'s  great 
achievement,  the  French  Alliance,  was  faithfully  maintained, 
and  his  general  policy,  of  peace  abroad  and  order  at  home, 
carefully  pursued.  A  strong  minister,  Plehve,  made  a  determined 
attempt,  on  the  one  hand  to  stamp  out  the  revolutionary 
agitation  by  force,  on  the  other,  so  to  amend  and  regularize  the 
bureaucracy  as  to  enable  it  to  go  on  governing  Russia  without 
the  co-operation  of  independent  social  elements.  This  attempt 
proved  a  decided  failure.  The  systematic  repression  of  the 
revolutionary  movement  by  force  alone,  though  it  greatly 
restrained  its  outbursts,  did  not  succeed  in  eradicating  it.  On 
the  contrary,  that  agitation,  till  then  confined  to  groups  of 
intellectuals,  penetrated  into  the  working  classes  of  large  cities 
and  even,  by  forged  proclamation  in  the  name  of  the  Tsar, 
incited  the  peasants  to  burn  the  landlords'  mansions  and  seize 
their  property.  The  Zemstvos  and  the  municipalities,  the 
propertied  and  the  professional  classes,  unduly  restrained 
and  interfered  with  in  their  activity,  were  dissatisfied  and  had 
no  means  of  defending  their  interests  and  combating  the 
revolution.  The  bureaucratic  machine  was  already  in  an 
advanced  state  of  deterioration,  and  private  interests  dominated 
the  bureaucrats.  Members  of  influential  coteries,  at  the 
Court  and  in  the  administration,  feeling  themselves  threatened 
in  the  enjoyment  of  their  illegal  privileges,  were  trying 
betimes  to  get  for  themselves,  to  the  detriment  of  the  State, 
as  many  private  advantages  as  they  could.  Corruption 
of  all  kinds  and  on  a  large  scale  was  alarmingly  on  the 
increase. 


56 


RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 


CD 


' 


of  the  privileged  to  retain  the  power  in  their 
hands  were  systematically  encouraged  and  assisted  by  German 
influences  within  and  without.  The  policy  of  the  Berlin 
Government  towards  Russia  underwent  a  radical  change 
after  the  unification  of  Germany.  Weak  Prussia  needed  a 
strong  Russia  to  protect  her  and  to  help  to  attain  her  aims 
of  aggrandisement.  But,  when,  thanks  to  the  unselfish  services 
of  Russia,  Prussia  had  absorbed  Germany,  she  wanted  her 
late  protector  to  become  her  satellite,  and  in  order  to  ensure 
this,  considered  it  necessary  first  to  weaken  Russia  by  pushing 
her  into  hazardous  and  disastrous  undertakings.  She  could 
succeed  only  by  the  help  of  those  irresponsible  coteries  whose 
influence  she  was  trying  to  maintain. 

As  Germany  herself  now  cast  eyes  on  the  Near  East  she  tried 
to  divert  Russia's  attention  from  it  and  direct  it  towards  the 
Far  East.  Her  efforts  were  crowned  with  success,  and  she 
could  undertake  the  construction  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  and 
establish  her  exclusive  influence  on  the  Bosphorus.  German 
diplomacy  hoped  also  to  utilize  the  German  leanings  of  St. 
Petersburg  in  order  to  effect,  with  the  help  of  Russia,  a 
rapprochement  with  France.  During  the  South  African 
War  the  Berlin  Cabinet,  and  the  Emperor  William  himself, 
strained  every  nerve  to  form  a  coalition  against  Great  Britain. 
The  pronounced  friendliness  of  the  Emperor  Nicholas  towards 
the  latter  disconcerted  those  schemes. 

Lack  of  space  does  not  allow  us  to  relate  here  the  German 
wiles  in  order  to  involve  Russia  into  a  war  with  Japan.  After 
succeeding  in  that,  Germany  gave  Russia  an  apparently 
generous  guarantee  of  the  safety  of  the  Western  Russian 
frontier  and  an  assurance  that  she  would  not  undertake 
anything  in  Europe  to  the  disadvantage  of  Russia.  Immediately 


THE  PRESENT  REIGN  !     PERIOD  OF  CONSERVATISM.        57 

afterwards,  however,  she  began  to  press  for  the  conclusion 

of  a  Russo-German  treaty  of  commerce ;    and   during  the  V****  **• treaty 

»  °  of  commerce 


negotiations,  the  German  Government  made  capital  out  of  %• 
its  "generosity,"  frequently  hinting  it  would  be  put  to  a 
severe  test  should  Russia  not  prove  her  gratitude  by  far- 
reaching  commercial  concessions.  All  discussion  of  that 
treaty  pending  its  conclusion  was  suppressed  in  the  Russian 
Press,  and  it  was  only  last  year,  at  the  approach  of  negotiations 
for  a  new  treaty,  that  competent  Russian  specialists  were  at 
last  able  to  point  out  the  one-sided  charges  it  imposed  on 
Russia,  so  that  in  fact  the  treaty  amounted  to  the  payment  of 
an  immense  tribute.  Notwithstanding  this  Germany  began, 
just  before  the  conclusion  of  the  Peace  of  Portsmouth,  a 
diplomatic  campaign  against  France  and,  as  is  known  to  the 
writer  from  the  best  German  sources,  contemplated  sending 
an  ultimatum  to  Russia,  asking  if  she  intended  to  maintain 
her  alliance  with  France,  in  which  case,  Germany,  "  to  her  Projected « 

on  France  and 

sincere  regret,"  would  be  obliged  by  military  considerations 
to  direct  her  main  forces  first  of  all  against  the  Russian  frontier. 
It  -is  possible  that  those  intentions,  and  the  unguarded  state 
of  the  frontier  in  consequence  of  the  German  pledges, 
accelerated  the  end  of  the  war  with  Japan. 

Deeply  laid  plans  were  methodically  pursued  for  strengthen- 


Government 

ing  German  influence  in  Russia.    Systematic  colonization  of 


colonization  of 

the  frontier  provinces  of  Russia  was  hurriedly  pushed  forward.  v 
The  greatest  progress  was  made  in  the  Vistulian  region 
(Poland),  in  the  Baltic  provinces  and  in  South  Western  Russia. 
Russian  authorities  in  Poland  had  been  persuaded  that  in 
favouring  German  immigrants  they  were  acquiring  for  Russia 
quiet  and  obedient  subjects,  able  and  willing  to  defend  her 
against  Polish  nationalism.  Those  immigrants  have  proved 


58  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

and  are,  indeed,   proving   their  ability  and   willingness   to 
serve  the  German  armies  in  the  present  war.     They  furnish 
them  with  their  best  spies,  and  are  appointed  to  administrative 
posts  in  the  parts  of  Poland  occupied  by  the  Germans. 
1°  I9°5  a  violent  insurrection  of  the  Letts,  natives  of 

prorlaces. 

Livonia,  shattered  the  domination  of  the  German  barons  and 
would  have  put  an  end  to  Germanism  in  the  Baltic  provinces, 
had  not  the  Russian  Government  taken  to  heart  the  appeals 
of  the  perishing  barons  and  sent  a  strong  force  which  saved 
them  from  annihilation  and  replaced  the  Lettish  and  Russian 
population  under  their  sway.  The  dangers  which  had  threatened 
Germanism  gave  a  pretext  for  an  agitation  in  Germany, 
and  large  funds  were  collected  there  "  for  restoring 
Deutschthum  in  the  German  Baltic  provinces."  Farmers 
and  labourers,  foresters  and  inspectors  were  sent  hither  from 
Germany,  and  the  German  hold  on  the  East  Baltic  coast  has 
become  firmer  than  ever.  There  are  certainly  Baltic  Germans 
bound  by  interest  and  sentiment  to  the  Russian  Empire ; 
many  of  them  are  in  the  Russian  Army  valiantly  fighting 
the  Germans  ;  and  at  the  beginning  of  this  war  their  number 
was  increased  by  volunteers.  It  is  perplexing,  however, 
to  know  that  other  Baltic  Germans  have  joined  the  German 
Army  as  volunteers ;  in  some  cases,  brothers  are  fighting 
against  each  other, 
itoiypin  on  ttw  In  Januarv,  IQIO,  the  present  writer,  in  an  interview  with 

argent  necessity  to 

SSm«  Fnv^on     the  Prime  Minister  Stolypin,  called  his  attention  to  the  efforts 

of  Western  Ruwi*. 

of  Germany  in  that  part  of  Russia.  Story  pin  replied  that  he 
recognized  the  gravity  of  the  matter,  but  there  was  a  much 
more  actual  danger  with  which  the  Government  had  to  deal, 
the  immigration  of  Germans  into  the  South- Western  provinces, 
which  took  the  form  of  a  systematic  invasion.  A  bill  had 


THE   PRESENT   REIGN  :     PERIOD   OF  CONSERVATISM.         59 

just  been  framed  and  would  immediately  be  presented  to  the 
Douma,  which,  Stolypin  was  confident,  "  would  vote  it  with- 
out delay  on  account  of  its  extreme  urgency."  That  bill  never 
even  came  up  for  discussion  in  the  Douma,  and  was  withdrawn 
in  1913  by  Stolypin's  successor.  So  great  was  the  German 
influence  with  every  party  in  the  Russian  Parliament  as  well 
as  with  the  Government.  This  war  and  the  voice  of  the  Press 
compelled  the  bureaucrats  to  undertake  the  framing  of  a  new 
bill  against  the  passage  of  landed  property  into  German  hands. 
The  accounts  of  it  given  in  the  newspapers  show,  however, 
how  ineffective  it  was,  and  even  now  such  a  bill  is  meeting 
with  great  opposition*  on  the  part  of  German-Russians, 
Germanophils  and  pacifists  who,  in  spite  of  the  treachery  of 
German  colonists  in  Poland  still  believe  in  the  harmlessness 
of  the  German  colonization. f 

But  it  is  not  onlv  to  help  a  military  invasion  that  the  German 

ttOH  M  *  OMMM  Of 

Government  was  directing  the  stream  of  emigration  towards 
Russia.  Their  deeper  plans  have  been  revealed  to  us  by 
Pan-German  writers.  To  take  one  out  of  many,  Karl  Jentsch  J 
advised,  in  1905,  a  systematic  buying  up  by  German  syndicates 
of  large  estates  of  the  Russian  nobles,  as  well  as  of  the  peasants' 
communal  land.  The  syndicates  were  to  resell  their  acquisitions 
to  "  skilful  and  intelligent  German  farmers  who  would 
scientifically  cultivate  them  with  cheap  Russian  labour." 
Then  German  tradesmen  would  settle  in  small  towns  and  make 

*  Since  the  above  was  written  the  firmness  of  the  Government, 
supported  by  a  unanimous  public  opinion,  succeeded  in  breaking  down 
that  opposition,  and  a  decree  has  been  issued  considerably  limiting 
the  possession  of  land  in  Russia  by  Germans.  The  Press  generally 
approves  it,  but  points  at  several  loopholes  favourable  to  Germans. 

f  After  this  was  written  it  became  known  that  an  attempted  Turkish 
raid,  guided  by  German  officers  near  Akerman  on  the  Bessarabian  coast, 
found  a  warm  welcome  from  German  colonists  in  Bessarabia. 

Jin  an  article  entitled  "  Grossdeutschland "  in  the  "  Zukunft " 
September,  1905. 


60  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

them  prosperous  centres  of  German  culture.  Manufacturers 
would  follow  and  found  great  factories,  utilizing  on  a  large 
scale  cheap  Russian  labour.  Thus,  wrote  Jentsch,  "  the  vast 
territory  the  Russians  are  unable  to  cultivate  themselves  would 
receive  its  full  value,  and  the  regenerated  Russia  would  form 
an  appendage  to  the  Central  European  agglomeration  of  States 
directed  by  Germany.  The  latter  would  discover  the  reward 
for  her  work  of  implanting  culture  in  Russia  by  finding  in 
it  an  immense  field  for  the  activity  of  the  surplus  of  her 
population,  which  would  not  be  lost  for  the  Fatherland  as 
when  it  emigrates  to  America."  The  Pan-German  writer 
laid  down  a  characteristic  condition  for  the  full  success  of 
the  Germanization  of  Russia.  "  The  German  landlords  must 
be  much  less  harsh  and  imperious  than  were  the  German 
barons  of  the  Baltic  provinces.'* 

It  is  now  quite  certain  that  this  plan  was  deliberately  adopted 
by  the  German  Government,  and  that  a  great  part  of  it  has 
already  been  carried  out.  German  colonists  in  Russia  who 
wanted  to  return  to  Germany  were  told  by  German  Consuls 
it  was  their  duty  towards  their  German  fatherland  to  remain 
*n  Russia  and  work  there  for  the  German  cause.  Encouraged 
ky  the  amazing  passivity  of  the  Russian  Government  as  well 
as  of  the  Douma,  the  Germans  have  been  gaining  ground  in 
Russia  with  every  year.  A  new  and  powerful  impulse  was 
given  by  the  passing  in  the  German  Reichstag,  in  1911,*  of 
the  bill  "  on  the  Conservation  of  the  German  Nationality," 
completed  in  1913  by  another  bill  "  on  the  double  subjection  " 

*  During  the  discussion  of  that  law  in  the  Reichstag  in  1911, 
attempts  were  made  in  a  Russian  newspaper  to  point  out  the  danger 
arising  from  it  for  countries  with  descendants  of  German  immigrants. 
Neither  the  bureaucracy  nor  the  public  paid  any  attention  to  the 
question. 


THE  PRESENT  REIGN  :     PERIOD  OF  CONSERVATISM.        6  1 

which  permitted  the  "  recovery  "  of  that  Nationality  to  all 
descendants  of  former  German  subjects  by  means  of  a  private 
"declaration"  to  German  Consuls.  The  significance  of  that 
law  has  just  been  explained  by  a  Frankfort  Lecturer  on 
International  Law,  Strupp,  a  recognized  authority  in 
Germany  on  that  matter. 

In  an  article  entitled  "  The  Juridical  Status  of  Germans  who  o«m»n  jurist-.. 

J  view  of  the  duty 


are  British  Subjects,"  Herr  Strupp  asserts  that  "  If  a  German  ***•<**  t 

Germany  even 

is  also  a  British  subject,  that  circumstance  has  no  influence  on  0**™™*?*?. 
his  rights  and  duties  as  a  German  subject."  "  Such  an 
*  Englishman  '  (Strupp  uses  the  inverted  commas  with  an 
evident  intention)  is  bound  to  fulfil  his  military  duty  in  the 
German  Army.  He  cannot  evade  paying  German  military 
taxes.  In  return  for  that,  he  enjoys  the  fulness  of  the  rights 
of  a  German  subject  ;  in  particular  he  is  not  to  be  interned 
in  concentration  camps,  is  not  obliged  to  register  himself 
at  the  police  station,  etc."  But,  if  he  refuses  to  join  the 
German  Army  fighting  against  the  country  of  which  he  is 
also  a  subject,  he  is  —  according  to  Strupp  —  liable  to  be  treated 
as  a  deserter  and  a  traitor. 

With  a  marvellous  unanimity  the  Governments  of  all  the  M»nr  «*j«*t»  of 
countries  possessing  such  double  subjects  have  ignored  and  SSSSa^SJSli 
continue  to  ignore  the  law  whose  effect  essentially  concerns 
them  all.    It  is  alleged  that  hundreds  of  thousands  of  former 
German  subjects    have    made    the   "private"   declarations 
required  from  them  and  are  secretly  fulfilling  their  duties 
towards  their  recovered  Fatherland.     If  that  were  verified 
many  otherwise  obscure  events  in  the  present  war  would  be 
explained.    However  important  that  matter  is  for  all  States  particular  danger 

of  German  colonies 

with  Teuton  subjects  —  and  it  seems  to  become  very  prominent 
in  the  United  States  just  now  —  it  nowhere  could  attain  the 


62  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

importance  it  has  in  Russia,  where  the  Germans  have,  in  the 
last  two  centuries,  been  the  ruling  race  and  where  their 
influence  still  permeates  the  whole  administration  of  the 
State,  as  well  as  that  of  most  of  the  great  financial  and  indus- 
trial companies.  Every  day  since  the  war  began  new  facts 
come  to  the  surface  which,  long  known  to  many,  could  not  be 
publicly  stated  till  now.  For  instance,  we  are  learning  that  in 
the  self-governing  German  colonies  in  the  South  of  Russia 
everybody  is  in  possession  of  guns,  the  permission  to  have 
them  having  been  easily  obtained  from  the  local  authorities, 
while  all  such  requests  of  Russian  peasants  were  stubbornly 
refused  as  dangerous.  We  know  also  that  colonies  of  late 
years  have  invariably  been  established  at  important 
strategical  points,  junctions  of  railways,  etc.  Under  the 
pretext  of  shooting  parties,  German  colonies  are  visited 
by  German  officers  who  generally  have  in  their  suite  some 
relatives  of  the  colonists.  Such  was  the  practice  for  a  number 
of  years  in  the  Caucasus,  where  every  spring  saw  the  arrival 
of  German  officers,  with  their  Jaeger  (huntsmen)  whom  they 
*  B««taB*f  generally  left  behind  them  in  those  colonies,  and  arrived  next 
spring  with  another  set  of  Jaeger.  Those  officers  were  most 
interested  in  shooting  near  the  Turkish  frontier  which  they 
often  crossed  to  visit  Turkish  officers.  The  Russian  authorities 
saw  no  harm  in  that,  and  were  only  anxious  to  give  the 
Germans  every  facility  for  their  sport  or  study.  The 
inhabitants  of  the  Caucasus  who  related  this  to  the  writer 
pledged  him  to  secrecy  concerning  their  names,  the  revelation 
of  which  would  have  for  consequence  their  being  hunted  down 
by  those  authorities. 

The  same  passive  attitude,   if  not    connivance,   of    the 
administration  has  till  lately  been  seen  in  their  not  noticing 


THE  PRESENT  REIGN  :     PERIOD  OF  CONSERVATISM.        63 

how  many  of  those  German  colonists,  Russian  subjects,  were 
going  to  serve  their  time  in  the  German  Army,  thus  getting 
imbued  with  German  patriotism.  On  the  other  hand,  German 
subjects,  selected  for  their  ability  by  their  Government,  were 
sent  to  Russia  to  seek  employment  in  the  State  military 
factories.  They  were  forbidden  to  write  about  their  observa- 
tions to  Germany  and  even  to  take  notes  in  writing,  but  were 
bidden  to  keep  all  knowledge  in  their  memory  and  to  come  to 
Germany  to  report  verbally  every  two  or  three  years. 

Immeasurable  services  to  Germanism  were  rendered  by  emu  «*««'.• 

*      in  Russia, 


invent  Pan*i»vi»m 


German  schools,  justly  named  "  fortresses  of  Germanism " 
in  Russia.  German-Russian  and  purely  Russian  pupils  were 
equally  inoculated  there  with  a  worship  of  Germany  and  a 
contempt  for  Russia.  It  is  most  remarkable  that  the  higher 
Education  authorities,  often  vexatiously  interfering  with  the 
Russian  schools,  allowed  the  fullest  liberty  to  the  German 
ones.  And  these  were  all  supported  by  the  Deutsche  Schul- 
vereine  in  Russia,  acting  on  the  instructions  and  with  material 
assistance  of  the  Central  Direction  in  Berlin. 

The  laisser  alter  system  applied  to  those  Schulvereine 
formed  a  striking  contrast  to  the  continuous  hampering  of 
the  work  of  the  patriotic  Russian  Societies  of  the  so-called 
"  Slavophils."  The  most  brilliant  success  of  the  German 
policy  and  the  most  colossal  deceit  ever  practised  in  Universal 
History  was  the  labelling  of  those  poor  Slavophils  with  the 
name  of  Panslavists,  thus  rendering  them  an  object  of  distrust 
and  suspicion  in  Russia  and  of  fear  and  hatred*  in  Western 

*  The  unfavourable  reputation  of  the  Slavophils  in  this  country  is  the 
more  astonishing  in  view  of  their  warm  admiration  for  England,  whom 
they  have  always  extolled  as  a  perfect  national  State.  And  there  exists 
in  no  language  a  more  glowing  description  of  England  than  in  the  poem 
of  the  greatest  Slavophil  leader,  Khomiakoff,  "  Marvellous  Island." 


64  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

Europe.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  have  never  been  Panslavists 
in  Russia,  and  the  very  name  has  never  been  used  there 
except  in  quoting  foreign  writers.  No  Russians  ever  wanted 
the  reunion  of  other  Slavs  to  Russia,  and  no  agitation  in  that 
sense  has  ever  been  practised  in  Slavic  lands  by  the  Russians.* 
What  the  Slavophils  wanted  was  to  preserve  the  minor  Slav 
nations  from  Germanization.  It  is  that  purpose  of  theirs 
which  rendered  them  so  criminal  in  German  eyes ;  and  German 
cunning  succeeded  for  a  long  time  in  making  Englishmen  and 
Frenchmen  see  in  those  defenders  of  small  nations  the  worst 
&  trath.  «ht  enemies  of  civilization  and  humanity.  The  Slavophils  had, 

Slavophils  aim  at 

*h^S*from°th/     in  truth,  another  and  still  more  important  aim,  the  defence 

Carman  yoke. 

of  the  Russian  nationality  and  the  liberation  of  Russia  from 
the  German  yoke.  Their  last  great  leader,  Ivan  Aksakoff, 
told  the  writer  that  "  the  Slavophils  were  unjustly  criticized 
in  Russia  for  taking  too  great  an  interest  in  foreign 
Slavs ;  they  did  it  chiefly  in  order,  by  emphasizing  the  Slav 
origin  of  the  Russian  people,  to  attain  its  national  independence 
at  home." 

Yet  another  contrast  was  formed  by  the  absence  of  any 
restraint  of  the  anti-Russian  agitation  of  Pan-German  organs 
in  Russia  and,  up  to  1905,  the  strict  and  meddling  super- 
vision of  the  national  Russian  organs  of  the  Press.  The 
chief  Pan-German  newspaper  in  Russia,  organ  of  the  German 
Embassy,  the  "  Deutsche  St.  Petersburger  Zeitung,"  enjoyed 


*  Panslavism  in  a  theoretical  sense  existed  among  the  weakest  and 
most  oppressed  Slav  peoples,  e.g.,  the  Slovaks  of  North  Western 
Hungary.  Austrian  Slavs  in  general  used  to  visit  Russia  and  complain 
of  their  sufferings  and  persecutions,  trying  to  excite  sympathy  in  the 
Russians.  They  often  deplored  the  apathy  of  the  Russian  public, 
which  they  did  not  succeed  in  rousing  sufficiently.  Such  was  the  only 
"  Panslavist "  agitation  which  has  ever  existed. 


THE   PRESENT   REIGN  I     PERIOD   OF  CONSERVATISM.        65 

even  the  privileged  publication  of  all  official  announcements, 
which  was  equivalent  to  a  large  subsidy.  The  ardent  German 
and  openly  anti-Russian  tone  of  that  paper  in  the  first  two 
months  of  the  war  compelled  the  Russian  Government  to 
decide  on  the  suppression  of  it  from  January  i  (14)  1915, 

Russia. 

leaving  it  three  months  to  continue  its  insolent  activity  when 
the  smallest  similar  offence  by  a  Russian  paper  would  have 
led  to  its  immediate  suppression. 

Generally  speaking,  since  the  restoration  of  the  German 
Empire,  the  Pan-German  agitation  in  Russia  has  greatly 
increased,  while  the  leniency  and  even  connivance  of  the 
administration  continued  unchanged.  The  national  feelings 
of  Germans  in  Russia,  whether  subjects  of  Germany  or  of 
Russia,  has  also  grown  and  become  more  self -conceited 
(with  the  laudable  exception  always  of  the  quite  Russified 
German- Russians,  particularly  those  belonging  to  the  Orthodox 
Church  or  married  to  Russians).  The  erection  of  a  statue  to  J5SSI?" in*0 
Bismarck  in  the  German  cemetery  in  Moscow  proved  to  be 
a  constant  stimulus  to  Pan-German  truculence.  Spoiled  by 
continual  favour  and  impunity,  the  Germans  feel  themselves 
to  be  a  superior  race  in  Russia.  That  is  so  in  the  highest  degree 
in  the  Baltic  provinces,  in  which  even  since  the  beginning  of 
this  war,  patriotic  Russian  demonstrations  have  been  dis- 


...  ,.          ~  «tiU  forbidden  to 

persed  as  offensive  to  the  German  Noblesse ;  on  the  same 
ground,  the  local  Russian  and  Lettish  Press  is  forbidden 
to  express  its  feelings.  The  German  language,  though 
spoken  by  a  small  minority,  is  there  still  the  only  one  used  in 
public  life. 

Owing  to  an  extraordinary  support  at  Court  and  in  the 
Government,  as  well  as  to  the  devotion  of  all  the  Germany- 
serving  elements  in  Russia,  the  position  of  the  German 

F 


66  RUSSIA  AND  DEMOCRACY. 

Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg  had  acquired  an  exceptional 
importance.  A  thousand  channels  brought  him  every  possible 
information  and  conveyed  his  instructions  to  all  parts  of 
the  Russian  Empire.  Under  Alexander  II.,  the  German 
Ambassador,  prompted,  as  he  asserted,  by  his  personal  attach- 
ment to  the  Russian  Emperor,  reported  to  him  supposed 
malevolent  and  traitorous  utterances  of  Russians  in  high 
position,  who  always  happened  to  be  unfriendly  to  Germany. 
^n  subsequent  reigns  the  German  Ambassador  arrogated 
to  himself  a  kind  of  censorship  over  the  Russian  Press.  Every 
article  unfavourable  to  the  German  policy  was  instantly 
made  a  subject  of  complaint,  while  grossly  insulting  articles 
in  German  newspapers  were  excused  on  the  plea  of  the  pre- 
tended freedom  of  the  Press  in  Germany.  The  Russian 
authorities  had  grown  so  anxious  to  avoid  those  complaints 
that  they  came  to  regard  every  public  expression  of  distrust 
towards  Germany  or  the  Germans  as  reprehensible.  When, 
in  1898,  Major-General  Zolotareff,  professor  at  the  War 
Academy  in  St.  Petersburg,  alluded  in  a  speech  to  the 
abnormally  privileged  position  of  Germans  in  Russia,  a  detach- 
ment of  gendarmes  was  at  once  sent  to  arrest  him,  and  it  was 
with  much  difficulty  that  his  immediate  chiefs  succeeded 
in  having  that  order  cancelled.  The  distinguished  strategist 
was,  however,  compelled  to  leave  his  professorship  and 
even  the  Army.  The  Germans  in  Russia  were  evidently 
above  criticism.  In  1910,  when  a  lecture  on  Anglo-Russian 
Relations  was  to  be  delivered  at  the  Political  Club  in  St.  Peters- 
burg, though  it  had  no  reference  to  Germany,  the  German 
Ambassador  tried  to  have  it  forbidden,  and  not  attaining 
that  object,  warned  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister  and  his 
Under-Secretary  against  their  attending  that  lecture.  Both 


c™ 

Rucsi&n  Press. 


THE   PRESENT  REIGN  :     PERIOD  OF  CONSERVATISM.        67 

statesmen,  who  intended  to  be  present,  found  it  more  prudent 
to  keep  away. 

Innumerable  were  the  German  diplomatic  attempts  to 
influence  the  Russian  Press,  directly  through  cajoling  popular 
writers,  and  indirectly  through  disguised  offers  of  money. 
A  considerable  income  was  once  offered  to  a  member  of  the 
staff  of  the  most  influential  Russian  organ  for  "  watering  " 
the  London  telegrams  of  that  paper.  Its  correspondent  was 
himself  offered  "  by  his  sympathizers  "  the  double  of  his 
salary  in  case  he  would  "give  himself  rest,"  that  is,  cease 
corresponding.  A  surer  means  of  influence  was,  however, 

to  attract  the 

found   in   the   propaganda   among   the   Russian   conserva-  gj£S5" 

of  Monarchical 

tives  of  the  "  necessity  to  uphold  the  traditional  Russo- 
German  friendship,  in  order  to  save  the  monarchy."  That 
did  not  prevent  the  German  Embassy  from  cultivating 
intimate  relations  with  Russian  revolutionaries,  and  even 
from  hatching  plots  which  were  to  spread  insurrection  in 
Russia  simultaneously  with  the  beginning  of  war  with 
Germany.*  They  failed  only  because,  on  the  outbreak  of  war, 
those  revolutionaries  shrank  from  co-operating  with  the  enemies 
of  their  country.  Non-Russified  German-Russians  persisted 
in  their  hostility  against  the  national  Russian  policy  and  the 
friendship  between  Russia  and  England  which  it  involved. 
A  former  Russian  Ambassador  was  so  entirely  carried  away 


*  After  the  destruction  oi  the  German  Embassy  in  Petrograd,  the 
only  act  of  popular  fury  against  Germany  in  Russia,  there  were  found 
in  a  room  in  which  Count  Pourtales  was  said  to  have  indulged  in 
amateur  photography,  16,000  copies  of  proclamations  appealing  to 
Russians  to  rise  against  the  very  Government  to  which  the  Ambassador 
was  accredited.  It  is  now  also  authentically  proved  that  the  great 
strikes  in  Petrograd  during  the  French  President's  visit  last  July  were 
instigated  by  the  same  Embassy. 


68  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

by  his  racial  feelings  as  to  dare,  at  a  sitting  of  the  Upper 
House,  after  protestations  of  loyalty  to  the  Sovereign, 
categorically  to  blame  his  foreign  policy  and  boldly^assert 
the  only  right  policy  for  Russia  was  that  of  alliance  with 
Germany ! 


CHAPTER  X. 

PERIOD  OF  PROGRESS  (1905-1915). 


The  first  act  of  personal  initiative  of  Nicholas  II.  was  the 
epoch-making  proposal  of  the  Hague  Conference.  At  the 
moment  it  greatly  amazed  and  startled  everybody.  European 
Liberals  claimed  the  Emperor  as  one  of  themselves  and 
highly  praised  his  grand  humanitarian  move.  Most  Govern- 
ments showed  themselves  favourably  disposed.  One,  which 
was  nourishing  thoughts  of  aggression,  persistently  blocked 
the  way. 

The  present  moment  is  least  propitious  for  rendering  justice 
to  a  peace  act.  Still,  one  must  recognize  that  the  creation  of 
the  Hague  Court  is  the  only  concrete  step  in  favour  of  peace 
which  has  ever  been  taken,  that  it  has  been  of  practical  service 
in  many  cases,  and  that,  if  as  we  hope,  this  war  will  remove 
the  chief  obstacle  to  a  lasting  peace,  all  future  development 
of  international  relations  will  have  to  proceed  on  the  lines 
of  the  proposal  of  the  first  Hague  Conference.  The  present 
writer  in  convinced  that,  in  following  in  this  matter  the 
impulses  of  his  heart,  the  Emperor  Nicholas  was  giving 
expression  to  the  innermost  wishes  of  the  Russian  people 
who  have  always  been  averse  from  war  and  in  favour  of  peace. 
The  said  proposal  was  the  first  of  the  great  acts  of  the  national 
Russian  policy  of  this  reign. 


RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 


Parsonal  views 
of  the  Emperor 
regarding  home 
policy. 


Misunderstood 
tt.aa  not  carried 
oat. 


It  was  but  natural  that  the  Sovereign  who  endeavoured 
to  promote  peace  amongst  all  Nations  should  be  anxious 
to  assure  it  to  his  own.  His  liberal  and  humane  feelings,  the 
warmth  and  sincerity  of  which  always  struck  those  who 
approached  him,  found  their  expression  in  the  Manifesto 
of  1903,  which  contained  a  clear  statement  of  just  and  liberal 
principles  of  government.  If  they  had  been  taken  to  heart 
by  the  Emperor's  ministers  and  conscientiously  applied, 
many  of  the  subsequent  troubles  would  have  been  avoided. 
Unfortunately  the  bureaucratic  clique  did  everything  in  its 
power  to  prevent  their  application,  supported  and  stimulated 
in  that  disastrous  work  by  German  influences  in  and  out  of 
Russia.  The  decisions  of  Nicholas  II.,  however,  are  always 
deeply  matured  and  inspired  by  what  keen  observers  of  his 
acts  term  his  "  historical  sense."  This  latter  assertion  is 
supported  by  the  Emperor's  keen  interest  in  history,  mani- 
fested, for  instance,  by  his  patronage  of  historical  research, 
particularly  by  his  presiding  -at  meetings  of  the  Historical 
Society.  One  would  probably  not  err  in  attributing  to  the 
Emperor's  ever-growing  knowledge  and  understanding  of 
history,  especially  of  the  history  of  Russia,  the  deep  and  lasting 
character  of  his  decisions.  Some  of  them  came  quite  as  a  bolt 
from  the  blue,  and  yet,  having  been  the  results  of  a  many- 
sided  study  and  meditation,  they  remained  irrevocable. 

The  Organic  Laws  of  October,  1905,  have  been  much 
criticized  by  conservatives  as  well  as  by  liberals,  and  may  be 
very  imperfect ;  but  who  can  deny  that  they  produced  an 
r^nte1n  tSpsutea  immense  improvement  in  the  state  of  Russia  ?  They  restored, 

«K  Suasla. 

in  a  form  adapted  to  modem  conditions,  some  of  the  features 
of  the  ancient  regime  destroyed  by  Peter  the  Great.  The 
Council  of  the  Empire,  one-half  of  whose  members  is  elected 


The  Organic  Laws 
01  October,  1905. 


PERIOD  OF  PROGRESS.  71 

by  the  Zemstvos  and  the  municipalities,  is  a  much  improved 
Boyarskaia  Douma,  and  is  more  democratic  than  most  of  the 
Upper  Houses  of  Western  Europe,  the  hereditary  element 
being  quite  absent.  The  Douma  of  the  Empire  recalls  the 
Zemsky  Sabor,  differing  from  it  by  its  more  democratic 
character.  It  offers,  indeed,  the  spectacle  of  the  most 
democratic  legislature  in  Europe,  for  in  no  other  have  the 
lower  classes  such  a  large  number  of  representatives,  many  of 
whom  wear  the  peasants'  dress.  And  it  is  the  only  parliament 
of  a  great  power  in  which  Asiatics  and  Mahomedans  are  sitting 
side  by  side  with  Europeans  and  Christians,  enjoying  equal 
rights  with  them.*  Western  radicals  and  socialists  who  deny 
or  under-rate  the  magnitude  of  the  change  in  Russia  evidently 
do  not  realize  that,  before  the  October  Laws,  the  fact  of  one's 
being  suspected  to  be  a  socialist  would  have  been  a  motive 
for  his  prosecution,  while  now  there  is  a  legally  constituted 
socialist-democratic  group  of  Members  of  the  Douma  who 
state  their  views  freely  from  its  tribune.  The  right  of  inter- 

ad  m  iuifrtr&tion 

pellation  in  the  Douma,  together  with  the  freedom  of  the  Press, 
is  exercising  a  most  salutary  effect  on  all  branches  of  the 
administration.  Great  and  small  bureaucrats  tell  with  deep 
sighs  their  relatives  and  friends  how  impossible,  owing  to  an 
eventual  disclosure  in  the  Douma  or  in  the  Press,  are  now 
become  all  those  illegal  favours  they  used  to  bestow  on  them. 
Better  control  of  the  administration  and  the  changed  spirit 
of  the  Government  in  general  account  for  the  reduced  inter- 
ference with  private  enterprise  and  business  of  all  kinds.  This 


*  Asiatics  and  Mussulmans  have  always  enjoyed  in  the  Russian  Empire 
all  the  rights  of  other  citizens,  without  any  discrimination  due  to  their 
religion  or  origin.  Mussulman  generals  commanded  Russian  troops 
and  an  Armenian  Loris-Melikoff,  was  Prime  Minister. 


ivs 


72  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

aLows  a  greater  display  of  activity,  stimulates  to  more  energetic 
efforts,  encourages  savings,  and  has  in  fact  largely  con- 
tributed to  a  wonaeriul  economic  revival.  Russia  has  not 
only  quickly  recovered  the  losses  incurred  through  a  disastrous 
war  and  internal  troubles,  but  has  attained  a  degree  of 
prosperity  she  had  never  known  before. 

It  is  also  smce  the  introduction  of  the  new  regime  that  a 
loiuury  effects,  reform  has  been  brought  about  of  the  deepest  economical, 
social  and  political  significance,  namely,  the  passing  of  peasants 
from  communal  to  individual  land-ownership.  When  the  serfs 
were  emancipated,  land  was  not  given  to  them  individually, 
but  to  the  village  commune,  an  institution  the  origin  of  which 
is  hidden  in  the  darkest  ages.  To  most  Russians  the  commune 
seemed  to  be  an  exclusively  Russian  institution,  a  part  of  their 
nationality.  It  required  a  deep  conviction  of  the  necessity  of 
the  reform  to  undertake  it,  and  a  clever  handling  to  carry 
it  through  successfully.  The  commune  was  not  abolished; 
its  members  were  only  allowed  to  choose  between  remaining 
in  it  or  becoming  individual  landowners,  in  which  case  the 
State  would  come  to  their  aid.  The  immediate  consequences 
of  that  measure  clearly  proved  its  beneficence.  The  possession 
of  his  own  plot  of  land  exercises  a  powerful  influence  on  the 
peasant  ;  it  transforms  him  into  an  independent  working 
unit,  enterprising,  self-controlled  and  progressive.  It  is  per- 
missible to  attribute  that  reform  to  the  personal  initiative  of 
the  Emperor,  who  always  shows  a  warm  interest  in  the 
welfare  of  the  peasantry,  who  are  by  far  the  most  numerous 
class  of  the  Russian  people. 

According  to  the  latest  information  received  by  the  writer 
from  authoritative  sources,  the  peasants,  with  the  assistance 
of  the  Ministry  of  Land  Organization,  are  eagerly,  as  in  Ireland, 


PERIOD  OF  PROGRESS.  73 

buying  up,  by  mutual  goodwill,  the  lands  of  the  gentry  ; 
who  now,  as  they  mostly  live  in  towns,  have  less  opportunity 
to  look  after  their  property  in  the  country.  A  class  of  small 

Russia. 

landowners  is  thus  growing  up  which  will  constitute  a  new 
and  important  element  in  the  Russian  Nation,  giving  it  a 
decidedly  democratic  character,  recalling  that  of  the  primitive 
communities  of  the  Slavs  of  Russia. 

The  same  Ministry  is  also  managing  the  colonization  of  JJJ&8S*" 
Siberia,  making  grants  of  land  to  such  immigrants  as  are  able 
to  cultivate  it.  The  number  of  these  settlers  from  European 
Russia  of  late  years  annually  amounted  to  half  a  million  ; 
in  1913  it  rose  to  a  whole  million.  Compare  the  peopling  of 
Siberia  with  that  of  another  rapidly  growing  country,  Canada, 
and  you  find  that,  while  in  1906  the  population  of  Canada  was 
larger  than  that  of  Siberia,  in  1911  Siberia  had  already  two 
million  inhabitants  more  than  Canada ;  and  the  increase  has 
since  been  maintained.  The  explanation  lies  in  the  proximity 
to  and  the  quick  growth  of  the  population  of  European  Russia, 
but  also  in  the  able  and  consistent  way  in  which  the  will  of 
the  Emperor  is  carried  out  by  the  Minister  of  Land 
Organization,  Mr.  Krivosheine,  whose  successful  labours  are 
forming  a  fine  page  in  the  history  of  the  Russian 
administration. 

The  second  period  of  the  present  reign  in  Russia  is  marked 
in  foreign  affairs  by  the  completion  of  Alexander  III.'s  work 
in  carrying  out  Peter  the  Great's  plan  of  an  alliance  of  Russia 
with  France  and  England,  which  may  be  called  his  Unwritten 
Testament.  The  Triple  Entente  has  in  the  seven  years  of  its 
existence  proved  to  be  the  most  pacific  grouping  of  Powers 
which  has  ever  been.  It  might  justly  be  called  the  Pacifist 
Entente.  Nothing  could,  in  truth,  equal  their  readiness  to 


74  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

accept  the  most  fallacious  assurances  of  the  aggressors,  to 
overlook  facts  which  gave  these  assurances  the  lie,  and  to 
make  all  kinds  of  concessions,  in  order  to  preserve  at  least  a 
formal  peace.  It  fell  to  the  lot  of  Russia  to  surpass  even  her 
Partners  m  meekness  towards  Germany.  She  yielded,  in  1909, 
to  an  insolent  demand  such  as  Russia  had  never  received  from 
anyone  since  she  threw  off  the  Mongol  yoke.*  And  she  patiently 
bore  William  II.'s  impudent  public  boastings  about  Germany's 
"  shining  armour."  The  entirely  one-sided  Agreement  of  1911, 
by  which  Russia  recognized  the  Bagdad  line  as  a  German 
Government's  undertaking,  and  pledged  herself  to  build  a 
railway  which  would  facilitate  the  German  competition  with 
the  Russian  trade  in  Persia,  was  a  climax  of  pacifism  never 
before  attained  by  any  powerful  nation. 

The  submission  of  the  Triple  Entente  to  Austria's  require- 
ments — the  creation  of  the  State  of  Albania  and  the  exclusion 

to  placd  tho 

°^  Serbia  from  the  coast  of  the  Adriatic — was  the  direct 
cause  of  the  second  war  between  the  Balkan  Powers.  The 
heightened  self-confidence  of  the  Germanic  Powers  determined 
them,  under  a  false  pretext,f  to  attempt  to  subjugate  Serbia 
and  to  establish  their  domination  over  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 
Thus  it  turned  out  that  the  very  conciliatory  and  yielding 
policy  of  the  Pacifist  Entente,  pushed  to  an  extreme,  led  to 
the  conflagration  which  it  had  been  endeavouring  by  all  means 

*  It  has  been  rumoured  that,  at  the  meeting  of  the  Council  of  Ministers 
presided  over  by  the  Emperor,  he  alone  inclined  to  resistance,  and  only 
reluctantly  accorded  his  sanction  to  the  Ministers'  conclusions. 

t  The  fact  that  both  the  actual  murderers  of  the  heir  of  Austria  were 
exempted  from  the  capital  punishment  inflicted  on  those  who  were  but 
indirectly  concerned  in  the  crime  confirms  all  that  was,  indeed,  widely 
known  before  ;  namely,  that  the  murder  was  not  due  to  Pan-Serbian 
agitation,  but  to  the  divergencies  within  the  Hapsburg  monarchy  itself 
and  its  dynasty. 


PERIOD  OF  PROGRESS.  75 

to  avoid !  This  had,  on  the  other  side,  the  inestimable  advantage 
of  unmistakeably  showing  to  the  world  who  it  was  that  wanted 
war  and  why  the  war  was  taking  place.  Germany  and  Austria 
became  the  prey  of  the  gods  who  blind  those  whom  they  wish 
to  destroy. 

The  declaration  of  war  by  Germany  brought  about  a  com- 
plete  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  Russian  Government. 
In  rapid  succession,  one  after  another,  were  issued  radical 
decisions  of  the  Sovereign,  enthusiastically  welcomed  by  the 
whole  nation.  The  suddenness  of  those  decisions  ought  not 
to  induce  us  to  think  they  were  taken  on  the  spur  of  the 
moment.  They  were  matured  long  ago  by  the  Ruler  of  Russia, 
and  kept  in  suspense  to  be  applied  at  the  right  moment.  They 
all  bore  a  profoundly  historic  character,  and  were  all  based 
on  a  thorough  knowledge  of  Russian  history ;  they  settled 
questions  which  had  been  pending  for  over  two  hundred 
years.  Although  universally  known,  their  immense  importance 
renders  it  necessary  to  make  clear  the  full  significance  of  each 
of  them. 

Russia  has  been  at  war  with  Prussia  and  with  Austria 
alternately  ;  and  once,  in  1812,*  with  all  the  German  States 
together,  yet  no  one  of  those  wars  was  essentially  a  Russo- 
German  struggle  ;  the  Russians  took  part  in  the  Seven  Years'  First  Ruaso 

German  struggle 

War  only  as  Allies  of  one  or  the  other  of  the  chief  antagonists, 
just  as  in  the  war  of  1812,  the  Germans  acted  only  as 
Napoleon's  Allies.  In  most  of  the  wars  of  Russia  against 
European  States,  she  was  allied  to  one  or  all  of  the  Germanic 

*  The  best  Austrian  General  Schwartzenberg  with  30,000  of  his  best 
troops  (the  equivalent  of  which  would  be  now  at  least  600,000)  invaded 
South-western  Russia  and  advanced  on  Kieff.  His  plan  made  so  deep 
an  impression  on  the  Austrian  Staff  General  that  it  has  been  adopted 
for  the  present  Austrian  campaign  against  Russia. 


76 


RUSSIA   AND   DEMOCRACY. 


Kapture  with 
-Lt-  Gernsfcn 

cysarties. 


Hatittwl  BuwUn 
tolicy. 


Liberation  of 
the  S!»vs. 


rr.;i?  knd  auto- 
Eoay  of  PclaEd. 


Powers  and  fought  chiefly  for  their  defence  or  in  their  interest. 
Now,  for  the  first  time,  Russia  and  Germany  are  fighting  each 
other  in  a  life  and  death  struggle. 

This  fact  was  strongly  emphasized  by  an  open  rupture 
between  the  Reigning  House  of  Russia  and  the  German 
dynasties  who,  for  over  two  centuries,  had  been  bound  together 
by  many  ties  of  relationship  and  friendship.  All  Russians 
have  joyously  saluted  that  event,  which  puts  an  end  to  those 
real  or  imagined  German  influences  in  the  highest  circles 
that  had  so  long  been  distressing  them.  The  Russian  people 
are  now  feeling  themselves  the  more  closely  bound  to  their 
national  dynasty,  and  their  attachment  to  it  has  grown  in 
equal  degree. 

This  freeing  of  Russia  from  any  regard  for  German  opinion 
rendered  at  last  possible  the  declaration  of  the  true  Russian 
national  policy.  It  is  that  of  the  so  long  misjudged  and 
persecuted  Slavophils.  The  Imperial  War  Manifesto  expressly 
stated  that  Russia  was  about  to  fight,  not  for  herself  alone, 
but  also  for  our  brethren,  the  other  Slavs.  Russia  had  done 
so  several  times  before,  but  no  mention  of  it  ever  appeared 
in  any  official  document,  as  the  Russian  Government,  out 
of  regard  for  Germany,  studiously  avoided  it.  The  present 
writer,  himself,  with  many  others,  heard  in  October,  1876, 
in  a  hall  of  the  Imperial  Palace  of  Moscow,  Alexander  II. 
addressing  the  Moscow  Noblesse  and  praising  the  Russian 
volunteers  in  Serbia  *'  who  proved  in  shedding  their  own 
blood  their  devotion  to  the  Slav  cause."  The  bureaucrats 
were  appalled  by  the  Emperor's  address,  and,  fearful  lest  the 
words,  "  Slav  cause,"  might  give  offence  to  Germany,  sup- 
pressed them  in  all  reports  of  the  Imperial  visit  to  Moscow. 

A  war  for  the  liberation  of  all  Slavs  could  not  be  consistently 


PERIOD  OF  PROGRESS.  77 

waged  by  Russia  while  it  kept  in  subjection  the  most  numerous 
of  the  non-Russian  Slavs.  The  proclamation  of  the  Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief,  guaranteeing  the  Poles  national  unity 
and  automony,  is  the  first  step  on  the  path  of  that  liberation. 
The  Slavophils  always  advocated  the  granting  to  Poland, 
not  only  autonomy,  but  even  independence.  The  Poles  them- 
selves, however,  are  opposed  to  the  latter,  for  it  would  involve 
the  loss  of  the  vast  Russian  market  for  their  flourishing 
industry,  and  prove  the  economic  ruin  of  their  country.  The 
great  obstacle  to  reconciliation  has  ever  been  the  claim  of 
Polish  politicians  to  the  provinces  which  had  belonged  to 
Poland  before  its  partition,  but  where  the  Noblesse  alone  was 
Polish.  It  appears,  however,  that  the  Poles  do  not  pretend 
any  longer  to  impose  their  nationality  on  non-Polish 
populations.  Their  representatives  in  the  Douma  have 
declared,  without  conditions  or  reservations,  that  "  the  Poles 
will  be  with  the  Slavs."  The  Poles  in  general  decline  to  put 
forward  any  demands  as  long  as  this  war  lasts.  It  is  known, 
nevertheless,  from  private  utterances  of  their  foremost  leaders, 
that  they  would  be  satisfied  if  all  districts  with  over  50  per 
cent,  of  Polish  nationality  were  included  in  the  autonomous 
Poland. 

The  heroic  conduct  of  the  Poles,  who  do  not  shrink  from  any 
sacrifice  in  the  defence  of  the  Empire  against  the  common  *""*• 
foe,  strongly  appeals  to  the  Russians.  It  proves  to  them 
that  Russians  can  trust  Poles  as  Poles  trust  Russians.  Both 
Slav  peoples  have  at  last  realized  that  their  fratricidal  struggle 
was  chiefly  fomented  by  the  traditional  enemy  of  their  race. 
All  the  most  offensive  measures  tending  towards  the 
denationalization  of  the  Poles  have  been  conceived  and 
attempted  by  the  German-Russian  Governors-General,  whose 


Bojuo-PolUh 

reconciliation 
and  muta»\ 


78 


RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 


Loyalty  to  the 
Empire  of  all  the 
nationalities  and 
parties  in  Ruscia 


Russian  politicians 
oppoted  to  an 
inclnaion  of  mm- 
Buudan  popula- 
tion into  BussU 
proper. 


The  arduous 
task  of  the 
de  -Gtormaniz&tion 
of  Ruscia. 


systematic  Russification  of  Poland  consisted  principally  in 
the  plantation  of  those  German  colonies  which  were  the 
vanguard  of  the  German  attack  on  Russia,  as  this  war  has 
convincingly  demonstrated. 

Loyalty  to  the  Empire  characterizes  the  conduct  of  all  the 
nationalities,  as  also  of  all  the  parties,  in  the  whole  of  Russia. 
However  great  and  seemingly  well-founded  had  been  the 
motives  for  dissatisfaction  on  the  part  of  certain  portions 
of  the  population,  they  dwindled  to  almost  nothing  the  moment 
the  fate  of  the  Empire  was  at  stake.  The  Finns  do  not  form 
an  exception.  Finnish  volunteers  in  the  Russian  Army,  and 
hospitals  for  wounded  Russians,  organized  by  the  Finns  in 
Finland,  prove  that  the  Finnish  people  has  not  listened  to  a  few 
agitators  acting  under  German  influence.  This  loyal  attitude 
of  the  Finns  will  certainly  help  finally  to  settle  the  position  of 
Finland  in  the  Russian  Empire  satisfactorily  for  both  sides. 

All  Russian  politicians  of  to-day  agree  in  believing  any 
increase  of  heterogeneous  elements  in  Russia  proper  to  be 
contrary  to  Russian  national  interest,  and  in  considering 
the  existence  of  an  autonomous  Finland  and  of  an  autonomous 
Poland  as  conforming  with  that  interest.  Therein  lies  the 
best  guarantee  for  the  maintenance  of  those  autonomies,  as 
well  as  against  the  annexation  by  Russia  of  any  territories 
with  a  non-Russian  population. 

One  of  the  most  popular  among  the  latest  Imperial  decisions 
was  the  Russification  of  the  name  of  the  capital.  It  symbolized 
the  end  of  the  German  domination  in  Russia  and  the  begin- 
ning of  a  national  period  of  Russian  history.  But  it  is  only 
the  first  step  towards  the  de-Germanization  of  Russia.  To 
defeat  the  German  armies,  to  break  the  power  of  Germany 
is  comparatively  an  easier  task  than  to  pull  out  the  innumerable 


PERIOD  OF  PROGRESS.  79 

fangs  of  Germanism,  which  had  systematically  fastened 
themselves  into  Russia,  like  the  tentacles  of  an  octopus, 
clutching  its  intended  prey.  One  of  the  leaders  of  the  Russian 
national  thought  wrote  lately  to  the  writer : — "  We  are 
still  living  in  *  Russlandia,'  *  Rossia  *  (Russia)  is  yet  to  be 
created!" 

That  view  is  unfortunately  justified  by  the  more  or  less 
disguised  resistance  which  the  intentions  of  the  Government, 
warmly  supported  by  public  opinion,  are  meeting  with  on 
the  part  of  certain  bureaucratic,  financial,  commercial  and 
other  circles  whose  interests  have  become  dependent  on  the 
continuation  of  the  German  influence.  To  extirpate  the  results 
of  the  German  pacific  penetration  is  not  found  easy,  even  in 
the  countries  where  it  has  been  methodically  pursued  since 
the  day  of  the  restoration  of  the  German  Empire.  It  must 
needs  be  infinitely  more  difficult  in  Russia,  where  that 
penetration  began  with  Peter  the  Great's  "Reform,"  and  where 
for  more  than  two  hundred  years  the  Germans  occupied  a 
predominant  position  at  Court  and  in  the  Government,  and 
were  treated  as  a  superior  race,  entitled  to  every  kind  of 
privilege  denied  to  all  other  peoples  of  the  Empire.  Russia 
can  be  de-Germanized  only  by  a  determined,  unrelenting, 
systematic  action  of  the  Government  with  an  energetic 
organized  concurrence  of  all  Russian  citizens.  The  complete 
de-Germanization  of  Russia  is  the  only  efficient  safeguard 
against  a  return  of  the  German  influence  which  would  endanger 
not  only  the  national  independence  of  Russia,  but  also  that  of 
all  Europe. 

A  great  reform,  utterly  unconnected  with  politics,  but  of  a 
hygienic  and  sociological  character,  is  exercising  just  now  an 
immense  influence  on  the  economical,  political  and  even 


8o  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

military  situation  of  Russia,  and  is  legitimately  expected  to 
exercise  an  ever-growing  influence  on  the  destinies  of  that 
Empire.  In  the  rescript  appointing  M.  Bark  as  Finance 
Minister,  the  Emperor  Nicholas  expressed  that,  on  his  Majesty's 
journeys  across  Russia,  he  had  been  struck  by  the  great 
harm  caused  to  the  People  by  the  vice  of  drunkenness,  and  that 
he  had  resolved  that  the  State  should  no  longer  get  profit 
from  it  through  the  State  monopoly  of  alcoholic  drinks.  The 
prohibition  movement  had  existed  in  Russia  for  some  time 
already.  Its  partisans  eloquently  pleaded  that  it  was  chiefly 
drunkenness  which  kept  the  Russians  behind  other  peoples 
of  Europe,  and  that  it  was  increasingly  undermining  their 
physical  constitution  and  conducting  them  to  economical 
and  social  ruin.  Everyone  agreed  about  the  harmfulness  of 
that  national  vice,  but  many  practical  politicians,  Members 
of  both  Houses  of  Parliament  and  others,  argued  that  the  State 
was  not  able  suddenly  to  renounce  so  large  a  source  of  income, 
that  a  total  abstinence  could  not  be  observed  by  the  people 
so  much  accustomed  to  the  use  of  alcohol — which,  indeed, 
in  moderate  proportion,  was  necessary  on  account  of  the 
climate — and  finally,  that  a  rigid  enforcement  of  the  pro- 
hibition would  be  difficult  to  maintain  and  might  excite  a 
dangerous  dissatisfaction  in  the  masses.  It  is  hardly  probable 
that  the  reform  would  ever  have  been  attempted  had  not 
the  idea  of  it  suggested  itself  to  the  observing  mind  of  the 
Autocrat  of  All  the  Russias  who  resolved  himself  to  take  the 
initiative. 

The  decision  to  give  up  the  largest  item  of  revenue  at  the 
moment  of  entering  on  a  gigantic  war,  necessitating  a 
tremendous  expenditure,  as  well  as  a  radical  change,  in  a 
habit  of  the  whole  nation,  was  indeed  heroic,  and  surpassing 


PERIOD  OF  PROGRESS.  8 1 

in  boldness  any  reform  that  has  ever  been  undertaken.  Six 
months  have  elapsed  since  the  issue  of  the  decree  of  pro- 
hibition, and  none  of  the  evil  consequences  foreseen  by  prudent 
and  experienced  statesmen  has  occurred.  The  income  from 
the  taxes  of  the  country  did  not  drop,  but  on  the  contrary, 
rose  considerably  over  that  of  the  preceding  year,  1913. 
According  to  official  reports,  the  revenue  expected  last 
December  was  surpassed  by  almost  one-fifth.  The  productive- 
ness of  the  people  increased  between  30  and  40  per  cent.  The 
savings  too  were  increased  largely ;  in  last  December  alone, 
by  £2,834,700. 

From  several  trustworthy  private  sources  the  writer  learns 
that  the  half-year  of  the  prohibition  has  already  resulted 
in  a  remarkable  rise  of  the  standard  of  living  of  the  lower 
classes,  who,  with  the  money  they  used  to  squander  on 
drinks,  can  afford  to  be  better  fed  and  better  clothed  than 
before.  Instead  of  the  expected  resistance  or  dissatisfaction, 
there  reigns  everywhere,  particularly  among  the  peasants, 
a  deep  feeling  of  contentment  with  having  got  rid  of  such 
an  inveterate  and  pernicious  habit,  also  of  gratitude  to  the 
Sovereign  who  imposed  his  will  in  that  grave  matter  for  the 
benefit  of  the  people.*  This  heightened  welfare  and  activity, 
as  well  as  the  consciousness  of  a  successful  exercise  of  their 
self-control,  greatly  increases  the  confidence  of  the  Russians 
in  the  triumph  of  their  efforts  in  the  present  war. 


*  In  the  sitting  of  the  Douma  of  January  29  (February  n)  last,  a 
Member  speaking  on  behalf  of  the  Peasant  Members  of  the  Douma, 
a  peasant  himself,  declared  that,  after  the  prohibition,  "  the  population 
is  become  healthy,  the  number  of  the  poor  has  decreased,  the  temples 
of  God  have  become  full  of  people,  peace  and  quiet  reign  in  family- 
life,  criminal  trials  and  law-suits  have  diminished  by  half,  the  young 
generation  is  growing  morally  stronger." 

G 


82 


emocracy  and 


CHAPTER  XL 

RECAPITULATION  AND  CONCLUSIONS. 


1°  our  brief  survey  of  ten  and  a  half  centuries  of  Russian 
history  we  have,  through  all  the  evolutions  of  Russia,  seen  the 
working  of  two  main  principles,  Democracy  and  Monarchy. 

It  was  of  their  own  free  will  that  the  Russian  Democracy 
founded  Monarchy  when  they  appealed  to  Rurik  to  secure 
peace  and  order  in  their  country.  It  was  again  by  their  free 
choice  that  the  Russian  people  restored  Monarchy  when  they 
elected  as  Tsar  Michel  Romanoff.  There  have  never  been 
conflicts  between  Monarchy  and  Democracy  in  Russia.  All 
popular  movements  were  in  the  name  of  the  Tsar  and  against 
the  partition  wall  which  arose  between  him  and  his  people, 
which  it  was  as  much  in  the  interest  of  the  Tsar  as  of  the  people 
to  destroy.  In  their  darkest  thraldom  the  Russian  people 
were  always  comforted  by  the  Ideal  grown  up  in  the  popular 
mind  of  a  People's  Tsar  from  whom  they  hoped  to  get  freedom 
and  justice. 

Such  3.  partition  wall  in  the  Moscow  period  was  formed  by 
the  aristocracy.  Peter  the  Great,  who  completely  broke  it, 
might  have  become  a  true  People's  Tsar.  Unfortunately  he 
was  impelled  by  his  genius  to  seek  a  rapid  attainment  to  power 
and  prosperity  for  Russia  at  the  price  of  an  immediate  com- 
pulsory change  in  her  entire  mode  of  existence.  Materially 
his  work  was  crowned  with  success.  The  Empire  he  founded 


RECAPITULATION   AND  CONCLUSIONS.  83 

quickly  grew  up  to  be  immensely  vast,  populous  and  mighty. 
But  it  lost  the  vivifying  spirit  of  nationality.  In  the  St. 
Petersburg  period  the  Emperors  were  separated  from  the 
people  by  a  new  and  formidable  wall,  the  Germanized 
bureaucracy.  This  bureaucracy  acted  arbitrarily  and  did  not 
let  the  voice  of  the  people  reach  the  Sovereign.  And  the 
bureaucrats  consistently  favoured  the  penetration  of  Russia 
by  the  Germans,  gave  them  the  position  of  a  ruling  race  there 
and  placed  the  power  of  the  Russian  Empire  at  the  service 
of  the  German  cause,  until  Germany  was  unified  and  became 
the  dominant  Power  in  Europe. 

The  Russian  national  revival  began  with  the  literary  move-  ^«Jj* 
ment  which  awakened  national  consciousness  and  created 
public  opinion.  Both  currents  of  it,  the  Liberal  and  the 
National,  were  essentially  democratic  and  strove  against 
the  bureaucracy  who  tried  to  keep  the  Sovereign  apart  from 
the  people.  However,  in  spite  of  the  precautions  of  the 
bureaucrats,  the  Tsars  learned  to  know  the  true  situation  and 
took  themselves  the  initiative  of  the  reforms  which  the  people 
desired.  Alexander  II.  laid  a  broad  basis  for  the  JJ'ie*£e£*" 
democratization  of  the  Russian  State.  Alexander  III.  Russified 
the  foreign  policy  of  Russia.  Nicholas  II.  carried  his  grand- 
father's and  his  father's  work  through  to  a  high  degree.  And 
in  allowing  the  wishes  of  the  people  to  reach  his  ears  by  the 
voice  of  their  elected  representatives,  as  well  as  by  that  of  a 
free  Press,  the  Emperor  placed  himself  in  direct  communication 
with  the  people,  and  practically  broke  down  the  partition 
wall. 

Russia   is   described   in   the   "  Almanach   de   Gotha"    as  EMU*  t.h? »«» 

democratic 

*  Monarchic   Constilutionnelle  sous  un  Empereur  Autocrate."  I^SSJ?  1A 
It  might  with  equal  justice  be  called  "  Democratic  Monarchy  " 


84  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

or  "  Monarchical  Democracy."  In  no  other  country  of  Europe 
is  the  aristocratic  element  so  weak  as  in  Russia.  There  is  no 
peerage  and  no  representation  of  aristocracy  in  the  Upper 
House.  There  is  no  right  of  primogeniture,  and  upon  a  father's 
death,  his  fortune  is  equally  divided  among  all  his  sons,  his 
daughters  receiving  a  smaller  share.  (In  practice  it  is  often 
rendered  equal  to  the  sons'  share.)  Titles  are  inherited  by  all 
sons  and  daughters,  and  are  therefore  so  multiplied  that  the 
bearing  of  a  title  does  not  necessarily  indicate  any  superiority 
of  position.  The  Russian  Noblesse  has  no  necessary  connection 
with  landed  property,  and  since  the  emancipation  of  the 
serfs,  especially  since  the  agrarian  troubles  of  ten  years  ago, 
the  majority  of  the  former  gentry  live  in  towns.  Hereditary 
Noblesse  is  automatically  acquired  with  the  grade  of  Colonel 
in  the  Army  and  that  of  Conseiller  de  College  in  the  Civil 
Service.  There  is  besides  a  numerous  "  personal "  Noblesse 
acquired  by  lower  tchins  (grades  or  degrees) .  Nothing  astonishes 
Russians  more  when  they  visit  Western  Europe  than  the 
important  position  held  there  by  the  aristocracy  even  in 
countries  claiming  to  be  democratic  ;  republican  France, 
for  instance,  possesses  a  more  solid  aristocracy  than  Russia. 
Busman  The  most  important  class  in  Russia  is  the  peasantry,  which 

santry, 

forms  90  per  cent,  of  the  whole  population.  The  peasants 
who  know  that,  through  the  guilt  of  the  aristocracy,  they 
had  fallen  in  bondage  and  have  been  released  by  the  Tsar, 
and  who,  moreover,  have  seen  themselves  ever  since  the  object 
of  special  Imperial  solicitude,  are  boundlessly  devoted  to  the 
Tsar,  and  constitute  a  most  solid  foundation  of  Russian 
Monarchy.  Perfect  loyalty  to  the  Emperor  is  general  in  all 
public  other  classes.  Public  opinion  certainly  demands  a  consistent 

te. 

development  of  the  Russian  institutions  necessary  to  make 


RECAPITULATION    AND   CONCLUSIONS.  85 

Russia  a  modern  State,  and  criticizes  the  bureaucracy  for 
not  fully  carrying  out  the  liberal  measures  of  the  Sovereign  ; 
the  Press  particularly  complains  of  the  bureaucrats'  continued 
partiality  for  the  German  element  in  Russia.  However,  the 
confidence  inspired  by  the  whole  trend  of  the  policy  adopted 
by  the  Emperor  gives  the  progressive  movement  a  steady 
and  moderate  character. 

The  Russian  revolutionary  movement  has  never  been  a 

,.      .  .  revolutionaries 

popular  one.  It  was  limited  to  groups  of  intellectuals  acting 
under  the  influence  of  German  socialistic  and  anarchist  writers 
and  agitators.  When  those  revolutionaries  wanted  to  incite 
the  masses  to  acts  of  violence  against  property,  they  employed 
forged  proclamations  in  the  name  of  the  Tsar  commanding 
the  people  to  do  so.  They  aimed  at  abolishing  individual 
property  and  destroying  the  present  organization  of  society  ; 
they  would,  with  equal  bitterness,  have  fought  a  non- 
socialistic  republic.  Their  criminal  attempts  against  persons 
in  high  position,  which  excited  universal  abhorrence,  were 
greatly  due  to  the  instigation  and  assistance  of  the  enemies 
of  Russia  as  a  nation.  It  has  lately  been  asserted  that,  on  the 
declaration  of  war  by  Germany,  the  revolutionary  leaders 
refused  to  listen  to  the  suggestions  of  the  German  Ambassador  Doited  to  insor 

rection  by  the 

in  Petrograd,  who  was  urging  them  to  organize  insurrectionary 
risings,  and  that  these  leaders  broke  off  all  relations  with  the 
enemies  of  their  country.  It  is  certain  that  on  the  very 
evening  when  that  declaration  became  known  in  the  Russian 
capital  the  workmen  who  were  taking  part  in  a  seditious 
manifestation  spontaneously  began  singing  "  God  save  the 
Tsar,"  and  all  the  strikers  resumed  work  next  day.  Whatever 
be^the  conduct  of  a  few  individuals,  it  seems  that  an  over- 
whelming wave  of  patriotism  swept  over  most  of  the  agitators, 


86 


RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 


The  ideal  of  the 
People  *  Tsar 


Paopie  V 
realized. 


ion  of  »'l 


Tbe  Rnssian 
Ueinocracy  and 
Monarchy  ini: s- 
aoiubly  nutted . 


who  at  once,  like  other  Russians,  concentrated  all  their 
thoughts  on  the  longing  for  the  victory  for  Russia. 

The  task  of  the  present  reign  is  still  far  from  being  completed. 
No  substantial  progress  can  be  made  in  many  reforms  which 
are  universally  recognized  as  necessary  until  this  great  War 
is  terminated.  However,  the  reforms  already  achieved  or 
initiated  constitute  a  wonderful  co-ordinate  series  of  great 
acts  of  a  manifestly  great  reign.  Above  all,  they  plainly  show 
that  the  Ideal  which  the  Russian  people  have  borne  in  their 
hearts  for  so  many  centuries  is  at  last  realized :  the  Russians 
have  found  the  People's  Tsar  ! 

No  one  could  deny  that  by  his  latest  decisions  the  Emperor 
Nicholas  II.  has  united  all  parties  and  nationalities  of  the 
Russian  Empire  as  they  have  never  been  united  before.  There 
are  in  Russia  at  present  no  revolutionaries  and  no  reaction- 
aries, but  only  Russians. 

That  fact  is  of  the  highest  importance,  not  only  for  Russia 
herself,  but  also  for  her  Allies,  for  the  issue  of  the  present 
War  and  for  the  future  destinies  of  Europe. 

The  President  of  the  Douma  rightly  said  in  the  historical 
sitting  of  February  nth: — "This  is  the  will  of  Russia.'* 
Everything  we  see  and  hear  strengthens  the  conviction  that 
the  whole  Russian  Nation  is  unshakeable  in  its  resolve  to 
continue  the  War  until  all  the  Slavs  are  liberated,  until  the 
question  of  Russia's  access  to  the  open  sea  is  settled,  and 
until  the  legitimate  interests  of  all  our  Allies  are  satisfied. 

The  sharp  medicine  of  war  is  rapidly  and  thoroughly  curing 
Russia  of  the  German  virus  which  for  two  centuries  has 
poisoned  the  organism  of  that  Empire.  The  Russian  Democracy 
is  at  last  coming  to  its  own  again.  Its  union  with  Monarchy 
is  indissolubly  cemented  and  consecrated  by  the  wise  leadership 
of  the  great  Slavic  Tsar. 


POSTSCRIPT. 


With  the  writing  of  the  preceding  lines  the  writer  considered 
the  task  which  he  had  set  before  himself  as  accomplished. 
He  hears,  however,  from  an  English  friend  of  Russia,  whose 
opinion  has  a  great  value  in  the  writer's  eyes,  that  itjwould 
be  worth  while  to  add  a  further  statement  concerning|the 
direction  into  which,  after  this  war,  Russia  with  her  increased 
power  and  prestige,  would  turn  her  strength.  Those  who 
know  her  well — says  the  above-mentioned  friend  of  Russia — 
believe  that  it  will  not  be  outwards,  but  to  the  development 
of  her  own  resources.  The  Germans,  and  their  conscious  and 
unconscious  helpers,  however,  are  straining  every  means  in 
their  power  to  spread  the  apprehension  that  Russia  will  take 
the  place  of  Germany  as  a  dominant  military  Power  and 
constitute  an  even  greater  danger  for  peace  and  liberty  than 
has  hitherto  been  Germany. 

The  writer  is  quite  willing  to  follow  the  suggestion  made 
in  the  mutual  interest  of  both  the  Allied  Nations,  but  he  finds  * " 
this  additional  task  very  much  narrowed  in  consequence  of 
an  authoritative  and  impressive  statement,  which  renders 
it  superfluous  to  assure  the  British  public  of  the  Russian  love 
of  peace  in  the  past  and  in  the  present.  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 
than  whom  no  one  possesses  the  power  of  summing  up  in  fewer 
and  clearer  words  the  whole  substance  of  a  question,  stated 


88  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

in  his  speech  at  Bangor,  on  February  28th,  that  he  doubted 
if  Russia  ever  made  an  aggressive  war  on  her  European 
neighbours,  and  added  :  —  "  Russia  desired  above  everything 
peace."  "  She  wanted  peace,  she  needed  peace,  she  would 
have  had  peace,  had  she  been  left  alone."  "  She  was  at  the 
beginning  of  a  great  industrial  development,  and  she  wanted 
peace  in  order  to  bring  it  to  its  full  fructification.  She  had 
repeatedly  stood  insolences  at  the  hands  of  Germany  up  to 
the  point  of  humiliation,  all  for  peace,  and  anything  for 
peace."  "  Never  was  a  nation  so  bent  on  preserving  peace 
as  Russia  was." 

That  testimony  appears  to  the  writer  to  need  no 
corroboration  and  to  admit  of  no  controversy.  The  only 
point  which  might  conceivably  be  raised  now  is  whether,  under 
the  influence  of  "increased  power  and  prestige,"  Russia  would 
not  be  tempted  to  imitate  the  ambitions  of  Germany. 

The  writer  hopes  to  have  shown  that,  after  the  recovery  of 

Oermiii  iafinence. 

her  own  shores  —  a  geographical,  economic  and  cultural  necessity 
—  all  the  European  wars  of  Russia  were  due  to  German  influence 
and  served  German  ends  to  the  detriment  of  Russian  interests. 
They  were  entirely  condemned  by  the  Russian  national 
conscience.  The  only  wars  which  the  Russian  people  approved 
longed  for  were  the  wars  for  the  liberation  of  their 


Eastern  Chri?tian8 

brethren  of  creed  and  race,  the  Russian  Crusades.  Both  these 
motives  must  needs  disappear  with  the  termination  of  the 
present  war.  As  Russia  will  not  cease  fighting  until  all  Eastern 
Christians  as  well  as  all  Slavs  are  liberated,  this  war  will  be 
her  last  Crusade.  And  it  is  unthinkable  that  Russia  should 
ever  make  war  again  to  serve  the  purposes  of  Germany. 

Moreover,  all  Russian  parties  are  agreed  that  the  annexation 
°f  anY  country  with  a  non-Russian  population  would  be  most 


POSTSCRIPT.  89 

undesirable.  The  only  annexation  which  is  regarded  as 
acceptable  is  that  of  Eastern  Galicia  and  Western  Bucovina, 
inhabited  by  the  Little  Russian  branch  of  the  Russian  nation- 
ality. That  extension  of  territory  will,  however,  be  more 
than  counterbalanced  by  the  separation  from  Russia  proper 
of  an  autonomous  Poland.  Thus,  while  the  territory  of  the 
whole  Empire  will  be  increased  by  the  reunion  to  Poland  of 
the  Polish  provinces  of  Prussia  and  Austria,  that  of  Russia 
proper  will  be  diminished.  This  notwithstanding,  no  act  of 
the  Emperor,  after  the  declaration  of  war  on  Germany, 
has  been  more  unanimously  welcomed  by  the  Russian 
people  than  the  restoration  of  national  existence  to  Poland. 

Russia  of  Polish 

This  is  evidently  the  reverse  of  aiming  at  conquests, 
And  the  sentiment  shown  on  that  occasion  by  the  Russians 
is  entirely  in  accordance  with  the  well-understood  interest 
of  Russia.  Nothing  could  render  her  Western  frontier  so  safe 
as  her  having  for  neighbours  friendly  peoples,  most  of  whom 
will  owe  to  Russia  their  national  existence  and  unity. 

A  free  access  to  the  open  sea  in  the  South,  another  vital  Russia 

with  free  access 

necessity  of  the  economic  development  of  Russia,  will  be  a  in  the°southe& 
natural  compensation  for  the  immeasurable  efforts  and 
sacrifices  made  by  Russia  in  the  defence  of  the  liberty  and 
independence  of  Europe.  That  will  also  answer  an  equally 
vital  need  for  the  supply  of  corn  to  Western  European  States. 
In  the  North,  Russia's  interests  are  identical  with  those  of 


identical  with 

other  Baltic  and  North  Sea  States  ;  it  is  as  essential  for  her  st 
as  for  them  that,  on  those  seas,  there  should  be  no  aggressive 
predominance  on  the  part  of  any  power  and  that  personal 
and  commercial  traffic  should  always  be  free  and  safe  from 
piracy.  One  of  the  most  successful  German  intrigues  has  been 
the  creation  of  a  panic  in  Sweden  on  account  of  an  imaginary 


90  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

Russian  invasion.  It  took  Russians  considerable  time  to 
realize  that  such  a  mare's  nest  found  credit  with  such  sensible 
and  shrewd  people  as  the  Swedes  generally  are.  Not  the 
slightest  indication  in  support  of  it  could  be  discovered  in  the 
acts  of  the  Russian  Government  or  in  the  language  of  the 
Russian  Press.  All  Russian  politicians,  whatever  shade  of 
opinion  they  belonged  to,  who  have  had  an  opportunity  of 
stating  their  views  on  the  matter,  have  been  unanimous  in 
repudiating  those  rumours,  and  in  protesting  that  Russia 
had  neither  the  wish  to  encroach  on  Scandinavian  territory 
nor  any  interest  in  doing  so.  Fortunately,  it  appears  that  the 
Swedes  themselves  sifted  the  legends  fabricated  in  Germany 
and  found  at  last  they  were  nothing  but  absurd  inventions.* 

The  absence  in  the  future  of  the  motives  which  had 
determined  a  warlike  policy  on  the  part  of  Russia  in  the  past, 
the  satisfaction,  in  agreement  with  her  Allies,  of  the  legitimate 
claims  of  Russia,  and  the  existence,  in  all  political  circles, 
as  well  as  in  the  public  opinion  of  Russia,  of  a  decided  and 
unanimous  opposition  to  any  expansion  which  involves  an 
inclusion  into  Russia  of  non-Russian  elements,  offer  quite 
uaJ^-  sufficient  guarantees  against  a  pursuit  of  conquests  and 

;  of  conquests 

dami£Hantiat  attempts  at  military  domination.  To  these  considerations 
of  foreign  policy  must  be  added  those,  still  more  powerful, 
of  Russian  domestic  policy. 


*  The  sight,  on  their  arrival  in  Sweden,  of  Russian  civilians,  mostly 
women  and  children,  who  had  been  detained  and  grossly  ill-treated  in 
Germany,  strongly  appealed  to  the  natural  kind  lin ess  of  the  Swedes 
and  moved  them  to  give  every  possible  help  to  these  innocent  victims 
of  Teuton  brutality.  These  acts  of  kindness,  which  greatly  alleviated 
the  sufferings  of  the  poor  Russian  travellers  returning  to  their  country, 
kindled  in  the  hearts  of  all  Russians  feelings  of  lasting  gratitude  and 
regard  for  the  Swedish  people  and  Sweden. 


POSTSCRIPT.  gi 

The  present  war  has  surprised  Russia  amidst  momentous 

.     -,f  f 

political,  economic  and  social  reforms,  some  of  which  had  JJj 
only  just  been  inaugurated,  and  the  full  achievement  of  all  of 
which  is  absolutely  indispensable  for  her  welfare  and  prosperity. 
Some  of  these  reforms  have  been  spoken  of  in  the  course  of 
this  work,  as,  for  example,  the  passing  of  the  peasantry, 
that  is,  of  the  90  per  cent,  of  the  whole  population,  from 
communal  to  individual  landownership  and  the  peopling  of 
Siberia,  a  country  three  times  larger  than  the  whole  of 
European  Russia.  Besides  these,  there  are  others  which  do 
not  yield  to  them  in  importance  —  the  organization  on  a  new 
basis  of  industry  and  of  commerce,  the  general  reform  of 
education  and  particularly  of  technical  education,  the  develop- 
ment of  the  local,  municipal  and  provincial  self-government, 
the  regularization  of  the  co-operation  between  both  Houses 
of  Parliament,  as  well  as  between  each  of  them  and  all 
branches  of  the  Government. 
All  these  reforms,  and  one  or  two  more,  must  needs  be 


to 

reform* 


task  of  uprooting 

carried  through  in  one  and  the  same  spirit.  They  all  must  tmt 
systematically  tend  to  eradicate  from  the  organism  and  life 
of  Russia  all  traces  of  the  German  poison  which  had  so  long 
arrested  and  perverted  the  economic  and  moral  progress  of 
Russia.  Until  the  task  of  a  complete  de-Germanization  is 
accomplished,  Russia  will  not  be  quite  safe  from  a  return  of 
German  influence  and  from  renewed  attempts  to  restore 
German  domination.  Legislative  and  administrative  measures 
alone  will  not  prove  sufficient.  There  must  be  above  all  a  unteam«eiied 

*  growth  of  Rusa 

full  display  of  the  free  activities  of  the  Russian  people,  an 
untrammelled  growth  of  Russian  national  culture  which 
has  for  two  centuries  been  repressed  and  penalized  by  the 
Germanized  bureaucracy. 


92  RUSSIA  AND   DEMOCRACY. 

This  will  be  the  true  continuation  of  the  work  of  Peter  the 
Great,  misunderstood  and  mishandled  by  his  successors.  As 
he  sought  assistance  for  raising  the  prosperity  and  civilization 
of  Russia  in  close  connection  with  England  and  France,  so 
is  the  present  Emperor  also  doing  politically,  economically 
and  culturally.  The  political  alliance  planned  by  the  great 
Peter  is  already  most  fully  attained.  Efforts  are  being  made 
and  must  be  made  more  closely  to  knit  both  fronts  of  the 
Grand  Alliance,  the  Western  and  the  Eastern,  by  material 
and  intellectual  ties.  That  Alliance,  which  gives  satisfaction 
to  the  legitimate  claims  of  each  of  its  members,  totally 
excludes  on  the  part  of  any  one  the  spirit  of  predominance 
or  conquest. 

All  Russia  is  acclaiming  and  will  continue  to  acclaim  this 

diflerence  between 

new  conception.  There  exists  between  the  German  and  the 
Russian  ideals  a  fundamental  difference.  "  Pangermanismus  " 
means  the  subjection  of  all  nations  to  the  German  rule. 
"  Slavianofilslvo,"  mistranslated  by  the  Germans  as  Pan- 
slavism,  means  the  liberation  of  all  the  Slavs,  the  Russians 
included,  from  the  German  yoke  and  the  free  development 
of  the  Slavic  nations  beside  the  Latin  and  the  Teutonic  in 
abiding  and  harmonious  progress. 

G.  DE  WESSELITSKY. 


93 


INDEX. 


Absolute  power,  4,  7 
Absolutism,  4 
Adrianople,  Treaty  of,  30 
Akerman,  59 
Aksakoff,  Ivan,  64 
Albania,  74 
Alexander  I.,  7,  20-26 
Alexander  II.,   19,  28,  37-48,  54, 
66,  83 

Alexander  III.,  19,  49-53.  54    55. 

83 
Alliance   of   the   Three    Emperors, 

49,  50 

Andrassy,  44 

Anglo-Franco-Russian  Alliance,  g 
Anna,  Empress,  14 
Araktcheyeff,  25 
Aristocracy,  4,  5.  84 
Armenian,  71 
Asiatics  in  Russia,  71 
Austria,  9,  18,  22,  24,  30,  32,  41, 

42,  44,  46,  47,  48,  50,  74,  75 
Austrian  Slavs,  64 
Autocracy,  4 
Autocrat  of  Russia,  55 

Bagdad  line,  56,  74 

Balkan  crisis,  43-47 

Balkan  peoples,  32,  47 

Balkans,  36,  42 

Baltic  German  barons,  II,  58 

Baltic  Provinces,  n,  21,  39,  58 

Baltic  States,  90 

Bark,  M.,  80 

Bennigsen,  28 

Berlin,  15,  36,  50 

Berlin  Congress,  46,  47 

Berlin  Government,  56 


Bessarabia,  59 

Biron,  14,  20,  2'5 

Bismarck,  41.  43,  44,  45,  46,  47- 

48,  49,  50,  65 
Boris  Godounoff,  6,  17,  35 
Bosnia,  45,  47 
Bosphorus,  31,  56 
Boyars,  5,  7 
Boyarskaia  Douma,  4,  71 
Brandenburg,  15 
Brunnow,  Baron,  28 
Bucovina,  89 
Bulgaria,  45,  46,  50 
Bureaucracy,  16,  39,  71,  83,  85 


Canada,  73 

Catherine,  Grand  Duchess,  21 
Catherine  the  Great,  10,  16-19,  20, 
28,  40,  41 

Caucasus,  62 

Church  of  Russia,  4,  7,  39 

Colonization,  German,  17,  58,  59, 

60 
Commission    for    the    framing    of 

laws,  1 6,  17 

Conservatism,  Period  of,  54 
Constantinople,  31 
Constitution,  22,  24 
Cossacks,  5,  6 
Courland,  24 
Crimea,  15 

Crimean  War,  i,  33,  38 
Croats,  32 


Dalmatia,  44 
Dardanelles,  31 
Danube,  21 


94 


INDEX. 


Decembrists,  26 
De-Germanization  of  Russia,  78,  79, 

Democracy,  i,  3,  82,  83,  84.  86 

Denmark,  31 

Dessiatines,  18 

Dimitri,  6 

Dissent,  Dissenters,  8,  39 

Dixon,  Hepworth,  40 

Dnieper,  5,  24 

Don,  5 

Douma,  39,  59,  71,  77,  81,  86 

Drang  nach  Osten,  18 

Eastern  Christians,  9,  18,  29,  88 
East  Russia,  15 
Egypt,  30 
Elbe  Duchies,  31 
Elizabeth,  Empress,  14 
Emancipation  of  the  Serfs,  37 
England,  i,  9,  29,  30,  43,  50,  63,  73, 

92 
Esthonia,  n,  24 

Finland,  40,  77 

Finns,  78 

France,  9,  21,  29,  30,  43,  50,  56,  73, 

92 

Francis  Joseph,  44 
Frankfort  Parliament,  31 
Frederick  II.,  15.  1 8 
Frederick  William  II.,  21 

Galicia,  89 

George,  Lloyd,  87 

Germanic  Cabinets,  Powers,  States, 

16,  18,  29,  31,  32,  41,  74,  75 
Germanism,  14,  30,  52,  58,  63 
Germanization  of  Russia,  60,  64 
Germanized    bureaucracy,    25,    35, 

77,  83 

German  dynasties,  n 
German  Government,  51,  57,  63 
Germanophil,  49,  51 
German  princes  and  princesses,  n 
German-Russians,  33,  36,  59,  65,  77 


Germans  in  Russia,  13,  14,  15,  27, 
29,  50,  51,  58,  59,  65,  66,  77,  87' 
92 

German  schools  in  Russia,  12 
Germany,  12,  21,  23,  25,  29,  37, 
41.  42,  43,  44.  45,  46,  47.  49, 
50,  51,  56,   57,  61,  65,  66,  67, 
75.  76,  87 

Gortchakoff,  41,  42,  49 
Grand  Dukes  of  Russia,  3,  4 
Great  Britain,  10,  56 
Greece,  29,  46 

Hague  Conference,  69 
Hague  Court,  69 
Hapsburg  monarchy,  46,  74 
Hapsburgs,  32 
Hartwig,  M.,  36 
|  Herzegovina,  44,  45,  47 
Hilferding,  35 
Hohenzollerns,  37 
Holstein,  Duke  of,  15 
Holy  Alliance,  22 
Hungary,  31 

Ibrahim  Pasha,  30 
India,  50 
Ivan  III.,  4,  8 
Ivan  IV.,  4 

Japan,  56,  57 
Jentsch,  59,  60 
Jews,  Russian,  12,  13 

Kieff,  75 
Konieh,  31 
Krivosheine,  73 

Laharpe,  20 

Land    Organization,    Ministry    of, 

72,  73 
Letts,  58 
Lithuania,  24 
Little  Russia.  24 
Livonia,  24,  58 
London  Protocol,  30 
Louisa,  Queen  of  Prussia,  21 


INDEX. 


Macedonia,  40,  47 
Mahmoud  II.,  31 
Mehemet-Ali,  30 
Mendeleyeff,  12 
Metternich,  30,  33 
Miller,  Orest,  35 
Mir,  3 

Monarchy,  82,  83,  84,  86 
Mongol  yoke,  4,  14,  74 
Montenegro,  44,  46 
Moscow,  23,  45,  65,  76 
Moscow  period,  4,  5,  34,  82 
Mussulmans,  71 

Napoleon,  21,  22,  23 
Napoleon  III.,  42 
Navarino,  29 
Nesselrode,  28,  30 
Nicholas  I.,  25,  27-36.  40 
Nicholas  II.,  54,  81,  83 
Nicholas     Mikhailovitch,     Grand 
Duke,  20,  21 

Noblesse,  the  Russian,  8,  9,  10,  n, 
16,  17,  19,  24,  25,  38,  39,  76,  77, 
84 

North  America,  38 
North  Sea,  89 
Novgorod,  4 

Organic  Laws  of  October,  1905,  70 
Orthodoxy,  Russian,  39 
Oubril,  d',  45 

Pahlen,  28 

Palaeologus,  4 

Pan-Germanism,  63,  64 

Panslavists,  36,  63,  64,  92 

Paul  I.,  20 

People's  Tsar,  6,  8,  82,  86 

Peter  III.,  15,  1 8 

Peter  the  Great,  3,  7-9,  n 

Petrograd,  7 

Poland,  18,  24,  57,  58,  77,  78,  79 

Poles,  1 8,  24,  39,  40,  77 

Pomerania,  15 

Porte,  the,  30,  46 


Portsmouth,  Peace  of,  57 
Pourtales,  67 

Prussia,  15,  18,  21,  22,  24,  27,  28, 
32,  33,  41,  42,  48 

Quadruple  Entente,  30 

Raskol,  8 

"Reform,"   Peter  the  Great's,    7, 

8,9,  ii,  39,  79 
Roditch,  44 
Romanoffs,  6,  82 
Roumania,  46 
Russified  Germans,  35 

Schleswig-Holstein,  31,  41 

Schwartzenberg,  75 

Sciences,  Russian  Academy  of,  12 

Serbia,  30,  46,  74,  76 
!   Serbs,  32 
*   Senate,  Russian,  8 
|   Siberia,  14,  73 

Slavdom,  36 

Slavic  Peoples,  41,  77,  92 

Slavophils,  34.  35.  63,  76,  77 

Slavs,  2,  3,  44,  76,  77,  88,  92 

S.  Stefano,  Treaty  of,  47 

Stein,  22 

St.  George's  Day,  6 

Stolypin,  58,  59 

St.  Petersburg,  n,  12,  15,  25,  29 
34.  42 

St.  Petersburg  period,  19,  39 

Strupp,  6 1 

Sweden,  23,  89,  90 


I  Terek,  5 

Thessaly,  46 

Tourgheneff,  35 

Triple  Entente,  29,  73,  74 

Tsar,  4.  6,  7,  83,  85,  86 
i  Turkey,  29,  30,  44,  46 

Turks,  1 8,  44 

United  States,  i,  38,  61 
<    Unkiar  Skelessi,  31 


96 

Varanger,  princes,  3 
Vetche,  3 

Vienna  Cabinet,  46 
Vienna  Congress,  22 
Vistula,  21 
Vistulian  region,  57 
Volga,  5 


INDEX. 


Wallachia,  30 
Warsaw,  Duchy  of,  24 
William  I.,  42,  48 

Yayik,  5 

Zapadniki,  34 
Zemsky  Sabors,  4 
Zemstvos,  38.  39 


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